Great Britain's naval underutilization against Germany in World War I

World War I

Great Britain's Failure to Use Its Navy to Its Full Effectiveness in World War I

As World War I began, Great Britain was considered the supreme power in terms of naval force. Yet, the German Navy had been upgrading enough to make it of significant British concern during the war. In particular, the use of German U-boats as a threat to both military and merchant vessels complicated Great Britain's naval choices. Though many history texts take it for granted that Britain was the stronger of the two navies, the only major naval battle (at Jutland) between the two forces resulted in heavy British losses. While the Royal Navy had both experience and opportunity to strike more forcefully at Germany by sea, they instead spent most of the war only blockading. With politics affecting many of the nation's naval policies and citizen morale weighing heavily on the wartime government, naval decisions were forced -- or avoided -- on many accounts. As such, there is evidence that Great Britain did not use the Royal Navy to its full abilities during World War I, mainly out of fear that a defeat of costly victory at sea would lose them the war by lowering morale of the British populace.

In the decade leading up to World War I, Great Britain was the world's major naval force. As an island nation, it had centuries of experience with naval travel. It had early defined itself as a colonizing world power with considerable sea forces. Sea forces, after all, were its only means of trade and communications prior to the twentieth century. While it had a foothold on areas around the globe, Great Britain's supremacy necessitated protecting the nation's home shores and the numerous sea-lanes it used for trade. The issue of trade routes was of particular importance in the coming war, and was recognized by Great Britain and Germany alike.

Despite the fact that it had maintained supremacy, Great Britain's naval forces were weaker than was ideal in the first decade of the twentieth century. Great Britain's liberal government after 1905 spent time debating the high costs of upkeep for the Royal Navy. Spending on the navy fell. Production did continue due to the rising pressures of Germany's fleet. However, government finances and poor planning related to liberal naval policies did affect the ability of Britain to adequately manage its fleet during the war. Additionally, older ships like the aging Bacchantes were not taken out of service, though they were risky to keep in the water. Rivalry with Germany kept Great Britain's guard up, and despite complaints from some British leaders, and England remained confident that no other nation would dare to attack them by sea.

The idea that the Royal Navy was all-powerful at sea was a pivotal notion for the people of the British Isles. Though they understood its importance, the push for less military spending exemplified Great Britain's assumption of strength. British citizens, as well, assumed that any war undertaken at sea would prove winnable for the British navy, a point that would later prove dangerous. As U-boats and water mines caused loss of British lives in the early years of the war, citizens were critical of the government rather than rallying to the war cause. Knowing that Britain had superior forces, why did the government "let" Germany keep its U-boats? The answer was that most people were uninformed of both the problems within the Royal Navy and the rising power of the German navy. In turn, leadership in England had the difficult job of keeping morale high without admitting that Germany was a formidable force.

Heading into the First World War, the German Navy was indeed formidable. Germany had begun planning for a navy that could rival Great Britain's as early as 1898. Naval laws instituted by Germany from 1898 to 1912 and into the war years were a clear indication of Germany's desire to rival Britain's fleet. Between 1906 and 1914, the increasing naval focus of the two nations started a naval race that also spurred animosity between the two powers.

The animosity was strong with England, who's survival depended on its navy. Germany, however, built a navy when their resources could have supplied their future plans for domination in mainland Europe. This choice, according to German Grand Admiral von Tirpitz, was not considered to lead to imminent war with England. Rather, Tirpitz felt that a strong Germany navy could induce Great Britain to accept certain security demands, since a naval battle would add up to unacceptable losses for both nations.

Germany had many plans in the early 1900s, many of which involved the British naval forces. In the years leading up to the war Germany envisioned many contingencies for what would happen if they were to attack or be involved in military actions. Though most of their plans were never carried through during the war, their early plans for combat did include power through control of enemy trade vessels. In the documentation of these plans, Germany explains that any naval policy in a war against Britain would have to curtail the movement of enemy merchant ships. By disrupting the British economy, the plans cite that Great Britain would be subject to social unrest and would give into demands or negotiate on Germany's terms.

In other words, Admiral Tirpitz viewed the naval arms build-up between Great Britain and Germany as a bluff for political pressure. Germany also purported that it was justified in building a navy to protect its merchant marines, though this was a not-so clever ruse; the boats built by the German navy were major warships not designed or ready for lengthy sea trips.

Perhaps recognizing that conflict of either a military or tactical nature was imminent, Great Britain sent Lord Haldane, War Minister, to negotiate with Germany in 1912. It was Britain's hope that the two nations could agree to stop their naval increases amicably. Instead, Germany offered to keep their fleet in check if Britain promised neutrality in a war between Germany and France; Britain refused. Germany again offered to keep its fleet in check in 1914 -- the eve of war -- in return for British neutrality in the event of both a war with France and with Russia; if Britain outwardly expressed its plans to stay neutral, the Kaiser believed that these forces would not fight the German military advances. When Britain refused again, the Kaiser responded that any war occurring as a result of their decision would be Britain's fault. He further denied any blame for the war that followed, saying instead that he would like to publicly prove that Britain could have stopped a major and costly war by agreeing to his demands.

Entering the Great War, Great Britain had power in both its naval military power and its control over economic shipping of goods, including food. It was on the latter that Germany focused its attentions in the long run. In the beginning, though, the numbers and experience of the Royal Navy far exceeded the Germany fleet and likely kept the Germany navy from becoming bold and venturing into the open sea. The Royal Navy's Grand Fleet under Admiral Sir John Jellicoe was the foundation of the British forces in the North Sea from the summer of 1914, the very beginning of the war. The force consisted of 20 dreadnoughts / super dreadnoughts, 4 battle cruisers, 8 armored cruisers, 13 pre-dreadnoughts, 6 light cruisers, and 41 destroyers. The force anchored at Scapa Flow in the North Sea in July 1914 and became an important part of Great Britain's blockade strategy. Though the British Navy felt prepared for battle in August of 1914, Jellicoe's forces saw little combat until the Battle at Jutland nearly two years later.

Once the war began Great Britain had many things to attend to, as its territorial concerns stretched across the globe. While the protection of its own nations was of course important, it also had to protect the Suez rout to the Far East, the Cape route around the tip of Africa, routes to Australia and the South Pacific, and the North Atlantic routes to Canada and North America. Great Britain's commitments in mainland Europe required naval protection of British Expeditionary Forces (BEF) as they were transported to the continent. Sumida contends that this split in forces actually made Britain's navy less formidable, in that the forces were so far apart that they could not respond to one another in times of need. Finally, Britain also expected that Germany would execute a North Sea naval attack early in the war.

In 1914 Germany had surpassed the United States as the second largest naval power in the world. Yet, a German attack failed to materialize early in the war. Germany was concerned with naval battles in the Baltic Sea. Its efforts in other areas consisted mainly of U-boat attacks and mines. In response, the Royal Navy for the most part sat still. One significant battle took place in August 1914 at the German Navy's home base of Heligoland Bight. The strike at Heligoland Bight was not intended to seriously hurt the German fleet. Rather, it was intended to distract Germany from the landing of marines at Ostend in Belgium. Catching the German fleet completely by surprise in its own port, German light cruisers engaged the Royal Navy without proper cover. The Germans lost 3 light cruisers and a destroyer, as well as more than 1,000 men. In great contrast, the British lost only 75 men and sustained few damages; no British boats were sunk. This was obviously a win for the British and would likely have encouraged future naval actions like it. However, Heligoland Bight was the only such action of World War I.

Though Jellicoe's forces met few German ships in their time in the North Sea, the threat of German U-Boats had become a serious one. U-boats threatened not only military ships, but merchant ships carrying everything from foodstuffs to materials for the war effort. In the early months of the war, before Great Britain's blockades cut off German surface ships, cruisers and other German ships were assisted by submarines in hindering trade. In the fall of 1914 German cruisers began assaulting British ships in the Atlantic, including South American ports of trade.

Mainly, the goal of these attacks was to both limit the trade of British ships and to commandeer any good for its own war efforts. Many attacks were made in this manner, however one incident stands as a good example of what the British were losing by neglecting aid to South America: the German cruiser Karlsruhe not only took twenty thousand tons of coal from eighteen British merchant ships, but also managed to sink fifteen of them. Additionally, Captain Karl von Muller's light cruiser Emden successfully stopped commerce from India's shores from the start of the war until November of that year. Great Britain regained power in the Southern Hemisphere and destroyed the threat of German cruisers by early 1915. Yet, these early German successes may have provided knowledge into gaps in Great Britain's presumably all-powerful naval facade.

After Heligoland Bight, the Kaiser ordered all future naval plans to first be approved by him personally. Between these harsh orders and the successful naval blockading by the Royal Navy, only U-boats played a part in naval warfare for the remainder of the war. Despite numerous torpedoed cruisers in waters not too far away from Britain's home ports, there seemed to be no actions available to Britain in stopping the U-boat destruction. This sign of weakness was quickly picked up on by the Germans, who issued warnings to those trading with Great Britain of the risk they were running. In a February 1915 Admiralty Declaration, the German government opened their first wave on "unrestricted" submarine warfare in the waters surrounding Great Britain. This action threatened all merchant shipping in the area, and suggested that neutral merchants would not be able to avoid danger if they were conducting business with Great Britain. Allies had to think twice before helping the British. Incidents including the sinking of the Lusitantia made world news when the Germans followed through on their declarations. Killing civilians made them more of the enemy to nations including the United States, who was assured to join on the British side if it entered the war due to the German navy's harsh actions.

The implications of this move were paramount. Great Britain, having the largest fleet in the world, was unable to protect its trading partners and allies as German U-boats fired at their own discretion. Further, Germany issued that ships flying neutral flags were not exempt, as other ships had recently misused neutral flags and brought the practice into doubt. Nearly one year later the Germans went further, citing that the British decision to arm merchant marines suggested that merchant marine ships were now targets. In a related document of 1916, German Admiral von Holtzendorff even suggests that the only way to eliminate Great Britain from the war is to prevent ocean commerce. So started the German practice of torpedoing ships that were at all in question without regard for crew or passengers. These practices later contributed to the entry of the United States into the war. This did not deter the German leadership, who felt that a strike against the British commerce system was the only way to combat their own situation of being blockaded. Additionally, German leadership felt that the United States' involvement would only make Great Britain more dependent on foreign trade and therefore more vulnerable to trade issues. In the short run the tactics were effective as showing the impotence of the British military forces.

From the beginning morale was a concern for Great Britain. Concern existed that those opposed to supporting France in the European war would lead to a secession of those leaders from the government to form an anti-war party. Since Britain did not yet have conscription, and voluntary enlistment would depend on support for the war. Though recruitment was successful in India and other British colonies, 1914 and 1915 still failed to see the number of volunteers they needed. This was in part due to the tedious and long trench warfare going on the front lines as early as September 1914. In 1915, controversial conscription legislation made war service mandatory. This was not popular with many British people, most of whom did not agree with Great Britain's involvement in the affairs of the mainland or how the government was handling it.

In the first year of the war, the British people did not rally to the cause of war as a consolidated nation. Instead, they heavily criticized the losses of naval and military forces, including attempts to take the German-allied Turks at the Dardanelles at Gallipoli. In a mixed naval and shore battle, British forces were repelled for a second time at Gallipoli in August 1915. Here, as in other battles, the Royal Navy was expected to break enemy forces but was unable to do so. As the war dragged on and little progress was made on the Western Front, morale was at the forefront of British leaders' minds. Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty in charge of the Royal Navy, had pursued the Turks at Gallipoli with war weariness in mind; he had hoped that a naval assisted campaign might break the German allies and shorten the war. When plans failed, plans had the opposite effect of what was intended, spurring criticism, pessimism, and doubt when troops died in the two campaigns at the Dardanelles.

Great Britain suggested peace negotiations on December 9, 1915. Germany again rejected the offer. Great Britain was feeling the sting of U-boat attacks and, as with the rest of Europe, the strain of a long and stagnant war. Even before the Battle at Jutland, the British Empire was vulnerable to a loss of heavy defeat at sea. While Tuchman and others contend that a loss of costly win could interrupt trade important to the war efforts, such a battle outcome would also significantly affect the morale of the British citizens.

The Battle of Jutland was a fumbled naval battle for both sides. Both Germany and Great Britain claimed a win and released their own spin on the events to newspapers. The German Chancellor unexpectedly considered it a win. Yet, there was no way to make it look like either force intended for the outcome that occurred in the North Sea; losses were too heavy on both sides. While the German navy lost a larger portion of their fleet, the British actually lost more tonnage.

The battle had occurred in the North Sea near Denmark in the last days of May 1916. British forces had gained access to Germany's wireless transmissions and knew from this intelligence that German submarines were heading into an area of the North Sea. Jellicoe's fleet and the fleet of another commander, Vice Admiral Sir David Beatty, followed to perform a sweep and hopefully intercept the submarines. They failed to do so. They also did not know that the German High Seas Fleet had ventured from port and was headed out into the nearby open seas. Neither force was aware of the other's full count or whereabouts. On meeting, British forces numbered 28 battleships, 9 battle cruisers, 8 armored cruisers, 26 light cruisers, and 78 destroyers. German forces consisted of 22 battleships, 5 battle cruisers, 11 light cruisers, and 61 destroyers. In what was considered the largest modern sea battle to ever take place, Brittain took considerable fire from German ships. It was called a "Calamitous Victory" and proved both that German armor was better and their gunnery more accurate. Germany perhaps recognized that Great Britain should not have lost as much as it did if it was truly the greatest naval force in the world.

After the battle at Jutland, peace talks were again proposed by Britain. Britain had sustained many losses, but considered Germany's losses to be greater in contrast. Germany's Chancellor rejected the offer and instead extolled the military virtues and future plans of the German state. Britain was forced to examine its naval forces, explain how the battle could have gone wrong, and plan for the future. Though Great Britain had superior numbers, more heavily armed ships, and secret intelligence, they still failed to manage a victory against Germany at sea.

Despite destroying an unexpected number of Great Britain's ships in the battle at Jutland, Germany's leadership was mixed on receiving the news. German leaders from both the Conservative and National Liberal Parties were not pleased with the battle. As a result, party leaders asked for a change of naval leadership. Despite this, the German Chancellor claimed that Germany was "stronger than when [the] first offer [of peace negotiation] was made" on December 9, 1915, additionally saying that the news of the North Sea battle was a "crowning achievement" and was received "with jubilant and grateful hearts." As such reports filtered through the newspapers of American and Great Britain, there was no concern for German morale. Keeping older ships in the water had been one mistake of Britain's. Weaponry and tactics were also used ineffectively or not at all according to their purpose. In a final blow to the British ego in regard to her navy, Great Britain found that the nation was unprepared to replace or repair its own ships, as previous government changes had removed the dry dock capabilities of the nation.