Economic Inequality and Austerity Motivator for Revolution

The study tests the following hypothesis to establish that lack of political representation is not as strong of a motivator of a revolution compared with economic inequality.

Economic inequality and austerity has been motivator and is the main driver for revolutions and lack of political representation has not been a strong major driver for revolutions.

The independent variables are the variables that do not depend on other variables. However, dependent variables depend on other variables and change in values. In this study, the independent variables are the economic inequality and austerity and political representation. However, the dependent variable is a revolution. An increase in income inequality leads to a rise in a revolution in a given country.

The Arab country is not homogenous, and globalization has made the economy of the Arab world be interwoven with the world economy. For example, the economic crisis of the U.S. affected the economy of the Arab country, and the global economic crisis in 2008/2009 led to a drop in oil prices and tourism. Consequently, a significant decline in oil prices had a direct impact on the economy of the exporting countries such as Libya and Algeria. There was also a decline of the capital flow in the petroleum producing countries. For example, there was a fall in export by 14% in Morocco and Egypt in 2009, 3% in Tunisia, and Algeria leading to a decline in the revenue of the affected countries. The highest decline was recorded in Libya with 28% reduction in export and Algeria by 21%. Since the economy of the European countries had been affected by the 2008/2009 global economic crisis, there was a decline in the capital flow from the remittance countries which provoked a loss of wages and employment.

Food riot is also one of the major causes of revolution in the Arab countries. Historical, food shortage has been one of the major factors causing the political riots, which subsequently affects the political institution. Brinkman and Hendrix, (2011) establish a direct relationship between a rise in food prices and violent riots and social unrest. The issue had been pertinent with the Arab countries such as Morocco, Yemen, Egypt and Tunisia where there was an episode of the bread riots in these countries between 2007 and 2008.

Fig 1: 2005/2008 Food price index and Riots

Source: Brinkman and Hendrix, (2011)

Typically, fig 1 has establishes the relationship between food riots and political unrest. Most countries that experienced political unrest recorded a hike in food prices. The issue is that most people in the middle and low-income countries spend a large percentage of their incomes on food, thus, a rise in the food price will exacerbate the standard of living of the low income in the society. For example, between 2008 and 2010 which were the years before the revolts, the average inflation rate in Egypt was 13%, 4% in Tunisia, and 5% in Libya and Algeria. (Brinkman and Hendrix, 2011).

The high rate of unemployment is also one of the major factors that influences a revolution. The economic theory implies that a reduction in the production capacity leads to a decline in the employment rate. In 2010, the unemployment rates in Tunisia, Egypt and Tunisia were higher than the preceding years. In the Arab world, a juvenile dissatisfaction leads to youth unrest. Before the global economic crisis in 2008 and 2009, one out of four youths was already without a job in Egypt and Morocco. Obviously, participation in the female labor force in the Arab world is very low leading to a waste of human capital consequently curbing the economic growth. Among the Arab countries, it was in Algeria where only 1% of the female is self-employed.

Skocpol, (1976) provides the theoretical relationship between a revolution and economic factors. The author argues that a revolution is the festivity of the exploited and oppressed. The social revolution is the combination of massive upheavals and structural transformation. On another hand, Muller, (1985) argues that income inequality has been one of the major causes of social revolution and political violence. Muller, (1985) further asserts that "level of economic development has been found to be a stronger predictor of political violence." (p 47). The argument has been demonstrated with reference to the Iranian revolution between 1978 and 1979 where

"The inequality hypothesis is also pertinent to the contemporary theoretical controversy between the relative deprivation and resource mobilization approaches to the explanation of collective political violence" (Muller, 1985 p 47).

Although, lack of political representation may cause political upheaval in a country, however, the violence only last in the short run. The Hibbs model points out that a magnitude of political factor can provokes political violence, however, the violence only last for short period. (Muller, 19857). Based on this argument, the study supports the hypothesis that states:

"Economic inequality and austerity has been motivator and is the main driver for revolutions and lack of political representation has not been a strong major driver for revolutions."