Heywood: historical and cultural overview

Heywood

George F. Kennan is considered to be one of the most important figures of the period following the end of the Second World War. His diplomatic career was marked to a large extent by "The Long Telegram," a document sent from Moscow to then Secretary of State James Byrnes, in which he tried to point out a possible new way to engage in political relations with the Soviet Union. (Kissinger, 1995) However, his later comments on the issue were seen as disavowing his initial proposals. From this point-of-view, it is rather difficult to place him in a theoretical framework. Still, Andrew Heywood's analysis of political theory can be used to shed light on the main issues Kennan was arguing in the late 40s and early 50s.

The historical context changed very rapidly once the end of the war was approaching. While during the confrontation, the relations between the three allies were seen as relatively stable and profitable for all sides, as the war came to an end serious concerns emerged over the real intentions of the actors involved in the conflagration. The most disturbing signal came from the Russian leader, Josef Stalin who had decided to take control of Eastern Europe and establish the communist system of government. (Kissinger, 1995) This perspective automatically ruled out the possibility of democracy in those states and therefore the threat of authoritarian regimes in Europe was becoming increasingly real. George Kennan, charge d'affaires in Moscow at the time considered a new approach for the foreign policy of the U.S., the containment doctrine, which advocated isolation from the rest of the world of the Soviet Union. In this sense, he believed, Stalin's need for conflict would not be met, and his internal legitimacy would in time erode which would eventually lead to the demise of the U.S.S.R. This general line of thought can be placed in a theoretical framework proposed by Heywood.

The major point is the framework which would best defined Kennan's attitude. Heywood discusses realism as a theory in which states have the control of legitimate power and of the political force. (Heywood, 2000) Taking into account Kennan's idea of the U.S. To promote a containment strategy over the U.S.S.R., therefore making this idea a tool of the U.S. foreign policy, it is fair to admit the realist view of the American diplomat. Furthermore, realism was considered to be the most comprehensive theoretical framework that could have explained the evolution of events at the time and Kennan, through his containment theory, offered the U.S. politicians a particular future direction.

From the perspective of the realist line of though, Kennan advocated serious economic measures to be undertaken by the U.S. And its allies to limit the influence of the soviet state. In this sense, he was a strong supporter of the Marshall Plan which insured financial aid to European countries such as Greece and Turkey. This support in terms of economy and political assistance can also be seen as a means of creating a strong European force that would balance the Soviets on the continent. This idea is though common to the balance of power advocated by the 1815 Vienna Congress, following the wars with Napoleon. (Guzzini, 1998) After the Second World War, indeed the U.S. needed a strong force to both balance and contain the U.S.S.R. And this idea was expressed by Kennan in his Telegram and by George Marshall in his speech presenting the Plan for the reconstruction of Europe.

An element which is not common to realists is the reliance on institutions as a means for promoting stability. Kennan, in his proposal, suggested strengthening the emerging institutional framework available to the Europeans in order to contain the U.S.S.R. Despite the fact that it was not a traditional approach, he considered institutions to be a useful tool for achieving an underlining goal, that of eventually increasing the power of the states which remained in his view the single and most important actors in international affairs.