High Stress and High Impact Decisions in the Military

Area in Question
These particular circumstances put the Rangers in a precarious but high potential place to liberate prisoners of war at a camp in the Philippines that goes by the name of Cabanatuan. At this point in time, the Japanese have already seized this island from the Philippines who are the original inhabitants, and are using it as a place to both contain prisoners and engage in military strategy. This target area is located in a part of the overall landscape that is bare of plants or other natural materials that might make spotting the prisoners difficult. This is both advantageous and disadvantageous as it will offer little cover or shelter during the operation.
Time Available to Complete Action: Urgent
Lieutenant General Walter Krueger had long received word of the extreme inhuman treatment of allied prisoners. There is a strong belief that the Japanese will murder the remaining POW as means of warding off additional allied soldiers. There isn’t a moment to lose. Once the plan is formed and soldiers have been briefed and prepped its time to initiate. Planning should be done within half of a day or less, preparation should also complete within half of a day or less, and the entire operation should be completed successfully within two hours.
Terrain
This part of the countryside is exceedingly flat, largely because of the Japanese’s effort to clear out all plant life so that all potential raids might be seen from a mile away and to also prevent prisoner escapes.
Visibility
There will be a full moon on the day of the potential raid and there will only be one solid hour of total darkness: this is the time when the sun has moved below the horizon and the moon has not yet risen to full height. There is likely to be a full or mostly full moon on the planned night, which will mean that the strategy of the attack should be particular.
Weather
There are no expected deviations from the standard jungle type weather that is typical to the region this time of year. The sun will rise around 5:55am and set around 8:45pm.
Movement Rates: Speed and Security
The successful implementation of this action depends on harnessing the utmost speed.
Anticipated Movement Rates
The soldiers will need to leave Platero and arrive 700 yards from camp, having crossed the Pampanga River, no later than 45 minutes later. At this point the soldiers can safely wait for that complete hour of darkness once the sun is below the horizon and the moon hasn’t risen yet. A half hour before this movement, the selected aircraft, chosen to be a diversion for the Japanese needs to begin circling the island, engaging in a display of aeronautics: this needs to occur for as long as it takes for the soldiers to totally advance the camp and commence the raid: a minimum of two and half hours: from 18:00 to 21:00 minimum. While the plane is engaging in this spectacular diversion, one of the leaders needs to cut the phone lines in the camp.
Rangers & former POWs and 6th Army: Movement
The former POWs will probably be so disoriented, malnourished and traumatized, that they most likely won’t be of any help in countering the Japanese. The most we can hope for is that they cooperate fully and swiftly.
Ideal Time to Initiate Action
The ideal time to initiate action would be in that solid hour of total darkness when visibility is at its lowest as the moon has not yet risen fully. Soldiers need to rush the camp as much as possible in total silence with absolute discretion. This should occur at 9:00pm. Once the moon has fully risen, using a distraction such as an aircraft flying overhead will allow the soldiers to rush the camp with greater success.
Role of Civilians and Guerillas
Civilians and guerilla forces can play a valuable role to the success of this raid. Civilians nearby such as native Filipinos can do their best to quietly inform the Prisoners of War that a rescue is imminent and to be prepared. This can be done by discreet messaging the POWs in the camps, letting them know through secret messages they can trust, that a raid is coming.
Guerrilla Forces
Guerilla forces local to the area can be harnessed in their numbers to aid in the attack. It’s definitely worthwhile to meet with them, share intelligence and intentions. Guerilla Forces in the area offer potential for strengthening our own attack and making it even more shocking and unexpected to the Japanese. It’s also possible the Guerilla forces in the area have knowledge of the situation that we don’t and can offer valuable insight into weaknesses or habits of the Japanese within this camp that we’re not already aware of. Guerilla forces can act as a blockade from the collectives of Japanese forces near the camp.
Role of Aircraft
Aircraft offers much potential for aiding in the success of the raid. A single lone aircraft would be useful in providing a distraction for the Japanese so that soldiers can continue their steady advance upon the beach. The aircraft could pretend to be crashing or engaged in some other struggle that would definitively give the Japanese cause for concern. This would allow our soldiers the opportunity to fully advance upon the beach, unseen and unbeknownst to the Japanese, until they were under siege and confused.
#2 PROBLEM STATEMENT: METT-TCC
Mucci’s problem is distinct. The mission has distinct maneuver objectives: to free the prisoner’s of war while taking complete control of the camp, and forcing the Japanese militia located there to surrender. Coverage and counter fire should be expected from the Japanese when the mission is in full swing and the raid of the camp has commenced. In terms of enemy: this biggest threat to them is a surprise attack. There were 250 Japanese guards securing the camp. Over 500 soldiers are held prisoner and over 120 rangers are engaging in the raid, with the help of around 80 or so guerilla forces to act as guides. The temperature and humidity will be warm and humid as it typically is, with no rainfall and illumination from the moon. The troops are half the size in numbers the Japanese guards they have to overcome: 120 to 250. The general morale of the unit is strong, though this is a daunting task. This task is particularly daunting as there are ten thousand Japanese troops located nearby to defend the camp just in case something like this were to occur. However, Philippine guerilla forces volunteered to screen the flanks of the raiding force counter to Japanese reactions.
The terrain is flat and free of vegetation, meaning once the raid commences, all members of the unit will be quite exposed and in order to approach the camp will have to cross a full kilometer of open ground (Rottman, 2012, 22). In terms of time, the raid had to occur at dusk, with the bulk of the invasion occurring during the one hour of complete darkness. In regards to civilian casualties, this is not a big concern, given the isolation of the island.
#3 MISSION STATEMENT
According to the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, a raid is defined as. “An operation to temporarily seize an area in order to secure information, confuse an adversary, capture personnel or equipment, or to destroy a capability. It ends with a planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission (JP 3-0).” Likewise, this same dictionary defines the verb “to secure” as: “In an operational context, to gain possession of a position or terrain feature, with or without force, and to make such disposition as will prevent, as far as possible, its destruction or loss by enemy action. See also denial measure.” Finally, this particular dictionary doesn’t have a specific definition for “to liberate” however, they do have a definition for “liberated territory” which is described as, “Any area, domestic, neutral, or friendly, which, having been occupied by an enemy, is retaken by friendly forces.” Hence, from this definition, one can infer that that to liberate means to retake something or someone via friendly forces that was formerly in the grip of an enemy. Upon scrutiny of all of these definitions, the verb “to raid” really is the most fitting one to describe the events at Cabanatuan.
#4 PURPOSE AND TASK
The Filipino citizens provided protection in the form of food, water and transport in the villages along the path to safety and freedom of American lines (TASK). This contribution was needed because it was a 30 mile journey and many of the freed prisoners of war were too weak to walk it on their own: Filipino citizens provided caribou carts to transports the soldiers too weak to walk (PURPOSE). This occurred after the raid had been successful and prisoners were officially freed from the camp (SYNCH). The Filipino Guerillas were responsible for much of the success of the entire movement. Two distinct collective of Filipino guerilla soldiers were stationed as an obstacle to the main road that went along the front of the camp: in this manner, the Japanese were prevented from reaching the raid when it occurred (TASK). The captain of the Guerilla soldiers, Juan Pajota, was in charge of neutralizing around 1000 Japanese soldiers that were located a mile or so to the east of Cabanatuan, encamped near the Cabu bridge (Hovious, 2016). Captain Eduardo Joson would also initiate a blockade just exterior to the city to ensure that the Japanese couldn’t further intrude (Hovious, 2016) (PURPOSE). These preventative and defensive efforts occurred before the raid began (SYNCH).
Ten or so Alamo Scouts joined forces with the rangers in order to defeat the Japanese. Two Alamo Scouts located a stilted hut in a rice field not far from the main gate (King, 2018) (TASK). This finding proved to be incredible as it offered US Forces undeniably important intelligence regarding the layout of the enemy camp, showing where the location of troops were, the distances between the structures, and the general size of the enemy force as a collective (PURPOSE). This occurred the day of the attack before the raid (SYNCH). The 1st Platoon Charlie Company commandeered by First Lieutenant William J O’Connell, was to force the front gate of the compound open and kill Japanese at several specified locations (King, 1985) (TASK). This represented the first wave of attack to commence the raid, disorient the Japanese and disarm their first line of defense overall (PURPOSE). This occurred at 21:00 and represented the first wave of the attack (SYNCH). The 2nd Platoon Company C was to follow the 1st Platoon in the compound, open the prisoners part of the camp and start evacuating them while engaging in close fire support when needed (King, 1985) (TASK). This was to begin the liberation of the prisoners of war (PURPOSE). This began just after the actions of the 1st Platoon Company (SYNCH). The 2nd Platoon Company F, worked to eliminate the guards at the back entrance of the stockade (King, 1985) (TASK). This was to prevent Japanese from progressing into the part of the camp where the prisoners were located (PURPOSE). This occurred at the start of the raid at 21:00.
#5: COMMANDER’S CRITICAL INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS (CCIRs)
IF the Japanese has actually planned to kill or torture the remaining Prisoners of War since the United State forces have landed in the Philippines, AND we have at least one hundred US Rangers at our disposal AND we have the help of Filipino Guerilla Forces OR we have the support of the US Airforce THEN we will engage in a swift raid of Camp Cabanatuan.
#6 COMMANDER’S JUDGEMENT
Mucci’s forces were prepared and ready to engage in the assault on the 29th of January. They had arrived at Balincarin on the morning of January 29th where Mucci met the Lieutenants of the Alamo Scouts (Rounsaville and Nellist) as well as Captain Juan Pajota of the Filipino Guerilla Army (King, 2018). These three leaders told Mucci of the massive presence of Japanese troops in the area. The road directly in front of Cabanatuan had been used frequently by withdrawing Japanese troops in the last day, and a few hundred enemy troops were still at Cabu Creek, just north of the camp. Pajota’s forces were also able to attest that there was at least one Japanese sanction at Cabanatuan city, just a few miles to the south. “The number of Japanese in the area convinced Mucci that a delay in the operation would be prudent, and he decided to postpone the raid for twenty-four hours” (King). This proved to be a sage decision and one, which helped to solidify the overall success of the raid.
#7 COA ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Mucci’s concern that local civilians might not be able to provide enough oxcarts to enable the POWs to be pushed safely back to Guimba is a fair concern. This leaves US Forces with three distinct options. The first option is: Continue to move toward Guimba, acknowledging that movement will be slow. As a collective, US forces can only move as quickly as the weakest prisoner of war. This means that realistically, the troops and liberated POW will be able to move at just under one mile an hour during the day and around half that rate at night. This means that it will take around 60 hours to reach Guimba or two and a half days. This will leave the exposed troops vulnerable to Japanese attack. However, one great virtue of this option is that while the prisoners of war won’t be moving very quickly, as a collective, they will be moving and thus harder to attack by the lingering Japanese forces in the area.
The next option, remaining in the prison and defending as the 6th Army sends a regimental combat team to connect with our forces, also has distinct advantages. For example, this option means that the already weak and traumatized prisoners of war won’t be further taxed by 25 mile hike to Guimba in already stressful circumstances. However, just sitting and waiting in the camp leaves the remaining forces and the prisoners of war exceedingly vulnerable to the massive Japanese presence in the area. While US Rangers had been able to block and surprise the Japanese long enough to liberate the camp, it is unlikely that they will be able to sustain this for very long. Once the surprise attack was finished, nearly all the Japanese forces near the camp were aware of them. Unless the 6th army regimental combat team would be able to guarantee that they could arrive within six hours or less, it would not represent a smart decision for the rangers or the POWs. Furthermore, there is uncertainty regarding how well, safely or swiftly the 6th army regimental combat team would have been able to infiltrate the area. The Japanese presence in the area was already mobilizing and could very well have created a blockade for that division, preventing them from even reaching the camp.
The third and final option is to move away from the prison to the first concealed location and then build a defensive perimeter while the 6th Army sends a regimental combat team to connect with the remaining forces and POWs. This option sounds like a good idea, but actually presents a host of uncertainties and needless risks. First of all, at this time, it is unclear where this “concealed location” will be, who will offer it, how we are supposed to know its secure. These are significant questions that demand an answer before the movement of the former prisoners of war. This option already represents much uncertainty and insecurity: since it is unclear whether or not the concealed location is actually safe and secure, moving the troops and weakened POWs represents a high risk situation. How can Mucci and all other leaders be certain that the Japanese are truly unaware of this “concealed location,” given their high numbers in the area? Furthermore, staying in one place and waiting for the 6th Army to send an appropriate regimental combat team seems like a losing strategy. The availability of the additional regimental combat team largely depends on what else is currently going on in nearby areas in terms of battle and Japanese aggression. It becomes much more difficult to predict when the regimental combat team will be able to connect with us and if that will be before the Japanese stage an attack, using their massive forces and resources present throughout the area. Again, there is a very real concern that even if the regimental combat team is sent out right away, they might not be able to make a swift or even eventual connection with us, as a result of a Japanese blockade, which is something Japanese intelligence might be planning right this second. Even if a defensive perimeter is established, we are still outnumbered by the Japanese in the area: the only reason we were successful with the raid in the Cabanatuan was because of the strong element of surprise. Now that the Japanese are aware of us, it is likely that they will attack us with every ounce of force and strategy they have.
Hence, based on all of these considerations, the best option for all parties involved would be to begin the immediate and swift retreat to Guimba. It’s possible that stretchers could be made for the weakest POWs, and even if that’s not a possibility, its important not to remain as sitting ducks just waiting for the attack of the tremendous Japanese presence in the area. Movement is the safest option, even if it is slow movement, as American troops will be more likely to evade potential attack in this regard. It is possible to establish a moving defensive perimeter as we head to Guimba, with the weakest links in the center and the strongest rangers protecting all. We can even send out a few cells out ahead in the path of trajectory to ensure all is clear.








Bibliography


Department of Defense. Last modified October 31, 2009. http://jitc.fhu.disa.mil/jitc_dri/pdfs/jp1_02.pdf.
Hovious, Kirk. "The Forgotten Men of Cabanatuan." Hawaii Reporter. Last modified February 5, 2016. http://www.hawaiireporter.com/the-forgotten-men-of-cabanatuan/.
King, Michael J. "Cabanatuan." U.S. Army Chemical Mortar Battalions. Last modified April 2018. http://www.4point2.org/cabanatuan.htm.
King, Michael Julius. Rangers: selected combat operations in World War II. No. 11. DIANE Publishing, 1985.
Rottman, Gordon L. The Cabanatuan Prison Raid: The Philippines 1945. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2012.