Morales/Gramm Campaign the 1996 Senatorial

¶ … Morales/Gramm Campaign

The 1996 Senatorial race in Texas was historic in that for the first time, a major party (the Democrats, in this instance) had nominated a Hispanic individual as its candidate. The fact that Victor Morales was running against long-time Senator and Texas institution Phil Gramm had a huge affect on many different aspects of his campaign, not the least of which was his losing the election. An analysis of the two campaigns and their effectiveness as inferred from voter turn out on election day, however, reveals that Gramm's victory -- and Morales' defeat -- were not as clear cut as many of the pundits of the time would make it seem.

Even scholars looking back over the election reflect that "in theory, Morales had no chance of winning the general election against Sen. Gramm." Gramm's popularity, along with the popularity of the Republican Party in Texas, were considered prohibitive to the idea of a Democratic upset of the Senate seat. As this essay will show, this defeatist attitude was in large measure responsible for Morales' defeat. Inadequate campaign financing from the party machine led to a reduced capability to spread word of Morales' candidacy and attract voters, even in predominantly Hispanic areas, which resulted in Morales' loss in a surprisingly close race.

Before laying the blame at the feet of the Democratic Party, it is necessary to acknowledge that Morales and the Democrats at large were fighting an uphill battle in Texas: "prior to this election, both U.S. Senators, the Governor of the State and a majority of the Justices of the State Supreme Court were Republicans." Regardless of the Democratic candidate's ethnicity, the former party of the South had no mistaken notions about their popularity, and were not expecting a win or even as close a race as they ended up receiving that year.

These dismal expectations led to a lack of financial interest in the campaign, however, which if altered could have provided a significant difference in the outcome of the election (i.e., Morales could have won). The numbers regarding voter turn out reflect that the Teas population felt the outcome was about as certain as the Democrats seem to have felt. Numbers dropped significantly in almost all counties, and the number of Hispanic voters fell even more sharply than the statewide average turn out in many instances. When Hispanics did vote, it was usually with a majority -- albeit a slim one -- for Morales. This suggests that increased spending in Hispanic communities could have had a significant impact on the Morales campaign.

The benefits of increased spending and promotion focused on the Hispanic community might not have been enormous, but they could have been decisive. With the proportion of Hispanic voters that were turning out for Morales, even simply increasing overall Hispanic turn out, though providing Gramm with additional votes, too, would have provided Morales with approximately twenty-percent more voters than Gramm in many counties where Hispanics constituted eighty-percent and more of the population. Given how close the statewide race was, the difference of even a few of the more populous counties could have been all that was needed to change the outcome of the campaign. Instead, as Morales struggled with a budget about a tenth the size of Gramm's, communication efforts simply were not extensive enough to produce the kind of results that the Morales campaign needed. An awareness of the discrepancy in spending between the two campaigns, which must certainly have been available at the time, should have revealed the closeness of the race to Democratic leadership.

Republican spending on the campaign to re-elect Senator Gramm, which formed the bulk of the total funding for the campaign (non-party funding represented less than a fifth of contributions), should have been a tip-off to the Morales campaign and the leadership of the Democratic Party that not everyone considered the race to be as sure a thing as the Democrats did. Gramm's much larger presence in the media could only have served to reinforce the idea that the campaign was wrapped up; had Morales had the adequate funding to present a higher public profile, his candidacy might have been taken more seriously by the public generally and the Hispanic community specifically. As it was, Morales was able to obtain numbers in the forty-percent range in many counties, and carried several predominantly Hispanic counties. Only a slight edge was needed to effectively shift the tide in Morales favors in many counties. Morales' campaign lacked the financial and moral support that it and the public needed from the national party, and this in large measure can be attributed to his loss in the campaign.