Anglo Chinese War the Historical

¶ … Anglo Chinese War

The historical discussion of the First Anglo-Chinese War (frequently referred to as the First Opium War) included a variety of competing perspectives even as the war was still being fought, because either side viewed the war in entirely different contexts.

In largely the same fashion, for years the historiography of the first Anglo-Chinese war developed independently in the East and West, and it was not until relatively recently, when Mao Zedong relaxed restrictions on access to Chinese documents and collaboration between historians, that this historiography has begun to include these differing perspectives, thus allowing a more complete picture of the war, as well as its causes and effects, to emerge. Coinciding with this increased access to Chinese primary documents was a variety of shifts in military history in general, from the "Revolution in Military Affairs" approach that focuses on technological development, to the so-called New Military History that attempts to expand the scope of military history to include a variety of heretofore ignored factors, such as the interplay between economics, politics, and culture.

Just as Eastern and Western scholars produced markedly different histories prior to the greater collaboration over the latter half of the twentieth century, so too do these different historiographical approaches frame the First Anglo-Chinese War in markedly different ways. After considering the histories produced by these different schools of military historical thought, it becomes clear that an accurate history of the Anglo-Chinese War must take much more than tactics and technology into account, and furthermore, that the production of such a history is dependent on challenging some of the lingering assumptions and presuppositions regarding both militaries as such and their role in society that continue to underline military history to this day.

Before considering how changes in military history have produced differing perspectives on the First Anglo-Chinese War, it is first necessary to provide an introduction to each of these schools of thought, in order to better understand how their particular academic interests shape their reception of the war. The first school of thought relevant to this study is the so-called "drums and trumpets" approach to military history, because this approach characterizes many of the early histories of the war produced by Western historians. As the name suggests, this approach to military history focuses mainly on the most dramatic and obvious elements of war, namely, the strategy and execution of battles. This approach has been somewhat dismissively described as a discipline of "writers who lack the sources, languages, institutional support and intellectual formation necessary to see beyond the smoke and dust of battle."

Despite this, interest in this form of military history remains widely popular, and in fact, one might go so far as to argue that a majority of the military history consumed by the general public falls into this category, if only because focusing on the operations of war offers a kind of historical entertainment, where complex socio-political movements are reduced to discrete battles and campaigns.

Thus, early Western histories of the First Anglo-Chinese War, produced in the decades following its conclusion, place a dramatic emphasis on specific battles or conflicts. For example, John Slade's 1839 account of the events leading up to the outbreak of the war follows this trend. While he mentions the opium trade, he does not bother to discuss why it might be of any importance; instead he focuses on the execution of an opium dealer, or an event in September of 1838 when "an officer was deputed to Wjhampoa to search for and seize opium. A riot ensured, the officer was wounded, lives were lost, and the local government found it necessary to send more troops to quell the disturbance."

Similarly, in his 1843 account of the war, John Bingham describes the history of the war not by addressing any of the underlying causes of overarching themes, but rather by providing a detailed account of troop and ship movements, interspersed with dramatic battle scenes. When describing the blockade of the Pearl River and the subsequent British capture of Chusan, he focuses on how the British ship the Blonde was attacked by a group of Chinese, who fired "a match-lock and two or three arrows," so that "at the instant two of the Blonde's thirty-two pound shot went bowling into the midst of these valiant fellows, and 'Sauve qui peut' [every man for himself] became the cry, -- the whole mass, officers, soldiers, and spectators flying for their lives, leaving five or six of their number dead upon the beach."

These narratives favor the recounting of specific battles and events, as if the nature of a conflict is determined solely by its battles, and not the underlying factors which exist prior to the actual occurrence of those battles.

As a result, these early historians explained the British success by attributing it primarily to the British Navy's superior size, tactics, and firepower. The British Navy's familiarity in combat, superiority in firepower, and well-regarded seamanship allowed them to easily control the Chinese coast and destroy what little resistance Chinese junks and fireboats offered. Similarly, as evidenced by the relatively easy blockade of the Pearl River and the capture of Chusan, the forts along the rivers and bay were equally ineffective in their defenses. However, while all of these factors undoubtedly contributed to the British success, these early historians' focus on British naval superiority fails to fully or accurately describe the reasons for the war's outcome, because they do not include a satisfactory account of the Chinese response, other than to suggest it was insufficient. To see the problem with viewing the outcome of the First Anglo-Chinese War as solely the result of the superior British Navy, one need only look to the examples of the American Revolution and the War of 1812, where the British military was defeated despite the fact that their navy largely controlled the entirety of the Eastern seaboard. Thus, there must be more to the story than what is accounted for by the "drums and trumpets" historians, but in order to reveal this more complex picture of the First Anglo-Chinese War, it will be necessary to continue with a discussion of the different historiographical perspectives.

If "drums and trumpets" military history represents one of the most popularly consumed modes of historical research, then the "Revolution in Military Affairs" (RMA) approach comes in at a close second. While RMA historians still focus somewhat on specific battles, they place much greater importance on technological development as a driver of military history, viewing the advancement of gunpowder, firearms, and other weapons as the primary factor influencing any given campaign. (to understand the popularity of this approach, one need only consider the multitude of television programs focused solely on the development of military technology.) in many ways this represents an evolution of the "drums and trumpets" perspective, rather than a distinct break from it, because the focus is merely shifted away from battles themselves to the technology used to carry them out.

From this perspective, the dominant factor influencing the outcome of the First Anglo-Chinese War is the marked disparity in military technology between the two sides, and particularly the belief that "the Chinese army […] differs little in 1836 from what it was in 1275, the date given for the Chinese invention of gunpowder."

Within this school of thought, the primary reason for the British success was its technological superiority, because the Chinese military appeared ill-equipped to deal with the might of the British navy and its arsenal. As a result, the British were able to capture important towns and forts relatively easily and quickly, facing little Chinese resistance.

At this point it is worth mentioning an issue that afflicts military history in general, but "drums and trumpets" and RMA histories in particular, namely, Eurocentrism. In his book Rethinking Military History, Jeremy Black views Eurocentrism as an: emphasis on the military history of, and involving, the West, with the latter ensuring that other states and societies appear primarily in order to be defeated -- so that the 'non-West' is misunderstood when it is not ignored."

This is particularly relevant in the case of RMA historiography, because its focus on "the technological interpretation of Western success, in the shape of the role of firearms," means that it cannot sufficiently account for either the role of technology in non-Western nations, or the decidedly different ways this technology was integrated into indigenous fighting styles and tactics.

Furthermore, when considering the specific case of the First Anglo-Chinese War, a RMA approach necessarily limits one's understanding of the conflict, because, like the "drums and trumpets" historians, the outcome of the war is viewed almost exclusively as a result of British technological superiority, with little to no attention paid to the socio-political factors on the Chinese side that contributed to their defeat. This is not to discount the importance of British firepower, but rather an attempt to highlight how a focus on this firepower as the dominant factor driving British success not only discounts the Chinese, but ultimately is insufficient to explain the outcome of the war.

More recently two schools of military history have developed that attempt to consider its object from a more eclectic, objective perspective, dubbed the "New Military History" and "War and Society" history. New Military History "refers to a partial turning away from the great captains, and from weapons, tactics, and operations as the main concerns of the historical study of war," and instead focusing on "the interaction of war with society, economics, politics, and culture."

New Military History is a relatively broad category, and its perspective can be evinced both on the level of a particular methodology and ideology.

Along with the "War and Society" school of thought, New Military History seeks to uncover the multifarious factors driving and influencing military conflict, with a particular view towards the interaction between these factors and the actual practice of war. That is to say, these schools of thought do no entirely abandon any consideration of battles, tactics, or technology, but rather view these topics within their much larger political and social contexts, in order to see how overarching political and social considerations evidence themselves in the actual practice of war.

Not to be too blunt about it, but the historiographical approach offered by New Military History and "War and Society" historians is the most helpful when attempting to understand the causes and effects of the First Anglo-Chinese War, because as will be seen, the overwhelming British success can only be explained if one considers not only British naval and firepower dominance, but also the political and philosophical underpinnings of the Qing dynasty, as well as the Chinese perspective on British attempts to gain access to their market. In fact, one may go so far as to argue that the British success was not truly a result of their superior navy and weapons systems, but rather was brought about by combination of naivete and military reluctance on the part of the Chinese government, headed by the Emperor. In order to see why, one may examine the attitude and philosophical perspective of the Chinese government both in regards to British mercantilism and the war itself, but first, it is necessary to dispel a certain pernicious myth regarding the central cause for the war.

Many earlier historians claim the First Anglo-Chinese war was an attempt by the British to open up China to Western markets and products, based on the argument that China was a "closed society." In reality, the war was conducted almost exclusively to ensure the sale of British opium in China, which was resisted by the Chinese government not because it desired to remain a "closed society," but rather because illegal opium sales threatened China's economy through the gradual evaporation of its silver while posing a public health problem.

Furthermore, it had no desire to give up the lucrative trade relationship it had with the West by importing more Western goods. Prior to the 19th century, China was at a marked advantage in relation to the Western powers, and Great Britain in particular, because while the West was importing more and more tea and silk from China, China had relatively little need for or interest in Western goods. As a result, China grew richer and richer while the West found itself with a large and rapidly increasing trade deficit. The Chinese, with a self-sufficient economy, showed little interest in Western products, and particularly the woolen goods the English hoped would solve the trade deficit.

In the 1820s, however, a few particularly shrewd, merchants (some from the infamous East India Company) realized that some Chinese had acquired a taste for smoking Indian opium, and saw a potentially lucrative market that might sidestep some of the official controls which had previously kept the West from establishing an effective market presence in China. In 1820, 9,708 chests of opium were smuggled into China, and 15 years later, the amount of smuggled opium rose to 35,445 chests a year, an increase of almost 400%.

As a result, the colonial governments in India increased opium production, and soon English merchants were bringing opium to China and filling their returning ships with Chinese tea and silver. Thus, opium was effectively the only quasi-British product to find a substantial market in China, and as China increasingly attempted to repress the sale and consumption of opium, it became clear that more drastic measures would be necessary in order to ensure continued drug revenues.

Despite the relatively straightforward centrality of opium in the run-up to the First Anglo-Chinese War, this fact was not recognized by historians at the time. Instead, the war was framed as an attempt to "open" up China to trade more generally, and attempts were even made to argue that opium had nothing to do with it. One can see the widespread acceptability of this view at the time and afterward by examining an 1896 essay written with express intention of challenging this historical interpretation. In his essay "The Truth About the Opium War," Joseph Alexander argues against the idea that the war was conducted to open up China to trade, and that increased opium use in China was merely an unfortunate aftereffect. Instead, Alexander suggests that while:

To say that the opium war was instituted "in order to force" China to take opium may perhaps be taken to imply that such was the express intention of the statesmen responsible for it, and is therefore a mode of statement which is better avoided, […] it is a good rule of the common law that a man is taken to intend the consequences which he must have known were likely to result, and which have in fact resulted, from his action. For such consequences he is criminally responsible, and the law does not stop to inquire into his motives.

In the same way, one must view the Anglo-Chinese War as an attempt to secure the continued sale of opium in China, even if the British government claimed differently (in fact, the British monarchy nominally opposed the sale of opium, but through its colonial and military action, it ensured that private British citizens would have free reign over the Chinese opium market). Although the Chinese government did treat foreigners with some degree of distrust and disrespect, "nothing is more clear than the fact that it was not these claims, but the seizure of contraband opium, which was the direct cause of the war."

Recognizing that the First Anglo-Chinese War (and the rest of them, for that matter) was caused primarily by Chinese resistance to the sale and consumption of opium, rather than China supposedly being a "closed society," allows one to better understand the conduct and outcome of the war. The early "drum and trumpet" historians largely understood the war from the British perspective and hewed closely to the official British line about the war's initial causes, so it only makes sense that they would focus almost exclusively on the superiority of the British navy, viewing it as an almost righteous force dedicated to protecting innocent merchants and manufacturers from "ruffians" and "barbarians."

However, an approach that considers the social and political aspects of the war reveals not only that it was primarily caused by Chinese resistance to British opium, but also that the British success was due not to its military superiority, but rather the particular philosophy and attitude of the Chinese government.

Put simply, the Chinese government viewed itself as inherently above other nations, and the Emperor in particular was viewed as divine, the 'son of heaven' ruling over the most powerful and enlightened nation in the world. As William Hanes notes:

China had always felt superior to the rest of the world -- and not without reason. After all, the Chinese had invented gunpowder, paper currency, eyeglasses, and the printing press, […] among many other innovations developed centuries before the West discovered them. […] China solipsistically called itself the "Central Civilization" and the "Middle Kingdom," but neither term referred to a geographic location. The titles described the Chinese belief that the nation was the land around which all humanity was centered.

As a result, the Manchu government launched its anti-opium campaign without any realistic calculation of its likely repercussions, because the thought that Britain might retaliate with overwhelming force likely did not enter the mind of the Emperor, let alone his subordinates. This inability to imagine that Britain might respond in a way that posed any real threat is evidenced by the brutality and seeming lack of diplomacy with which the Chinese government carried out its anti-opium campaign; for example, it had a tendency "in cases where it was believed that some foreigner had committed a crime to which the death penalty was attached" to simply demand "that a foreigner should be surrendered not for trial but for execution," instead of attempting "to seek out and bring to trial the person suspected."

Thus, the Chinese government was already at a kind of philosophical disadvantage, because it failed to accurately assess the likely outcomes of its actions, believing itself to be the preeminent global power and thus able to act against British subjects with impunity. (This is also why they seemed unable to learn from the American's success in repelling the British; there was no need to look to foreign examples when one is confident in one's inherent superiority).

In addition to this misunderstanding regarding Britain's likely response to China's anti-opium efforts, the actual organization of the Chinese government further contributed to its defeat. The ruling system of China was an enormous bureaucracy that paid tribute to the Manchu emperor, and, like the Japanese Tokugawa shogunate, governing at lower levels fell to appointed lords and governors. The emperor was involved in national crises such as famine, floods, and fielding armies, but as long as tax revenues continued to flow into the Forbidden City the emperor rarely was involved in local governance. As a result, court officials had a tendency to shield the emperor from potentially upsetting news, further hindering the emperor's ability to govern to the point that the British had actually won several engagements in the war before the emperor was even informed of a foreign navy in his waters

Even after he was apprised on the reality of the British invasion, the Emperor found himself almost unable to respond militarily, either out of shock, or as his own words would suggest, a reluctance to contribute to further bloodshed. Understanding the Emperor's response to British intervention is almost impossible if one does not take his dependence of Confucian philosophy into account, and this is likely why many early historians mistakenly assumed that the British victory was due solely to their navy, and not due to the decisions of the Chinese. The Emperor chose not to raise an army or move distant forces to meet the British in battle, and instead took the position, expressed in an 1840 edict, that