History concepts and applications

Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 is widely regarded as the most dangerous moment of the Cold War, and one which, "brought the world to the brink of the unthinkable" (Blight & Welch, 315). Although the successful resolution of the crisis led to an immediate improvement in relationship between the superpowers, and focussed the world's attention on the issues surrounding nuclear capability and deterrence, it also led to the development of a new method of 'crisis management' known as brinkmanship. This diplomatic theory, which involves using the threat of war in order to coerce an opponent into backing down, would have less celebrated consequences for America in the decades that followed the Cuban crisis.

On October 16th, two days after American surveillance planes had discovered Soviet medium-range missiles being installed in Cuba, the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExCom) met to plan a strategy that would resolve, what the American government regarded as, a direct threat to its security. President Kennedy favored some form of military action, and the chosen strategy was to initiate a blockade that would prevent any further missiles from reaching Cuba, accompanied by demands for the removal of all existing missiles. This was an astute decision by the President as, in addition to demonstrating America's ability and willingness to use military force, it also allowed the Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, the time and opportunity to back down. An added benefit was that, if Khrushchev then continued with his course of actions, then he would be seen as responsible for the escalation of the crisis. President Kennedy had, in effect, issued the Soviet leader with an ultimatum which offered a 'last clear chance' to avoid the conflict spiraling into a confrontation which would end in a nuclear war

Although, initially, appearing unwilling to accept America's terms, Khrushchev eventually agreed to remove all missiles from Cuba, in return for the removal of the military blockade and America's removal of similar missiles from Turkey. On October 28th 1962, President Kennedy announced his great diplomatic victory, which although involving the taking of enormous risks, was responsible for increasing his political prestige and public popularity. Khrushchev, however, faired less well, and although sharing in the credit for resolving such a dangerous and sensitive crisis, his forced withdrawal from Cuba was seen as a failure by many within Soviet government and is considered to have been instrumental in his [Khrushchev] removal from office two years later.

In addition to the significant, and differing, effects upon the political careers of the two leaders, the events and outcome of the Cuban Missile Crisis also exerted enormous influence upon subsequent relationships between the superpowers. Undoubtedly the most fundamental, and perhaps most crucial, was the setting up of a 'hot line' between the American and the Soviet premiers. Although the Cuban Missile Crisis was successfully resolved, the use of written correspondence and diplomatic aides to conduct negotiations allowed too much time for costly and dangerous misunderstandings, whereas the 'hot line' allowed immediate, and direct, communications between the leaderships in Washington and Moscow. The crisis was also responsible for bringing together America, the Soviet Union and Britain, to create the Partial Test Ban Treaty, in 1963, which outlawed nuclear testing in the atmosphere.

In terms of American military and foreign policy, another significant effect of the crisis was the adoption of 'brinkmanship' as the new science of crisis management. The decision-making processes, which had occurred within ExCom, during the Cuban crisis, were analyzed in order to formulate the key elements in this coercive form of diplomacy. However, the resulting method of threatening the opponent with the risk of war while simultaneously allowing them a 'last clear chance' to avert an escalation, was employed with less success in subsequent conflicts. According to Thomas Blanton, director of the National Security Archive at George Washington University, "the myth of calibrated brinkmanship - the belief that if you stand tough you win...had untold consequences for the planning of the Vietnam War and the nuclear arms race" (1997).