Analyzing and Assessing Homeland Security

Homeland Security

How does the creation of the Department of Homeland Security affect resources traditionally designated for local criminal justice organizations?

The Resource Imbalance caused by formation of HLS

The Department of Homeland Security controls a lot of resources. The significant among these are 40,000 coast guard members, 13,000 immigration law enforcement officers, 50,000 TSA screeners, 40,000 border patrol customs and 4000 Secret Service agents (Jaffe, 2015). These resources are immense and seriously affect the remainder, meant to be used by other law enforcement units. In 2012, the police were in dire need of ammunition while DHS had purchased up to 1.6 billion rounds of ammunition and added 2.717 Mine Resistant Armored Protection; the latter being vehicles that were previously used for counterinsurgency operations in Iraq (Bell, 2013).

Are there too few resources to fight both terrorists and traditional criminals?

Stressed State Police

Lack of funding has led to budget cuts in many police departments. In Baton Rouge, for instance, lack of funding and the resultant budget cuts has necessitated a reduction of police troopers in the Louisiana area. We now see 575 troopers deployed for work that was originally meant for 650 troopers. The state police commander in Louisiana expressed his wish to have a police academy established to deploy new trained personnel. However, he cited lack of funding to be the main obstacle for failing to achieve these noble goals. The American public will increasingly become insecure with reduced police officers. The fact that DHS takes about 57 billion dollars is evidence that they are taking away resources from the local criminal justice system. Although the DHS budget is huge, there is no justification to claim that resources are' sufficient to take care of both terrorism threats and homegrown crime. The concern lies in the allocation of the resources. The question is whether DHS needs $57 billion to operate? Could a portion of the resources be shared with the police department?

Who should bear the cost burden for investigating, apprehending, prosecuting, convicting, sentencing, and incarcerating terrorists?

Who, then Should Bear the Cost?

The governments of the countries in which the terrorists have been apprehended should bear the cost of the justice process. Such government resources should be combined with grants from various organizations to combat terrorist crime. MacArthur Foundation is known to make such contribution.

Implications of taking Osama Bin Laden Alive

Ideally, Osama bin laden should have been apprehended by the Seal commandos of the U.S. on 2nd May and consequently put on trial for his role in the 9/11 terrorist attacks and other crimes. However, Osama, while in his Abbottabad hideout, met a cruel form of sentence. If Osama would have been captured alive from Pakistan, the first burning question would have been that of jurisdiction. He planned his crimes from Afghanistan but attacked the U.S., UK, Yemen, Kenya Indonesia and Spain. If he had been flown to Guantanamo Bay, he would have been put under trial by a military tribunal. However, such a move would have triggered a barrage of complaints and outcries by his supporters who would claim that he was not getting justice; courtesy, the wavering, unstable credibility of the system. If he would have been subjected to a U.S. federal court process, it would have been a nightmare to raise jurors to hear and decide his fate. The security logistics of the process would have been overwhelming. It is even doubtful whether it would have been possible to find 12 unbiased jurors. Suppose Osama would have chosen to deny all the accusations against him, would it have been possible to adduce credible evidence against him to lead to conviction? Although some of the Al-Qaida leaders such as Khalid Sheikh Mohamed have been apprehended, owing to the circumstances under which evidence was extracted from them, such evidence has been put under scrutiny and bears signs of inadmissibility; it was extracted under duress.

Although Osama had been seen on tape boasting over the success of the various planned attacks, it would have been another thing to prove that he was actually the one behind their execution. He was always keen to talk generally and avoided insinuating that he took personal responsibility for the terrorist attacks over the past 15 years.

Osama would have possibly filed a formidable defense against the state and shown that he had had close links with UK, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia during the Soviet war in Afghanistan in the 80s. The fact remains that he was a close ally and friend of the agencies that would be accusing him in court. He assisted the arrival of Arab volunteers in Pakistan and offered logistic assistance in Afghanistan. Testimonies from veterans would have probably embarrassed the governments that would now be accusing Osama. On the other hand, the governments would have had a chance of barring them from testifying. However, such a move would have made the case process incredible in the public eye. The dilemma would not have possibly stopped at trial.

If Osama would have been found guilty, his execution would have been a simple victor's vengeance over a heroic Muslim figure. His grave would have turned into a form of shrine. Burying his remains at sea would not have been on the cards either; neither would cremation have made sense.

The entire trial would also have been under close scrutiny by the Islamic fraternity for signs of biased injustice. Consequently, the judicial system would have been on trial too (Hussain & Sadullah, 2011).

Trying to prove accusations against Osama would have been difficult if not impossible; in the process, it could have harmed the reputations of many institutions in many nations, rogue, as well as friendly. The present judicial systems do not allow for a swift, private, and effective trial for the newly evolving terrorist activities that spread across nations.

What are the due process protection questions in light of the creation of the Department of Homeland Security?

Should additional due-process safeguards be provided?

Does an imminent or ongoing threat make a civil and democratically governed society to abandon its principles, or the national security rights evenly balanced with the political rights so as to safeguard both?

Should these due process protections matter in the fight against terrorism?