al-Assad family has ruled Syria

al-Assad family has ruled Syria with an iron fist for the past 40 years, and the fallout from the recent uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa have also affected the Syrian people. The purpose of this research is to explore how the al-Assad family, members of a religious minority, came to power in Syria, and what that has meant for the Syrian people. To this end, this study examines how the Alawi sect came to power in Syria from a historiographic and religious studies perspective, and what the implications of the recent revolutions in neighboring countries might be for the ruling elite in Syria. A summary of the research and important findings are presented in the study's conclusion.

How a Religious Minority Came to Rule Syria and the Implications for Its People

Introduction

In the wake of the recent waves of unrest that have swept the Middle East and North Africa, even the most well-entrenched autocratic rulers are sitting up and taking notice, with the Saud family of Saudi Arabia and President Assad of Syria being among the most notable examples. Some observers are questioning whether these regimens can withstand the inexorable forces that are being arrayed against them, while others are questioning whether the loss of these strong leaders would have a devastating effect on the region. The purpose of this research was to explore how the Assad family, members of a religious minority, came to power in Syria, and what that has meant for the Syrian people. A historiographic account of important confrontations and conflicts that led to the Assad family's rise to power is followed by an examination concerning how their ongoing rule has impacted Syria's foreign and domestic policy according to the classical realism theory of state behavior. A discussion concerning the identity of Assad's backers and what motivates them to support his rule is followed by an exploration of the basis of fear of having a Sunni president. Through a religious studies framework, this study presents a review of the religious mix of Syria with an emphasis on the Alawites. Next, an examination of the political geography of Syria and how it correlates to the different religions is followed by an examination of the social implications, focusing on human rights and religion and the political implications of having an Alawite president, and how that has led to an ongoing brutal civil war in Syria. Finally, a summary of the research and important findings are presented in the study's conclusion.

Review and Analysis

Background and Overview

The history of Syria has been characterized by the same types of arbitrary geopolitical lines drawn in the sand by Western powers that have created so many problems for its neighbors and which have contributed much to the present situation. After the end of First World War, the former Ottoman Empire was dissolved and France assumed control over its former province, a mandate it continued until the country was granted independence in 1946.

The first few years of the new country's existence, though, were wracked by one military coup after another until February 1958 when Syria merged with Egypt to create the United Arab Republic.

In 1961, just three years later, Egypt and Syria went their separate ways once again, dissolving the United Arab Republic and the Syrian Arab Republic existed once again (Syria, 2012). The country's fortunes changed yet again in 1967 when Syria lost the Golan Heights to Israel during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and again 2 years later, Hafiz al-Assad, a member of the Socialist Ba'th Party and the minority Alawi sect, assumed control of Syria in a nonviolent coup that finally brought some political stability to the country in November 1970.

Despite a growing amount of scholarship regarding the Alawi sect and its rise to power in Syria, there remains some uncertainty concerning how the Syrian Ba'th regime can be conceptualized, due in large part to its complexity.

According to Hinnebusch, "The Ba'th came to power by a military coup and the army is a central pillar of the regime, but it is an 'army-party symbiosis,' not mere military rule. The Alawi minority sect has dominated it, but it is not simply a minority regime and incorporates a cross-sectarian coalition."

Just a few years ago, though, the most pressing issue facing Bashar al-Assad was navigating his way through the political and religious issues that helped his family assume power in the first place. In this regard, Ghadbian (2001) suggests that, "Bashar faces a classic dilemma: he must reform the political system in order for him to survive; yet a serious perestroika is likely to undermine the very forces that engineered his rise to power. Bashar's survival depends on how he resolves this predicament."

(p. 624).

Likewise, during his tenure, the elder al-Assad was clearly in control, but there were also other forces at work that not only helped him assume power, they helped him stay in power as well in a similar fashion to his son. In this regard, Hinnebusch adds that, "At its center was the personal dictatorship of Hafiz al-Assad, but his power rested on complex institutions. It has been described as a regime of the state bourgeoisie, but it also rose out of and incorporates a significant village base. Thus, no single one of the typical explanations of the regime-army, sect, class-adequately captures its complex multi-sided nature."

The multi-sided nature of the environment in which the Assad family came to power and managed to hold on to it for so long suggests that there are a few powerful insiders that help protect the regime, and it also indicates that there is a powerful security infrastructure in place that administer this protection. This assertion is borne out by the fact that the Assad regime at least brought some stability to the country following coup after coup and three decades would pass before Syria experienced any further substantive political changes after the elder al-Assad assumed power. In July 2000, President al-Assad died and his son, Bashar al-Assad, assumed power following his approval as president by popular referendum.

The fallout from this transition was just part of the turmoil that was taking place during this period in Syria's history. For instance, Stacher (2011) reports that, "Hafiz al-Assad died on June 10, 2000 after nearly 30 years at the helm of one of the Middle East's most volatile regimes. Syria witnessed 15 successful coup d'etats between 1949-1970, external wars with Israel (1948, 1967, and 1973), vicious Pan-Arab competition with regional states, and a near civil war between 1976-1984. Al-Assad slowed the raucous domestic political upheavals by stitching together a 'hard' state compared to its regional counterparts" (emphasis added).

There were some signs of moderation on the part of Assad during this period, though, that had some observers believing that a sea change in political attitude might be in the offing. In this regard, by mid-2005, all of the Syrian peacekeeping forces that had been stationed in Lebanon since 1976 were withdrawn.

Likewise, Guiora (2011) cites the example of the truce negotiated by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger between Syria and Israel following the 1973 Yore Kippur War. According to Guiora (2011), "The truce has held ground [and] reliable reports note that not one violation has been reported by either side."

Other signs of change in Syria's political outlook occurred in mid-2006 when Israel and Hezbollah battled it out over age-old disputes, and although Syria put its armed forces on alert, the country did not directly intervene in support of its allies in Hezbollah with military forces.

More recently, in mid-2007, President Bashar al-Assad was reelected to another term as Syrian president.

By March 2011, though, events in the Middle East began to swirl out of control for some autocratic rulers and the fallout from the uprisings that were taking place reached into Syria as well. For instance, in August 2012, Schaeffer-Duffy reported that, "Syria's 18-month revolution has already claimed the lives of 20,000 people. What began as a rebellion for reform is fast becoming a full-scale civil war of regional, perhaps global significance."

The intensification of the military clashes taking place between Syrian government military forces and insurgents in the Syrian cities of Damascus and Aleppo in early August 2012, together with an announcement by former U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan that he would resign as special envoy to Syria after his term expired, lent further support to this gloomy perspective.

On a similar note, U.S. government analysts also report that, "Influenced by major uprisings that began elsewhere in the region, antigovernment protests broke out in the southern province of Dar'a in March 2011 with protesters calling for the repeal of the restrictive Emergency Law allowing arrests without charge, the legalization of political parties, and the removal of corrupt local officials."

These events have been repeated time and again across the country where ordinary Syrian citizens have been forced to take to the streets to make their demands known, while Assad remained cloistered away. For instance, Corbin (2011) reports that, "The recent wave of domestic revolts moving east from the Maghreb to engulf the Levant and the Arab peninsula in the past few months is sparing few Arab states. The long-standing Ba'thist regime of the al-Assad family in Syria is no exception. As the initially isolated protests in the southern town of Dara'a spread throughout the country within weeks, the al-Assad regime faces the most significant challenge to its rule since the 1980s."

In the past, though, the Assads have historically proven up to the task of meeting such significant challenges to their rule and this latest round of challenges is certainly no exception.

During the past two years or so, there has been growing widespread unrest and public demonstrations throughout Syria

In response to these unsettling events, the Syrian government has taken steps to mollify the protests. Some of the steps the Syrian government has taken in response to these popular demands include a few modest concessions to the demonstrators, including the suspension of emergency law, formal approval for the creation of new political parties as well as local and national election reforms.

These social and political initiatives, though, have fallen far short of the demands from demonstrators and opposition parties for the country's president to resign, but Assad remains firmly in charge of the country -- for the present at least. The result of this intransigence has been even more widespread unrest, some of which has been met with violence reprisals from the Assad government. Analysts with the U.S. government emphasized that, "International pressure on the Assad regime has intensified since late 2011 as the Arab League, EU, Turkey, and the United States have expanded economic sanctions against the regime."

Lesser men, perhaps, would have buckled under this growing pressure but the al-Assad family has proven its ability to read the signs and take preemptive action to stay in power whatever the circumstances and whatever the implications may be for the Syrian people. For instance, the current Joint Special Representative of the United Nations and the League of Arab States on the Syrian crisis, Lakhdar Brahami, began meeting with regional heads of state to facilitate a cease-fire in October 2012.

These actions were necessary because of the carnage that was taking place at the time. In fact, by October 2012, the casualties from clashes between Syrian government forces and opposition forces reached 30,000.

The cease fire was violated by Syrian forces most recently on October 30, 2012, killing more than 500 civilians in the process.

Further exacerbating conditions in Syria today are the economic effects that have accrued, due in large part to continuing international sanctions and the incessant political turbulence. The economy continues to be highly regulated by the Syrian government and the short-term outlook for the Syrian economy is uncertain. For example, according to U.S. government analysts, "Long-run economic constraints include foreign trade barriers, declining oil production, high unemployment, rising budget deficits, and increasing pressure on water supplies caused by heavy use in agriculture, rapid population growth, industrial expansion, and water pollution."

Economics aside, though, the country also has some religious and ethnicity issues that are divisive and complex, and which contribute to the situation in which Assad finds himself today. The ethnic groups in Syria are predominately Arab (90.3%), with Kurds, Armenians and others comprising the remaining 9.7%.

Although Arabic is the official language, Kurdish, Armenian, Aramaic, and Circassian are widely understood and French and English are somewhat understood. The country is nearly three-quarters (74%) Sunni Muslim and Islam is the official state religion, and other Muslim sects includes Alawite and Druze (16%), Christians of various denominations (10%), and small Jewish enclaves in Damascus, Al Qamishli, and Aleppo (Syrian people, 2012). At present, the population of Syria is around 22,530,746.

Although less than three-quarters (73.6%) of females in Syria are literature, 86% of male Syrians can read and write and life expectancy is nearly 75 years.

Syria is also located geographically in the middle of a hotbed of countries where longstanding religious and political battles have been waged. Against this backdrop, the events that are playing out on the streets of Damascus and throughout the rest of Syria have assumed new relevance and importance to the international community because of the implications that are involved should Assad succeed in remaining in power despite the groundswell of opposition that is growing around him from the international community and his own people as well. By circling the wagons and surrounding himself with as many layers of protection as possible, Assad has mobilized all of his resources and appears willing to fight it out to the bloody end. Certainly, this has been the traditional approach used by dictators in these circumstances. In this regard, Alvarez-Ossorio (2012) emphasizes that, "Authoritarian regimes have traditionally been disinclined to accept any political or social opposition and have been hostile to the development of an independent civil society that could form a counterweight to state power."

Moreover, helping Assad stay in power has been the fact that he has been virtually unopposed politically at home. For instance, "Article 8 of the Syrian constitution established the Baath party, which has prevented any independent parties from emerging since the 1963 military but bloodless coup that brought it to power as the leading party in the state and society."

Notwithstanding the dubious track record of systematic repression of the people and press that has helped him maintain his position in power, though, there has been little opposition until recently. Nevertheless, there are signs that a sustained effort by opposition leaders may be cracking the formidable shell of military materiel and weaponry that Assad had created around himself and his cadre of followers.

In addition, besides the international economic sanctions that have caused significant problems for the ruling regime, the government of President Bashar al-Assad is also confronted with growing pressure from neighboring states as well as many of the Western powers.

The situation has become even more severe for Assad since late 2011 as uprisings in neighboring countries, especially Egypt and Tunisia, together with the ousting of former Libyan president, Muammar Qaddafi in a civil war that was supported by military actions from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have changed the complexion of the region.

Although the uprisings in other neighboring countries succeeded in overthrowing these longstanding dictators, it remains unclear how these events will play out in Syria given Assad's ability to remain in power to date. In this regard, Clawson emphasizes that, "It is not clear if Assad will fall or if he will hold on to power. It is fair to say that because his hold on power is sufficiently in doubt, it is well worth examining what would be the strategic consequences if he fell and what would be the strategic implications if he is able to muddle through Syria's current difficulties."

"Muddling through" in these circumstances, though, has profound implications for the people of Syria and the post-Assad nation that will result.

The strategic consequences, though, are of more salient interest to the West but it is clear that the people of Syria have much more at stake. Furthermore, based on the circumstances in which the other Middle Eastern and North African countries have experienced tumultuous and rapid change, the situation in Syria has profound implications for the rest of the world in general and on U.S. interests in the region in particular.

For example, Levitt (2010) reports that, "The Syrian government is the longest-standing member of the U.S. State Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism, having been so designated in 1979."

Likewise, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta, made it clear where the United States stood with respect to the incalcitrance exhibited by Assad in a speech before the Armed Services Committee when he stated:

Widespread demands for political change in Syria started more than a year ago. Rather than meeting these legitimate demands, the regime of Bashar al-Assad turned instead to violence against its own people. That violence has been brutal and devastating. It has put the Syrian people in a desperate and difficult situation. It has outraged the conscience of all good people. And it has threatened stability in a very important part of the world. The United States has made clear that the Assad regime has lost its legitimacy and that this crisis has no effective solution without Assad's departure. As the President has stated, Assad must go.

Assuming that the same forces that drove Tunisia and Egypt's leaders from their positions of power also succeed in overthrowing the Assad regime, it also remains uncertain what the implications for the Syrian people themselves might be. For instance, Clawson emphasizes that, "It is not clear how disordered the process of Assad's overthrow might be or what would be the character of a post-Assad government. To start with the transition, there is the risk of a violent civil war. Assad seems determined to rally Syria's Alawite minority to support him by exploiting the real risk that if he is overthrown, the more than 40 years of Alawite dominance over the state will end" (emphasis added).

Therefore, the younger Assad appears to be using the same methods his father used to gain and keep power by using a combination of religion, force and intimidation in appropriate portions.

Nevertheless, there are some important differences between the Syrian regime and the ousted leaders in Tunisia and Egypt as well that bear noting because these differences may have an effect on how Assad is deposed, if at all. In the latter two cases, the military enjoyed the support of the citizenry, but the military in Syria is despised, corrupt and hated by much of the populace. In this regard, Khashan (2011) emphasizes that, "Demands for democracy are unlikely to make headway in fragmented societies such as Syria and Lebanon. While Egypt and Tunisia are historically and geographically well-defined entities with fairly homogeneous populations and national attributes, Syria is dominated by a small minority sect whose fate hinges on the survival of President Bashar al-Assad's regime, which will not flinch from crushing pro-reform demonstrations, even if these do not demand a systemic change."

According to Clawson (2012), this may have an impact on how the events play out in the short-term. In this regard, Clawson advises that, "Although the Syrian government prevents the collection of information on the ethnic breakdown of the Syrian army, it is believed that the Alawites dominate the officer corps while Sunnis comprise a much larger rank and file. If provoked, Sunnis could exact revenge on the Alawites, who make up about 12% of Syria's population. Thus, although the Alawites may not like the Assad regime, they feel compelled to stick with it because of sectarian identity (emphasis added)."

Other observers feel that Syria needs a strong leader such as Egypt's ousted president Muburak, and absent this strong leadership, the country might well disintegrate into warring factions and even a failed state. For instance, Stacher adds that, "Much of the literature on Syria seems to suggest that the country requires a strong, repressive leader to offset the state's early proclivity for regime turnover. Al-Assad transformed a coup-ridden semi-state into a veritable model of authoritarian stability. The country's politics are often explained through a sectarian lens, since al-Assad hailed from Syria's minority 'Alawi sect (emphasis added)."

Of course, Syria is not the only country in the Middle East or North Africa where minority religions have dominated the country politically, socially, economically and militarily, but Syria is clearly ripe for rebellion.

This volatile mix of religion and politics has been at the forefront of the miasma that Syria now finds itself in, much to the dismay of the international community which is unsure which outcome might be in their own best interests as well as for the best interests of the Syrian people. As noted above, unlike Egypt and Tunisia, the governmental military forces in Syria have appeared to be willing and able to shoot their own people in an effort to keep the Assad regime in power. For instance, Clawson (2012) notes that, "The majority of soldiers in the key units being used for repressing protestors-namely, the Republican Guard and the 4th Mechanized Division-have proved willing shock troops against ordinary Syrians."

The ruling regime in Syria is clearly worried, though, despite the backing of the military, especially since there have been some troubling signs that all is not well in Damascus to the extent that the president is playing opposing forces off against each other. According to Clawson, "In the rest of the military, a few breaks have appeared: defections have been largely by individual soldiers rather than whole units. Assad is also playing to anxieties about Sunni extremism among the Christian community; Christians make up about 10% of the population and are important to the economy."

(2012, p. 2).

In the event Assad manages to fuel the strife between these factions, his downfall might be sufficiently delayed to make the transition drawn-out and even more violent. This point is made by Clawson (2012) who concludes, "Indeed, by November 2011, sectarian tensions in Homs, Syria's third-largest city, were leading to multiple deaths each day and to increasing population movements out of ethnically mixed neighborhoods" Rather that await a long, drawn-out overthrow of Assad, Clawson (2012) suggests that it might be time for the international community (by which he presumably means the United States and Israel) to take preemptive action by "encouraging" even more divisiveness within the ruling regime. According to Clawson, "Perhaps the best way to minimize potential sectarian violence is to encourage a split between Assad and key military officials including Alawites, such that he is overthrown from within and the old system continues, presumably with at least some reforms and greater openness."

Given the country's unstable political history prior to the Assads' assumption of power, even this eventuality carries some serious implications for the West as well as the other countries of the Middle East and North Africa. Moreover, it remains unclear whether any such division could be achieved based on the events to date. In this regard, Clawson emphasizes that, "The prospects for splitting the existing security elite from within do not look promising, which some take as an argument for why Assad's rule, unpleasant as it has become, is better than the alternative. Just how a transition could take place is uncertain; equally unclear is what Syria would look like under a new government."

(2012, p. 2).

Rather than encouraging secular divisiveness and hoping for the best, Clawson (2012) argues that one alternative would be to remove Assad from power while leaving the rest of the essential infrastructure of the country intact, an alternative that would change the presidency but little else. As Clawson puts it, "One possibility would be a coup d'etat from within, preserving Alawite rule. That could lead to a new Syria that does not look especially different from the old one. The new rulers might well continue Asad's long-established practice of promising reforms when pressured by popular protests, only to back away once the heat is off."

One of the biggest problems facing any transition to a new leadership in Syria is the fact that the country's longstanding security infrastructure and security elite will remain in place irrespective of who assumes the leadership helm. This means that even if Assad was replaced with someone who was viewed as less hostile to Western interests, the means to replicate the existing government would always be available. For instance, according to Clawson, "Even if the change in government brought new freedoms, so long as the extensive security apparatus remains in place, the new authorities would be well-positioned to reintroduce the old controls quietly and steadily."

An internal coup would allow Alawite rule to continue in Syria, and the historical record is replete with examples of ruling elite who would go to any lengths to remain in power, an outcome that may take place given the country's religious animosity. Indeed, Clawson stresses that, "Since a coup from within would continue Alawite rule, the old Alawite elite presumably would block any genuine popular voice in the government and exploit Alawite and Christian fears that democracy means Sunni rule that is oppressive toward minorities."

Analysts of the current situation in Syria indicate that a potential successor to Assad may have already been chosen, or is at least under consideration. In this regard, the editors of the Middle East Economic Digest (2012) report that, "Mandllass is the most high-profile defector from Al-Assad's inner circle and has been touted as a potential unity candidate to succeed the Syrian leader. He is a former brigadier general in the Syrian Republican Guard and childhood friend of Al-Assad. His father was defense minister under Hafez al-Assad."

In any event, a post-Assad Syria would be much like the country was immediately following its breakup with Egypt when it experienced one coup after another until the Assad family assumed power. Without Assad in charge, a power vacuum would emerge that would inevitably affect country adversely, but in what ways is uncertain. In this regard, Clawson adds that, "If Assad's overthrow leads immediately or ultimately to the collapse of the existing system, Syria will become a fragile state, which might not be much of an improvement for the Syrian people."

A report from the International Crisis Group (ICG) that called for Assad's overthrow was absolutely candid concerning the risks that are involved:

If and when ... The regime falls, Syrians will have no option but to start almost entirely from scratch. A weak and demoralised army, whose role in the current crisis has earned it no respect, cannot constitute the backbone of an emerging state. The police are notoriously corrupt and unpopular, as is the justice system as a whole. ... Ethnic and sectarian fault lines run deep in a highly divided society. With powerful and, so far, determined security services, feeble state institutions, and fragile social structures, Syria offers a stark contrast with Egypt and Tunisia, where weak regimes coexisted with relatively strong states -- in terms of their institutions -- and relatively strong societies -- in terms of their degree of cohesion and organisation.

From a strictly pragmatic perspective, then, even the most ardent opponents of the Assad regime are ambivalent about his remaining in power because any semblance of law and order in Syria today is quickly countered by renewals of violent protests by insurgents throughout the country. Indeed, more than 500 Syrians were killed by on October 30, 2012 alone by Syrian government air strikes, and this was during a 4-day ceasefire that was brokered by the United Nations. As Clawson points out, "It is hard to argue that Assad's rule provides stability when his forces are shelling more and more Syrian cities, with little discernible effect on protests, which resume at full force once the military shifts its attention elsewhere."

In sum, the options are few and the outcomes associated with all of the alternatives are potentially grim, particularly in the short-term. As Clawson points out, "Assad is already playing the sectarian card and the longer he stays, the more likely it is that sectarian tensions will grow. Furthermore, the protests are increasingly accompanied by armed conflict."

There are some solid signs that Assad is losing his grip on power, including most recently the growing armed opposition from the so-called Free Syrian Army which has successfully attacked government outposts and appears to be gaining popular support.

This point is also made by Spyer (2012) who reports, "The carnage in Syria continues and is intensifying as Bashar al-Assad's dictatorship pushes on in its countrywide effort to destroy the armed resistance against it. It appears increasingly likely that the struggle can only be settled by force. Either the dictator will crush the rebellion or the regime will fall. As a result, the rebel Free Syrian Army, as the armed element among the opposition, is playing an increasingly important role in the uprising."

For instance, on January 18, 2012, the Free Syrian Army overwhelmed Syrian government forces in the town of Zabadani where shelling had been taking place for two days.

A number of Syrian soldiers switched sides during the encounter and defected to the ranks of the Free Syrian Army.

In fact, there are some indications that the Free Syrian Army (FSA) is even planning now for a post-Assad Syria. According to the editors of the Middle East Economic Digest (2012), "The FSA has emerged as the main force in opposition to President Bashar al-Assad's rule. Headed by a prominent defector from the Syrian army, Colonel Riad al-Asaad, many of its commanders are based in Turkey, but the key factions that operate under it are on the ground in the main centres such as Idlib, Horns and now Aleppo."

Other indications of planning for the post-Assad Syria were noted in the observation that, "More recently, FSA leaders have proposed the creation of a formal structure for a future governing authority, involving higher councils for defense."

Clearly, the status quo in Syria is in jeopardy, and it appears to be only a matter of time rather than if when Assad regime's days are over. At present, though, the alternative eventualities that may result will create yet more problems for the people of Syria unless and until a truly democratic process can be implemented that avoids strongman rule. According to Spyer (2012), "The crucial issue now is whether a rival international effort to counterbalance Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah's outreach to Assad will come into being. If it does, and if this effort includes training and weaponry for the Free Syrian Army, then the rebel group has a chance to seriously challenge the regime and offer real protection to the Syrian people."

Although the outcome of the ongoing crisis in Syria remains uncertain, it is reasonable to suggest that things are going to get worse before they get better and Assad clearly holds the key to how things will play out. As Spyer emphasizes, "If [Assad does not step down] then scenes similar to those the world has seen in Homs, and far worse, are likely to be repeated across Syria in the months to come. The Free Syrian Army in Idlib Province have vowed to fight to the end. Whether the next phase will see the beginning of the end for the Assad regime or a long and drawn-out guerrilla war, depends largely on the West. As of now, the latter course appears the more likely."

In reality, though, Assad has an enormous array of resources at his disposal to delay the inevitable, and in the back of his mind he is probably thinking he can hold out forever. There are some very recent events that will also shape the future course of Syria, with the U.S. pulling Ambassador Robert Ford out of Syria in response to credible threats to his life and personal safety. According to reports from the field, "Ford antagonized the Syrian government with his high-profile support for anti-regime demonstrators by attending funerals, meeting with opposition members, and visiting Hama and Homs. Ford was not officially withdrawn; he was expected to return to Syria. Syrian Ambassador to the U.S. 'Imad Mustafa was also recalled for consultations."

With the U.S. presidential election just a few days away, President Obama is receiving increasing pressure from some quarters to do more to help the people of Syria while these events play out around them, and some analysts suggest he is failing them. Rather than look to the actual source of the misery, though, these analysts argue that it is the West's fundamental responsibility to provide humanitarian aid at a minimum. According to Guiora:

In the context of providing much needed -- actually critically required -- humanitarian intervention, the President has failed the Syrian people. While the Administration has intensified its rhetoric regarding the Syrian regime, words do not, and never have, provided actual assistance to those subjected to indiscriminate open fire orders with live ammunition. Perhaps words may satisfy the speaker, but to the victims, they are just words. While they can create expectation, and subsequent disappointment, they are not a substitute for action.

Action, though, is probably the last thing that is going to take place until the elections are over and the outcome is known, but these assertions are an indication that the Alawites are far more concerned with "putting down the mob" and remaining in power than they are about the implications these actions are having on the Syrian people. In sum, the ruling elite in Syria have stayed in power the same way they managed to attain power, through ruthless and cunning Machiavellian methods combined with the totalitarian military might that has been accumulated over the years.

Conclusion

The research showed that as a result of a bloodless military coup, Hafez el-Assad ruled from 1970 until his death in 2000 at which point his son, Bashar, assumed power. Unfortunately, the international community does not enjoy the luxury of time in resolving the conflict in Syria because thousands of people are dying while Assad tries to hang on to power by any means necessary, including killing his own people. The handwriting does appear to be on the wall for all to see, though, and Assad can surely read it as well and it is becoming increasingly apparent that his days in power are numbered and it might well be that he is deposed before this study is complete. To his credit, though, Assad has shown that he has been capable of withstanding the onslaught from all sides, and he has circled his wagons in response to the increasing pressures from without and within. In fact, absent an all-out war with the West together with the Free Syrian Army, Assad may be able to withstand an external assault for a very long time. An internal coup, though, would allow Alawite rule to continue, and it may be that Assad should be looking to his inner circle of leaders as Julius Caesar should have done with the Senate and Brutus in the coming days.

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