How Al Qaeda recruited and trained the 9/11 hijackers

How the 9/11 Hijackers Were Recruited, Trained, and Prepared for the Attacks On the morning of September 11, 2001, at 08:46, the north tower of the World Trade Center in lower Manhattan was plowed into by an airliner. At 09:03, the Southern Tower was hit by another airliner, 09:37 a third airliner plowed into the Pentagon’s western side. A fourth airliner was crushed in a field in southern Pennsylvania after intervention by passengers who knew that America was under attack. The fourth airline is headed to either the United States Capitol or the White House. In the World Trade Centre, more than 2,6000 people perished, 125 at Pentagon, 256 were on the four planes (United States Congress, 2002). In the aftermath, these attacks would come to be recognized colloquially as 9/11. These attacks were propagated by 19 Islamic extremists that were the Al Qaeda affiliates headquartered in Afghanistan. With only box cutters, small knives, pepper spray, and cans of mace in groups of four and five, they orchestrated a hijack of the planes and used them as missiles. This kind of sabotage of national security highlighted the country was caught unprepared, highlighting that the state had not anticipated such challenges.

Recruitment of Attackers The attackers were recruited by Mohammed Haydar Zammar, who surrendered to the Kurdish, United States allies at a remote checkpoint as he was fleeing the Islamic State. However, the events leading to 9/11 begun with the foundation of the Islamic State and the jihadist state in the 1980s and the 1990s, respectively (Council of State Governments; Eastern Kentucky University, 2006). In the early 1980s, young Muslims were invited by radical extremists back to Afghanistan to join as volunteers in Jihad (holy struggle) against the Soviet Union. Following the defeat of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, Osama Bin Laden formed the Al-Qaeda to spread Jihad elsewhere.
Notably, the intention to wreak havoc by Al-Qaeda in the USA was no surprise following previous attempts to attach American monuments that would cause a devastating impact on American society. Yamzi Yousef conducted the first attempt to bring down the World Trade Centre with a truck bomb. This attempt resulted in six fatalities, and 1,000 people sustained injuries. Among other landmarks in New York, plans to attack the Holland and Lincoln tunnels were frustrated after the arrest of some of the perpetrators of the attack (Dandurand, 2009). These attempts were followed up by a sequence of attacks targeting the American people and institutions locally and abroad. For example, in 1998, Al-Qaeda conducted simultaneous attacks in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya, resulting in the death of 224 individuals and injured more in thousands.
By late 1998, during the 9/11 attacks, the US government had identified the national enemy as Osama Bin Laden, leader of the Al-Qaeda. According to Mohammed Haydar Zammar, he recruited the attackers and met Osama once in 1991 to discuss the recruitment of the attackers, although he claims he did not know the plan that was in waiting for the recruits. Its perception informed the animosity towards the USA of the purveyor of tyranny that stripped the Muslims of their monuments of Muslim’s past greatness (Ilardi, 2009). The leader of the Al-Qaeda, Osama in Laden, suggested that America was the purveyor of the destruction of the Islamic pride and promised to restore it through the recruitment of the Islamic State and conduct attacks on the USA. This approach to the radicalization of unsuspecting recruits was complemented by the misinterpretation of the Quran’s Jihad, Holy War, teachings. Such teachings were founded on the ideologies of Sayyid Qutb, who was sent to study by the Egyptian government to study in the United States and acquired a superficial understanding of the western culture predicated on the fundamental perception of the Quran. Qutb’s main themes that Usama borrowed were licentiousness, unbelief, and barbarism. He described the western way of life as materialistic and one that “possessed nothing that will satisfy its conscience and justify its existence” (Ilardi, 2009). This shift in the global shift in civilization was blamed on America and used to convince the recruits into the Islamic State. Usama appealed for martyrdom. The call on his followers, “the walls of oppression and humiliation cannot be demolished except in a rain of bullets,” is the only way to restore order as an alternative to the current world’s uncertainty.
In an interview conducted with Mohammed Haydar Zammar, he recalled that during recruitment of Mohamed Atta, the leader of the 9/11 attackers, displayed high moral standards. However, after going through the training process, he was indoctrinated into the Islamic State convictions and committed to committing suicide in the ‘Holy War’ service. Atta was recruited in gatherings conducted by Mohammed Haydar Zammar posing as an Islamic preacher after failing as an Imam in a mosque in London (Ilardi, 2009). The development of the Islamic State was financed, in part, by the wealth of Usama and the network that he built in Afghanistan. Afghanistan allied with the Taliban, which Al-Qaeda used as a disguise. The financial advantage enjoyed by the Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan was linked to the Gold-Chain connected to Saudi Arabia and other nations that rely on the Gold-Chain. This freedom of movement within Afghanistan allowed Al Qaeda to move in and out. Visas allowed the Al Qaeda training camps and operation and expansion of the Islamic State’s organization. From Afghanistan, Al Qaeda would import weapons and vehicles as well as use the Afghanistan military plates. American intelligence suspects that the fighters who underwent training in Afghanistan under Usama were between 10,000 and 20,000.
The recruitment was mainly done with the oversight of Usama after winning the loyalties of the Afghan loyalties. Usama established multiple training camps where he would vet and oversee the training of fighters who had been appointed to conduct high-profile attacks. The military alliance in the Somali military also attempted to secure the Uranium to build nuclear bombs (United States Congress, 2002). Notably, the recruitment was not entirely orchestrated out of the United States but was conducted in conjunction with some Islamic State sympathizers and associates within the United States. The propagators of 9/11 had collaborators who received them after arrival into the USA in Los Angles. Khallad Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) was in charge of Khallad and Abu Bara (Sly, 2018). Both Khallad and Abu Bara would not access the USA easily compared to KSM since they had Yemeni passports that were more difficult to be granted vias than Mihdar and Hamzi, both of whom had Saudi passports that were easier to be granted US visas.
Due to this ease, the operation would be overseen by these two but was split into two parts. The second part of the plan involved hijacking planes en route to Japan, Singapore, and Korea, targeting the American embassies in these countries or grounding the planes (National Institute of Justice, 2006). The second part of the laned was aimed at the Asian targets since the Yemeni operatives would be able to fulfill their martyrdom without the need for flying skills. The objective in the first plan with Mihdhar and Hamzi was to hijack the airliners and piloting them into the World trade centers since they both had aviation training. For the Yemeni operatives, it would be easier to access Asian airliners and achieve their strategies without getting into the US. Training and Preparation for the Attack The training of the assailants who conducted the 9/11 happened in Faruq Camp in Kandahar, and Mes Aynak in Afghanistan offered full commando training. The training involved full advanced military training, including shooting, combat, and night operations. After completing their training in Mes Aynak, Hazmi, Abu Bara, and Khallad moved to Pakistan to receive instructions from KSM about western culture and travel. The training gathered material accessible about American aviation, such as aviation magazines, telephone dictionaries, for main cities such as San Diego, California, Long Beach, brochures for schools, airline timetables, and flight schools in these cities (Ilardi, 2009). In December 1999, Mihdhar arrived in Karachi, where KSM had rented a safe house to perform the training (United States Congress, 2002). The training at Karachi mainly involved English teaching on common phrases and words. The training also involved computer games that simulate aircraft models and functions. While at Karachi, they were also taught to monitor the airliner staff operations, such as the airliner attendants serving pilots or moving into the cockpit, and made inquiries at travel agencies to establish travel plans for the Asian operation.
At this stage, the American intelligence had identified the Mihdhar and monitored his communication but did not identify Hazmi, but they would have identified at this time. Khallad and Abu Bara traveled to Kaula Lumpur to study airport security and conducted flight casing. Malaysia was identified as a suitable point to launch the second operation since it did not require Saudi Arabia and the Gulf state citizens to possess a Visa. KSM doctored Hamzi’s passport to appear as though he had traveled to Kaula Lumpur from Saudi Arabia through Dubai. After he arrived in Malaysia, he had discovered that he had the opportunity to launch the second attack from Malaysia due to the observed air travel leniency towards travelers from the Gulf countries (United States Congress, 2002). Bangkok Khallad boarded a flight to Hong Kong booking the first-class ticket he identified was a mistake since he could not case the movements into the cockpit (UNODC, 2021). However, he tested the security measures at the airport by bringing a box of clutter onto the plane. The airport security opened the clutter and saw the clutter but let him onto the plan with the clutter (Ilardi, 2009). After this flight casing mission, Khallad returned to Kaula Lumpur. The other operatives, Mihdhar, Abu Bara, and Hamzi, arrived at Kaula Lumpur soon after. From Kaula Lumpur, Khallad moved to Bangkok for a meeting with Nibras and Queso, whose ship-bombing operation had failed.
From Bangkok, Khallad moved from Bangkok to Kandahar through Karachi to report the finding to Usama. Soon after, Usama canceled the Asian plan since he found that coordinating the USA and Asia operations would be too strenuous. Hamzi and Mihdhar were deployed from Bangkok to the US and arrived in Los Angeles on January 15, 2000. In Afghanistan, Al Qaeda had begun recruiting western-educated men who hailed from Egypt, UAE, Yemen, and Lebanon who were schooled and were classmates in Hamburg (United States Congress, 2002). These recruits were also destined for the airstrike in the US. These recruits included Mohamed Atta, Ramzi Binalshibh, and Ziad Jarrah. These recruits intended to join the Al Qaeda to pledge war towards Germany where they had studied, but Usama redirected their Jihad mission against the US. KSM and Abu Zubaydah planned their commute to the US by first creating a passport office at Kandahar (United States Congress, 2002). Airport that altered authentication of the fighters, such as passports, visas, and identification cards. This strategic organization was intended to teach the operatives how to forge documents and adapt to circumstances that would topple the planned attacks accordingly. Complexities Associated with the Study of Terrorism The study of terrorism has been marred by complexities with different attempts of differentiating terrorism from insurgency, warfare, and criminal activity. According to the 260th resolution of the UN, it essentially brought humanity to the act that not only examined the malevolent acts conduceted but ought to defend the human rights that are violated by violent conduct against humanity. The 260th resolution of the UN held that:
“Persons charged with genocide shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction” was the policy as stipulated in Act IV of the resolution” (Duffy, 2005).
Typically, terrorism is recognized as any crimes that are orchestrated against humanity. The 9/11 bombing of the United States trade center twin towers and Congress and the fourth jet that was shot down in an open field in Pennsylvania were certainly acts of terrorism (Duffy, 2005). Consequently, this raises whether the attacks leveled against all American citizens qualified as an international crime. If this is the case, the ICC should have followed them up to prosecute the culprits.
“(b) Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act,” (UNODC, 2021).
The complexity in the study of terrorism, insurgency, warfare, and criminal activity arises from the fact that these criminal groups liaise to develop an agreement that is destined to meet the prerequisites of the belief conviction and meet the challenges associated with the development of common interest (UNODC, 2021). The management of the challenges is associated with developing a common understanding of the difficulties associated with developing common interests. Management of these challenges made it possible for the corporation to meet the development of common goal tards the development of a com

Figure 1: Strata of crime-terror Nexus (UNODC, 2021).
As such, terrorism is interdependent with organized crime, although they differ in that terrorism is concerned with intimidating a national or large population to compel a government or international organization to bulge towards the political, religious, or social conditions held as a maxim terrorist organization. Conversely, criminal organizations are motivated to conduct malevolent plans due to financial motivation and material benefits directly or indirectly (UNODC, 2021). However, the complexities in the study of terrorism arise because terrorist groups often align their interests with those of criminal organizations to secure a strategy to raise financial resources to fund their terrorist motives. Therefore, criminal groups can liaise with terrorist groups to secure an operational mandate that is secured by the materialistic operational favors, such as the Al Qaeda, to meet the objectives related to raising the ‘profit’ required to fulfill the terrorist objectives and secure an unobstructed lifeline for the terrorist group.
As such, terrorist organizations and criminal organizations’ objectives overlap due to the convenient symbiotic relationship that underlies their operations. As such, terrorist groups can adopt conventional tactics employed by criminal groups to generate profits from either drug trafficking or any other illicit trade, such as the exploitation of the Gold-Chain by the AL Qaeda to raise the necessary to fund their objectives, which essentially predicated on ideological differences with a certain state (National Institute of Justice, 2006). Consequently, the UN General Assembly Resolution 55/25 called upon the states to recognize the connection between organized crime and acts of terrorism and seek to establish the relationship, if any, or interdependence among them to develop suitable counter-terrorism and anti-criminal activities contingencies.
The September 11 9/11 attacks were crimes against humanity since they were deliberately intended to kill mass numbers of American civilians for political and consequent economic implications and intimidation. Notably, they were an offense on civilian’s constitutional rights and liberties, qualifying them as crimes against humanity. The primary death of 246 people and 18 terrorists on the four planes who were in charge of the execution of the bombing perished. In the World Trade Centre, more than 2,6000 people perished, 125 at Pentagon, 256 were on the four planes. In the aftermath, these attacks would come to be recognized colloquially as 9/11 (Ilardi, 2009). These attacks were propagated by 19 Islamic extremists that were the Al Qaeda affiliates headquartered in Afghanistan. Conversely, insurgents are limited to the national conflict that seeks to impose their rule or topple their ruling government due to either economic, social, or political differences with the ruling regime. Recommendations On a constitutional basis, the 9/11 attack was an act against humanity which qualifies it according to the ICC terms as an international legal body recognizes Al Qaeda as propagators of the heinous crime against humanity. The leniency in the regulation of international travel requires a change in the international travel policies to require Visas despite any trade agreements to secure global air travel from abuse by terrorist organizations. Notably, for ICC to be involved in cases such as 9/11, the respective nations have to be signatories to the Rome Statute. Unfortunately, the United States under the leadership of President Bill Clinton resulted in the resignation from the Rome statute due to oversight of some of the USA concerns not being addressed. Further, President Bush administration was opposed to being part of the remnant signatories to the ICC, arguing that the institution had critical issues with bias, such as sweeping political power without regulation by the UN that made it susceptible to manipulation.
Consequently, the US administration felt it would be exposed as a signatory to the ICC holding national sovereignty and acting in its jurisdiction, even over the countries’ military personnel of non-party states in some circumstances. However, the resignation from the ICC limited the extent to which the states that had been part of 9/11 could be forced to examine their policies or participate in the investigation productively. The US intelligence was caught off guard for expecting the terrorist to act in the conventional methods and failed to remain alert in detecting new methods of attraction. For example, the intelligence would have identified and tracked the communications with Hamzi while they began tracking Mahdhar. Notably, the regulation of the migration laws became stringent for immigrants from across the globe, but this still does leave room for the abuse of the established laws. Notably, these loopholes can be mitigated by a proactive approach to intelligence and frequent adjustment of policies in air travel and consistent tracking of the cases that have been identified in advance. References