Baltic EU Russia, the Baltic

Baltic EU

Russia, the Baltic States and the European Union

The research conducted here below concerns the current state of hostility and disconnect between Russia and the Baltic States of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Simultaneously achieving independence in 1991, the three states in question would enter into NATO and the EU in 2004. Problematic foreign policy and citizenship issues illustrate a conflict in its policy of Europeanization and simultaneous Soviet disavowal. This has proved an unrealistic way of moving forward in a region where Russia remains an imposing force.

Central Puzzle:

Past:

Our research begins with the period initiated in 1991 and leading up to 2002. This first decade following the Cold War would see many parts of the world redefined by a major shift in power distribution. As the period leading up to the collapse of the Soviet Union would predicate, the Baltic States would be of particular influence in fomenting the internal rupturing of an empire. As the research here considers the hostility which remains between the two sides, it is not surprising that a mutual distrust and resentment has prevented any easy resolution between the parties.

This reality is underscored by such claims as that provided by Bajarunas et al. (1995), which argues that the Baltic seemed inherently poised to serve as a place of inflection on independence from Russian influence. Bajarunas et al. argue that "the Baltic republics played a pivotal role in dismantling the Soviet Union's 'external empire'. Gorbachev's policy of glasnost, introduced in 1986, allowed critical debate to spread beyond dissident groups. This gave rise to the formation of opposition groups

in all three Baltic states (the Latvian Popular Front; Sajudis in Lithuania; and the Popular Front of Estonia), which became focal points for popular movements calling for national independence." (p. 4)

With their success would come a ripple of uprisings throughout the Soviet Union, inviting no small amount of Russian antipathy toward the publics of the Baltic States as it reeled to redefine itself. Indeed, the Baltic States would simultaneously and successfully declare their independence in 1991, with the former Soviet Union recognizing this independence immediately thereafter. The decade to follow would mark a democratization and Europeanization of the Baltic States, which collectively determined to remove the vestiges of Russia's illegal occupation through political reform and alignment with its Western European neighbors. A consequence of this has been a pointed neglect of relations with Russia to its East.

Present:

Today, the neglect of relations between Russia and the Baltic States has festered as the sides have strode divergent paths. Russia struggles with economic turmoil, political corruption and a general instability in its form of governance. The Baltic States have, by contrast, engaged dramatic reform as they have worked to gain membership in the EU. To this end, the Baltic States would adopt forms of government and policy reflective of European values and, it bears noting, pointedly divergent from Soviet values. Accordingly, EU Facts (2010) reports that "all three countries are republics and are representative parliamentary democracies. In Lithuania, the President is elected by popular vote along with the members of parliament. In Latvia and Estonia Parliament appoints the president after the election." (EU Facts, 1)

Upon attaining these reforms, the Baltic States would engage in earnest in a process of ascension to the EU which would persist from 2002 to 2004. After a process of discourse on the benefits and drawbacks of membership, "Latvia voted by a large majority to join the European Union in a referendum on September 21. The small Baltic country, once part of the Soviet Union, was the last amongst the current wave of countries being admitted to the European Union, as part of its expansion eastwards, to have its entry endorsed by the population." (James & Green, 1)

Present day is defined both by the rapid growth and painful retraction which were to follow for the Baltic States. In spite of the immediate benefits realized through resource proliferation, economic growth and global trade expansion, the Baltic States are today ravaged much in the way as are many other developing nations connected to the recession. As Seputyte & Gomez (2009) report, the Baltic States are today experiencing the brunt of the recession and many in the public have attributed it to a dependency on an unstable EU.

Perspectives:

This perspective drives current thinking on the need for the Baltic States to step back from their total disengagement with Russia. The focus on Europeanization has imposed an interdependence upon the Baltic States that makes their isolation from Eastern Europe problematic during times of focused recession. This need butts up against the cultural tensions which are a dominant force in the current relationship.

Perceptions:

In a sense, perception remains a problematic interloper in the process of moving forward for all parties. Between Russia and the Baltic States, there remains a mutual sense of being aggrieved over the events marking Soviet history. So reports the text by Buhbe & Kempe (2005), which identifies the divergent perceptions of the Cold War as a persistent obstacle in realizing the ambitions of opportunity reflected by the European alliance. Buhbe & Kempe report that "dedicated to legacies of the past, both sides are hindered by mental maps that aim at compensation for moral damages and that cloak the pursuit of political goals in the rhetoric of history. As a consequence, the necessity of work-ing together in areas of economic and cross-border co-operation is overshadowed by the lack of strategic thinking, and by the lack of an ability to go beyond history towards new

European relations. " (p. 3)

This speaks to the cultural connection that many parties feel toward the immediate past, with the conflict, oppression and revolution of the 20th century still fresh in the minds of many participants. As the research here denotes, Russia's role has shifted dramatically but views on Russia remain in some regards steadfastly connected to the role filled by the Soviet Union. This perception is only further magnified by Russia's difficulties in evolving past the totalitarian traits which previously identified it both internally and continentally.

Background:

Following its long and often brutal occupation of the states surrounding it, the Soviet Union's collapse would be celebrated by a number of its newly independent territories. And in the ashes of this collapse would form a new hatred and resentment between the two parties, to the extent that many Russian ethnic groups remaining in the newly independent states have struggled for equality under emergent regimes. For Russia, this highlights a shared contempt for the Baltic States in particular, with a public Moscow survey reported on by Buhbe & Kempe indicating that Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, joined only by Georgia, ranked among those states most perceived as enemies of Russia. (p. 4) The result is a withdrawal from policy consideration where their membership in the EU is concerned. Buhbe & Kempe indicate that "although the Russian Federation seems to be working on its relationship with the EU, it clearly lacks a pro-active policy concerning the EU enlargement to the Baltic states. Current controversies are related to signing the border treaties, advocating the rights of the Russian-speaking population in the Baltic states and using rhetoric of confrontation rather than rhetoric of dialogue as an important means of accumulating political capital." (p. 4)

As Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia have coalesced to achieve membership in the European Union, that have done so with what our research finds are two imperatives which are often characterized as interdependent. Namely, Buhbe & Kempe argue that "the Baltic states' idea of 'returning to Europe' has remained closely intertwined with the idea of 'distancing from Russia'. That is, the EU means not only economic and political forms Baltic states should adopt, but also 'salvation' from Russian influence. Overall the Baltic states have fewer questions about their identity than their Russian neighbours, but at the same time their position can be characterised as restricting their activities to one side of the pitch and forgetting the other strategic half." (p. 4)

Such is to say that the opportunities of gaining access to European economic growth, of being guided by its political progress and of being granted participation in its diplomatic processes has been regarded by the Baltic States as a counterpoint to the period of isolation and occupation experience under the sway of the iron curtain. While this is accurate in many ways, it has also instigated a scenario in which these states have been largely unwilling to engage Russia economically, diplomatically or culturally. To the extent that this promotes a certain isolation of Russia from matters within its geographical radius, it may be viewed that the unofficial Baltic policy of Russian disengagement is furthering the struggle of Russia to transform into a viable participant in global trade.

SWOT:

The primary strength in helping to move forward the process of harmonious diplomacy between Russia and the Baltic is the influence of the European Union. The EU has placed certain demands upon the Baltic States calling for their resolution of inconsistencies in citizenship policies.

A core weakness in the current dynamic seems to be the laxity of enforcement on the part of the EU with respect to this issue of citizenship. According to EU Facts, "although they had to improve their citizenship process in order to join the EU in 2004, a significant proportion of the population (10% of Estonians and 19% of Latvians) have still not been given these rights. Relations with Russia are critical to all three countries." (p. 1)