Structural Violence Framework in International Conflict
Structural Violence
A Structural Violence Framework for Understanding & Analyzing International Conflict
Introduction to Structural Violence
Structural violence is differentiated from direct violence both in terms of etiology and nature. Direct violence is a result of events or the actions of individuals that kill or harm people. Structural violence, on the other hand, is a phenomenon made manifest through social inequalities (Christie, 1997). The organizational structures of political and economic systems cause and sustain the sort of hierarchical relations that enable dramatic differences between and across sectors of societies. Within these hierarchies, the people at the top have privilege, wealth, and power, while those at the bottom of the hierarchy are dominated, oppressed, and exploited (Christie, 1997). People are harmed and killed as a result of structural violence but, unlike direct violence, it occurs more slowly. The harm or death of oppressed people may come about because "some people are deprived of food, shelter, healthcare, and other resources" (Christie, 1997). Because structural violence is embedded in a society's way of being, over the long-term, groups of people may not be able to meet their basic needs to the degree that normal development and growth is impacted.
In order for structural violence to become established in a society or geographic region, or under the particular conditions of war, people must necessarily rationalize and tolerate structural violence. One aspect of the tolerance for structural violence is militarization. While military action is idealistically utilized to protect those with the fewest physical or material resources -- children, women, and indigenous populations -- militarization often establishes conditions that result in the most harm coming to these vulnerable people (Christie, 1997).
Philosophical Grounding of Structured Violence Theory
This paper will argue that a structural framework substantively contributes to an analysis and understanding of international conflict. That the topic of structural violence has bearing on international conflict, per se, is crystallized in the work of Rittenberger (1973). Rittenberger argues that the construct of violence as held by international organizations, such as the United Nations, does not include the notion of structural violence, but rather is focused on direct violence. The problem, according to Rittenberger, is that international organization is "an adaptive outgrowth of the modern state system" (1973), characterized by the same skewed perceptions and the careful lens of the parent agent. It is not enough to examine violence with the macro context of the nation or the micro context of the culture, if the macro and micro contexts are viewed through the filters of the modern nation states. It would seem that Einstein's caution is born out, that "We can't solve our problems with the same thinking we used when we created them" (Brainy Quote, 2011). A structural framework approach assumes -- and is informed by -- systems thinking in which violence is examined within the macro and micro contexts in which it occurs -- but that approach alone is insufficient. What makes a structural framework different, and what gives it capacity, is the thorough consideration of cultural influences and structural configurations that condition conflict. In this manner, as this paper will argue, a structural framework promotes separation from the confining paradigms of various disciplines and institutions, and moves it into the realm of critical theory.
Theories are grounded in their disciplines. The same holds true for theories supporting a structural violence framework which is intended to foster an understanding of international conflict. The structural violence framework is oriented toward critical theory, with "the goal of identifying and overcoming all the circumstances that limit human freedom" (Bohman, 2010) and that lead to violent conflict. Just as in classic critical theory, structural violence theories "could be furthered only through interdisciplinary research that includes psychological, cultural, and social dimensions, as well as institutional forms of domination" (Bohman, 2010). When considering theories of structural violence and conflict, and also the corollary theories of peace research, it is important to examine how the theoretical frameworks address both ontology and epistemology.
Patomaki argues that the ultimate task of these theories is the "transformation from politics to violence and vice versa" (2001, p. 1). In other words, if heterodoxical, or dissident, discourse is to occur, then theories must address the body of research and the praxis on which the research is based. Patomaki (2001) proposes a theoretical framework based on realist ontology with its inclusive open systems and open history base, and epistemological relativism. Realist ontology, here, is taken to mean that universals are real and that they exist independently of anything upon which they may be predicated, or that instantiate them. Epistemological relativism informs theories about structural violence, cultural violence, and peace, in that, it underscore the subjectivity of our thinking about the nature of the "thing" (Patomaki, 2001). That is, our thinking about the being or epistemology of violence which occurs as a result of the way society structures itself or the way in which members of society perceive the "rightness" of the structure, culture, and praxis.
Theories of Structural Violence
A number of structural violence theoretical frameworks exist (Rogers & Ramsbotham, 1999), and the field is dominated by several, which will be briefly outlined in this section, and referred to in subsequent sections.
The most fundamental issue when discussing conventional views of violence is that they are incomplete in as much as the viewpoints attempt to explain the phenomenon of violence in terms of its particulars (Rogers & Ramsbotham, 1999). Like the blind men exploring the elephant in the room, these authors may seize on a particular element of violence and attempt to explain the corpus by discussing the part. As Barak (2003) points out, these one-dimensional explanations focus on the behavioral and interpersonal expressions of violence and fail to include the institutional or structural expressions of violence. Barak argues that a complete theory of violence must incorporate a "reciprocal integration of interpersonal, institutional, and structural violence" (2003, paragraph 1).
Most commonly held viewpoints of violence within particular disciplines, such as psychology, sociology, anthropology, and criminology, are based on a dualistic, non-critical structure. Barak (2003) provides an analytical framework that examines these discipline-grounded theories on the basis of four main factors: The etiology of violence is believed to internal or external, and either normative or aberrant, depending on the constructs held with regard to the relationship between violence and perceived human nature.
A new tier of theories about violence has emerged that goes well beyond the uni-dimensional and interpersonal theories, to more complex frameworks. According to Barak (2003), these second tier theories tend to cluster in three categories: Integrative, developmental, and life-course frameworks. Integrative theories of violence emphasize the dynamics between the internal and external influences of violence and non-violence, and the interplay of these influences with the constraints and motivations related to violence and non-violence. The life-course and developmental theories of violence focus on the behavioral trajectories of individuals during their life-spans. Barak is explicit in his description of the inclusiveness and interactive aspects of these second tier theories, saying that,
The application of these pathways to violence and/or nonviolence recognize the accumulative natures of these behaviors, the reciprocal consequences of abusive and non-abusive behavior and the integral relationships between events, situations, and conditions in the course of one's personal and social experiences. (Barak, 2003, paragraph 1)
Commonly held behaviorally-based theories about violence explain incidences of violence as problems of self-control or social control. The difficulty with these common theories, explains Barak, is that they tend to reduce the analysis of violence to explicative variable, even though the theories may discuss the influence of other variables. In his research, Barak set out a typology of theories of violence (2003). He identifies 12 current theories, eight of which offer a uni-dimensional structural framework. The 12 theories Barak identifies in his typology are: "Exchange theory, sub-cultural theory, resource theory, patriarchal theory, ecological theory, social learning theory, evolutionary theory, socio-biological theory, pathological conflict theory, psychopathological theory, general systems theory, and inequality theory" (Barak, 2003). The four theories that include multiple factors within their conceptual frameworks are: Pathological conflict (internally motivated and internally constrained variables); ecological theory (externally motivated and externally constrained variables); inequality theory (internally motivated and externally motivated variables); and general systems theory (externally constrained variables, and internally motivated and externally motivated variables) (Barak, 2003).
Seminal Research in Structural Violence
The previous section provides an overview and a typology of the many theories of structural violence. To fill out some small portion of the larger typology, and to give color to some of the theories, this section will briefly discuss select sources of seminal research in the field of structural violence.
In the 1960s, Johan Galtung posited the construct of violence as a phenomenon generated by the existence of social barriers that deny needs satisfaction in certain sectors of society. Galtung's conceptual framework illustrates the relationship between the structure of society and the inequalities experienced by its citizens. Gilman's seminal definition of structural violence reads, "physical and psychological harm that results from exploitive and unjust social, political, and economic systems" (1983, p. 8).
Whenever a group or sector of society is prevented from meeting basic needs, there is opportunity for conflict, and often for violence. The relationship between structural violence and actual or direct violence is robust. Like most attributes of social systems, structural violence occurs along a continuum. At the lowest end, is domestic violence; at the highest, war. Importantly, the unit of analysis for structural violence varies depending on the type of structural violence being investigated. Research on structural violence can focus on an individual, as in an ethnographic case study, or it can examine the society of a nation.
Not all structural violence occurs directly. Much structural violence is insidious, happening subtly, but to entire classes or groups of people. As James Gillian (1983) argues, people on the lower levels of society experience higher death and disability rates -- not because of intrinsic differences between these classes or groups -- but because of differences in their life experiences and treatment. The nexus at which status inequalities turn into structural violence is cultural. The term cultural violence refers to the legitimizing process that occurs when violence, whether direct or indirect, is viewed by particular members of society as normative.
The roots of structural violence are historical, psychological, sociological, and economic. Historical and psychological roots contribute strongly to cultural violence. Very real struggles occur between individual and classes in a society driven by a belief in the immutable nature, or historical rightness, of a particular conflict. An equally strong driver of cultural violence is the sense of psychological rightness, which is largely based on individual perspectives of superiority or inferiority. Certainly, economic and sociological influences establish cultural conflict, which may be conjoint with cultural violence. The clash of supply and demand inequities can result in economically-based struggles as people attempt to get basic needs met when there does not appear -- or actually are not -- enough of fundamental commodities to go around. If one couples economic inequities with sociological justifications for maintaining those inequalities, the potential for flash fires of violence becomes very real.
Gilman (1997) notes that these examples of structural violence -- poverty and hunger, particularly -- could not exist without the permission of the people on earth at the present time. Further, he argues, an obstacle to peace is the human tendency to easily look the other way, to "acquiesce in injustice...and disclaim "response ability" (Gilman, 1997).
Burton draws a firm line in his work (2001) by insisting that that "peace begins at home," and that domestic or "family violence" must be considered a form of structural violence that occurs within a private sphere. His argument takes strength from the construct of family as one of the "main institutions of society" (Burton, 2001).
The Influence of Globalization on Structural Violence
In this section, the concepts developed by Galtung, Gillian, and Gilman, as well as the typology presented by Barak, will be applied to an exploration of the relation of globalization to structural violence. Globalization is presented here as the macro context for against which the micro level conflict of nations is examined.
Today, a structural violence framework applied to international conflict must consider the influence of globalization. According to Lerche & Tidwell (2004), globalization "is an accelerator of social change, and as such, may act as a catalyst for conflict, aggravating the tensions in any given society and even creating new ones. At the same time, it may catalyze and accelerate conflict resolution" (2004, p. 47-48). Inarguably, interpersonal connections are influenced when technology-enhanced communication promotes a sense of interconnectedness. In the same manner, globalization brings about 'intensifying interconnectedness" which can have both purposeful and accidental impact on international peace and conflict (Lerche & Tidwell, 2004, p. 13). Consideration of the interplay between 'marketization and democratization" in developing countries is useful for examining the impact of globalization. When a country engages in processes that lead to the development of democratic governance and also fixes an eye on competing in the global marketplace, the underlying goals are generally to "empower local populations" (Lerche & Tidwell, 2004, p. 57) but unintended negative outcomes may instead be the result. As Lerche & Tidwell emphasize, "[The actual] problematic area is not democratization or marketization per se, but rather their interactions with local circumstances" (2004, p.57).
Conflict diamonds. The disturbing events associated with "conflict diamonds' provides a solid example for evaluating the utility of a structural violence framework to examine conflict. Although direct violence typically occurs within the boundaries of the countries where the mines are located, the market for the conflict diamonds is global. The South African DeBeers cartel dominates the market with ownership in about 40% of the world's diamond mines (Goreux, 2001). Diamond mines are located in Australia, Canada, Russia, and South Africa. Extensive diamond polishing enterprises exist in Antwerp, Bombay, Dubai, and London. The primary markets for cut diamonds are Japan and the U.S. (Goreux, 2001).
The integrative theory posited by Barak, in which conflict theory is based on the "reciprocal integration of interpersonal, institutional, and structural violence" (2003, paragraph 1) fits well with this brief analysis of the impact of globalization on the dynamics surrounding conflict diamonds, particularly when the diamonds are the source of funds for military operations. About a decade ago, the trade in raw diamonds amounted to approximately $7.25 billion (Goreux, 2001, p. 3). Of this figure, trade in conflict diamonds is estimated to about $250 million, or 3.5% of the total diamond trade (Goreux, 2001, p. 3). This valuable commodity is traded on global markets and provides substantive funding for conflict in Angola and Sierra Leone.
The effect of several troublesome dynamics can be seen in the conflict diamond sector, all of which are related either directly or indirectly to globalization. There is tremendous global demand for diamonds which originate in areas fraught with extreme violence. Historically, insurgency campaigns have not been checked by an ineffective, failed central government (Goreux, 2001). Access to the mines is a given in these African regions and with no other sources of external funding available to the paramilitary troops, the military turns easily to a position from which mining activities can be controlled and funds will be assured. UNITA, the rebel force in Angola turned to diamond mining after the Cold War ended and the U.S. withdrew funding (Goreux, 2001). Diamonds were stockpiled by UNITA, basically in order to control the market, and as diamonds were sold, the money was used to buy weapons in order to continue attempts to overthrow the government in Luanda (Goreux, 2001). In Sierra Leone, a war has been going on between the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and the central government since 1991. This RUF military campaign is funded by proceeds from diamond smuggling. More than 20,000 people have been killed in this war, with nearly 2 million people displaced from their homes, and countless horribly maimed and disfigured.
Also, al-Qaeda is suspected of using money from smuggled conflict diamonds to fund terrorism. The allegation is that al-Qaeda operatives in Africa purchase conflict diamonds, have them exported, and then covert them into laundered cash (Farah, 2001, A-1). Ostensibly, "A diamond on the finger of a casualty of the attack on the World Trade Center may well have once been traded by al-Qaeda and mined by those working with the RUF" (Goreux, 2001, p. 51).
Conflict diamonds are central to the exploitation of people in Angola and Sierra Leone. The importance of culture and a hierarchical society are evident in this struggle. In addition, the impact of militarization and enduring conflict that has become a way of life (normalization) determine the nature of the struggle. Further, there is an embedded incentive to maintain the violent and chaotic situation in Sierra Leone. To the strength of the global diamond market has been added the lucrative global arms trade. As long as the mining continues, there will be funds available for weapons and a market for diamonds. As long as the war continues, there will be a market for guns. Absent the strong global markets, might the internal struggle in Angola and Sierra Leone be quite different from what it currently is?
A type of perfect storm has taken shape in Angola and Sierra Leone where the vectors all come together in a way that is sure, all things remaining the same, to result in violence. Cuesta and Murshed argue that while "factors such as inequality, poverty, polarization, exclusion, ethnic tensions, natural resource appropriation all contribute to the risk of conflict, yet some societies having such conditions do not descend into conflict" (2008, p. 6). Cuesta and Murshed posit that, in addition to the presence of abhorrent conditions such as those listed above, "for greed and grievance to take the form of large-scale violence" (2008, p.6) some breach of social contract must have occurred. A social contract is an established set of conditional rules to which the parties widely agree and that, formally or informally, govern the way resources are accessed, divided, or distributed (Addison and Murshed, 2001). If the social contract works well -- is "viable, credible, and enforceable," then the group's behavior may effectively be restrained (Addison and Murshed, 2001). But if it is not effective, then opportunistic behavior will dominate and there are highly likely to be incidences of large-scale confiscation of resources and grievances will take violent expression (Addison and Murshed, 2001). Azam (2001) supports the social contract construct as a catalyst for violence, and argues that inter-ethnic conflict in Africa is "the result of the state's failure to make a fair provision of resources among ethnic groups, thus encouraging individuals to rely more on ethnic capital" or group-specific capital. Ulsaner (1999, 2003) refers to this hyper-focus on one's own ethnic group as "particularized trust," which is at the core of differentiated treatment of particular groups of people and at the core of structural violence theory.
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