French-English Relations in Canada
In the 20th century, Canada has two significant relationships in foreign policy -- one with the UK and one with the U.S.A. The UK essentially set Canada's foreign policy "during the decades following Confederation" -- a fact which tested Canadian loyalty and Canadian unity (since it was, number one, a policy that meant to look out for the best interests of the UK). In the latter half of the 20th century, however, French-English relations in Canada experienced a very serious strain. This paper will analyze and discuss that strain, showing how it came about and what it entails.
While at the beginning of the 20th century, the Canadian census reported that almost 90% of all Canadian peoples were of French or British heritage, the complete emphasis of foreign policy upon British inheritance certainly set the tone for the straining of French-English relations in Canada. This was a reflection of the voice of British Imperialism, started anew in Canada thanks largely to the British Colonial Secretary at the time, Joseph Chamberlain. Canadian Imperialists virtually lined up behind the British Imperialist, believing their interests were the same at heart. To a degree, it was. Canadian Imperialism was represented best by the English-speakers of Canada. Yet, Canada also had its French-speakers whose heritage differed extensively and who saw no such "moral obligation to support Britain and British interests at the international level" ("External Forces and Domestic Realities").
On the other hand, Canadian Nationalists wanted nothing to do with the British influencing of foreign policy -- they believed that it should be set solely by Canadians themselves. The Boer War played a big part in establishing this belief. While Britain went to war with the Boers at the end of the 19th century, calling on the support of English-speaking Canadian Imperialists (who voiced a loud solidarity with the UK), the French-speaking population was less enthralled by the idea of a war against a "linguistic and cultural minority fighting for survival against an Anglo-Saxon onslaught" ("External Forces and Domestic Realities"). The French-speaking Canadians wanted nothing to do with the affair -- they were on the side of the "enemy."
The Alaskan Boundary Dispute also served as a reminder to French-speaking Canadians that relations with English-speaking nations was of primary importance for Canada. The resolution of the Dispute only reinforced the idea that the UK had its own interests at heart -- not Canada's.
British influence continued to strain French-English relations in Canada with the WWI and the Depression that followed. The same sentiments regarding the Mother Land and Canadian sovereignty were raised once again, with English-speaking British Imperialists on the side of the UK and French-speaking Canadian Nationalists on the side of a foreign policy that was independent of English manipulation. The latter sentiment was especially strong in the French-dominated territory of Quebec. French-speakers in Quebec wanted Canada to be viewed as a dictator of its own policy and as a separate entity altogether from the UK.
During the WWI, conscription and the fact that the Canadian military showed no zeal in establishing French-speaking regimental units did nothing to fix French-English relations. In fact, riots in Quebec illustrated the strain that Canada was undergoing. When the riots turned shockingly violent, Quebec began debating seceding from the Canadian Union.
By mid-century, relations between the two sides had not gotten any better. Domestic policy was now seriously skewed toward benefiting English-speaking Canadians. In fact, "Anglo-Canadian workers during the 1950s earned 50% more than francophones within the province of Quebec" ("External Forces and Domestic Realities"), despite the fact that in Quebec, French-speakers were the vast majority.
Other domestic policies, such as the new social welfare programs that were booming at mid-century, were not supported by French-speakers. Medicare became a huge issue in the politics at the time -- but one thing the government was able to do at this point in Canadian history was to boost the individual level of prosperity for many Canadians. However, most of those Canadians were English-speaking: "Aboriginal peoples, African-Canadians, francophones and new immigrants…suffered disproportionate levels of poverty" ("External Forces and Domestic Realities").
Problems continued into the 1970s with "a large segment of Quebec's francophone population [viewing] the political status quo as not protecting its cultural identity" ("Challenges and Opportunities"). Canadian ethnicity, as a result, has undergone a substantial change: a nation of diverse peoples is now on the brink of homogenization, with the homogeneity being on the side of the English.
Nonetheless, the 1980s saw a new Constitution Act that meant to preserve and support Canadian multi-culture. The Act, however, was somewhat farcical as it still denied rights to specific races of Aboriginals. As for French-speaking citizens, the Charlottetown Agreement "included recognition of Quebec's distinctiveness and of its need to promote the French language, culture and civil law" ("Challenges and Opportunities"), but again, such paper agreements hardly met the reality or rose to the occasion deemed necessary by decades of cultural and political strain. The failure to achieve any kind of "constitutional agreement with Quebec produced political consequences at both the federal and provincial levels" ("Challenges and Opportunities").
Immigration also presented a problem for French-English relations in the latter half of the 20th century, as many French-speakers feared the new immigrants would be "anglicized" -- a not unjustifiable fear, since most Canadian policy had been virtually dictated by English interests. In fact, from the end of WWII to the 1980s, "between one-half and two-thirds of immigrants were English-speaking, while three percent of immigrants were francophone" ("Challenges and Opportunities"). Thus, French-speakers in Quebec saw this new immigration as a threat to their own cultural identity and way of life. French-speakers were now being outnumbered and (politically more than ever) outgunned.
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