Intelligence dissemination failures before the Pearl Harbor attack

Intelligence Producers and Intelligence Users Comment by Frank, Kevin K: This paper would benefit from a hard look at organization to ensure that the argument is presented clearly.You have also not established your key point. You have over-focused on SIS, an ARMY SIGINT unit who was responsible for decrypting the Japanese diplomatic code. But that code to not include nay war or attack plans.The Navy was responsible for the Navy code, but was not decrypting it in Dec 1941. The Navy was using a method called traffic analysis and HFDF.Was it the Army's fault that the only method to communicate was via Western Union telegraphs?Why does Tagg say " With all evidence indicating the Japanese army would continue its aggression in the Southwest Pacific, MID intelligence estimates, myopically, focused on that region. " Did that include Hawaii?Even if the SIS "14 part message" had gotten into the hands of the Navy and Army commander in Hawaii, what do you think they would have done? Did that message say the Japanese were going to attack PH?Your argument is not sound because you have interpreted what your authors have said to fullfill what you want, rather than what they are really saying.In the next two weeks see if you can adjust your argument to match what they say. You are far off.You need to include page numbers in citations where where you can.
Introduction
The intelligence failure at Pearl Harbor is a good example of the need for those who produce intelligence to find new ways to make intelligence more accessible and user-friendly without sacrificing its accuracy, integrity, or usefulness. Intelligence that is useable is intelligence that can save lives (Pillar, 2018). It can influence outcomes (Piacine, 1997). If intelligence is not useable, it takes power away from leadership (Betts, 2009). At Pearl Harbor, intelligence was coming in from a variety of sources, including intercepted Japanese diplomatic cables, radio intercepts, and reports from HUMINT informants in Japan. As Tagg (2017) reports, "With all evidence indicating the Japanese army would continue its aggression in the Southwest Pacific, MID intelligence estimates, myopically, focused on that region." Intelligence could have been improved by answering the question, “Where might the Japanese engage with hostilities?” Had intelligence sought to answer this question it might have given military leaders more to think about in terms of protecting Pearl Harbor. However, this information was not properly disseminated to key decision-makers, resulting in a tragic misappropriation of resources and ultimately the loss of many lives. In the years since Pearl Harbor, significant strides have been made in improving intelligence analysis and dissemination. However,In the field of intelligence, there is always room for improvement, and it is incumbent upon those who produce intelligence to find new ways to make their products more accessible and user-friendly without sacrificing accuracy or usefulness. The following aim of this White Paper is to show that those who produce intelligence must find new ways to make intelligence it more accessible and user-friendly without sacrificing losing its ability to answer the important questions that leaders want answers to. its accuracy, integrity, or usefulness. The intelligence failure at Pearl Harbor is a good example of this need. Comment by Frank, Kevin K: Gets right to the point. But you wait to tell the reader the importance of that failure until later on.Why did you do that?Is the importance of your paper the technical issue of dissemination, or that intelligence provided at the wrong time leads to poor decisions or outcomes? Comment by Frank, Kevin K: You tend to use these terms over and over. See if you can say them in a different way to make your writing more interesting.
Background
The Interaction between Intelligence Producers and Intelligence Users
The users of intelligence, such as policymakers and military commanders, rely on this understanding to make decisions. This interaction is essential to the development and effective use of intelligence.
There is an important interaction between those who produce intelligence and those who use intelligence. The producers of intelligence, such as analysts and researchers, develop an understanding of the subject matter and the methods used to collect and process information. The users of intelligence, such as policymakers and military commanders, rely on this understanding to make decisions. This interaction is essential to the development and effective use of intelligence. Comment by Frank, Kevin K: This might be better if you lead with the users rather than the producers.Recall that we have noted that the whole point of intelligence is to answer a question. The users would like/need the question answered. The intelligence analyst produces the answer. But the decision maker is going to make their decision with or without the intelligence. Intelligence will make the decision better (we hope), but the decision can be made without it. If you lead with why intelligence is important to the user, it increases the importance of dissemination of intelligence.
The producers of intelligence must have a thorough understanding of the subject matter. They use this understanding to develop hypotheses about how the enemy will act. They also use it to develop collection plans to gather the information needed to test their hypotheses. The users of intelligence must have a clear understanding of the capabilities and limitations of intelligence. They must also understand the methods used to produce intelligence. Without this understanding, they would be unable to effectively use intelligence in decision-making.
It is assumed that the audience understands the basics of the concept and cares enough about to read a penetrating white paper on the topic. My level of expertise on the topic is such that it will help my audience to develop a fuller understanding of the topic and what needs to be done to address potential challenges. There is a need for intelligence analysts to interact with those who are using the intelligence to be successful. This is because analysts need to know what the users' requirements and needs are to provide them with relevant and timely intelligence. In addition, analysts need to be able to explain the products they produce for the user to be able to understand and use them effectively. The user also needs to trust the analyst and feel confident that they are receiving accurate and reliable intelligence. The aim of the white paper is to show that without this interaction, it would be difficult for either party to be successful. Comment by Frank, Kevin K: This is inappropriate for a White Paper, or any other analytic document. The fact that you are writing it means you have something to say. You will demonstrate your expertise by showing them. To paraphrase a famous writer, good writers tell others how good they are, great writers let others tell them.
The Problem
The problem is that the process of producing and disseminating intelligence is often complex and technical, making it difficult for non-experts to understand and use. This is particularly true when it comes to national security intelligence, which is often used by policymakers to make life-or-death decisions. The challenge for producers is to remember to focus on answering the question that intelligence users want answered. In doing so, intelligence producers can be better able to , then, is to find ways to make intelligence more accessible and user-friendly without sacrificing its accuracy or usefulness. One way to do this is to provide decision-makers with clear and concise summaries of complex intelligence reports. Another possible solution may be to develop better visualization tools that can help explain complicated concepts more clearly. Comment by Frank, Kevin K: You move through this too quickly.You are also focused on the intelligence and not the user.Why has the user asked a question? Why does a decisionmaker need intelligence?If you can explain that, then you can build a case that the way intelligence is produced and disseminated does not fill the decisionmakers need. Comment by Frank, Kevin K: This is about the problem; don't offer a solution yet.
What makes the problem this problematic is the fact that intelligence gathering is an art and rendering that information to an audience is likely to lead to different interpretations, just as any work of art is viewed differently by those in the audience (Pillar, 2018). If intelligence is not properly presented, it can lead to missed or wasted opportunities. Likewise,
). Those using intelligence are likely to have the same experiences, knowledge, and biases that any other person would have who interacts with a message (Kretz, 2018). Intelligence can be politicized in the way it is used as well (Betts, 2009).
At stake in addressing this problem, i.e., its significance, is the fact that it matters for all stakeholders of national security. For example, if intelligence information is not properly shared with policymakers, it could lead to policy decisions that are based on incomplete or inaccurate information. This could lead to dangerous situations, such as a military conflict that could have been avoided if the right intelligence had been shared with decision-makers. Similarly, if intelligence information is not properly used, it could lead to wasted resources and missed opportunities—and, worse, to lost lives as happened at Pearl Harbor. Comment by Frank, Kevin K: This is a weak articulation of the point of your paper.How can you say it more strongly? Can you provide better examples or more thorough explanations. Why is what you say in this part of the paragraph different from what happens at Pearl Harbor?
Intelligence is Complex
The intelligence gathered on the Pearl Harbor attack is a real-world example of how complex intelligence was mishandled by end users, resulting in lost lives of Americans at Hawaii (Piacine, 1997). Comment by Frank, Kevin K: This should be the first sentence in this paragraph so that the reader knows what this section is about.
Intelligence reports are often technical and complex, containing a great deal of information that can be difficult to process and understand. This can be problematic for intelligence users, who may not have the necessary expertise to interpret the data. In addition, the use of jargon and abbreviations can make intelligence reports difficult to read and comprehend. This can lead to misinterpretation and mistreatment of the information contained within. As such, it is essential that intelligence users take the time to familiarize themselves with the content of intelligence reports before using them for decision-making purposes. The intelligence gathered on the Pearl Harbor attack is a real-world example of how complex intelligence was mishandled by end users, resulting in lost lives of Americans at Hawaii (Piacine, 1997). Comment by Frank, Kevin K: This should be the first sentence in this paragraph so that the reader knows what this section is about.
It is possible that tThe Pearl Harbor attack was one that could have been prevented or caught in time had intelligence been communicated and received more effectively. (Dahl, 2011; Piacine, 1997; Tagg, 2017). It was not a case in which the intelligence itself was faulty but rather a case in which intelligence producers and intelligence users were not on the same page (Tagg, 2017). The Signal Intelligence Service (SIS) had obtained and analyzed the intelligence pertaining to Japan’s plans of attackintention to commence hostilities—but the SIS had no part in the command structure within the US military at that time. Therefore, its information was not considered relevant by military leaders—even though it absolutely was (Tagg, 2017). Those leaders with whom it was shared failed to realize the significance of information given them by the SIS (Dahl, 2011; Piacine, 1997). There was no alignment between the producers of intelligence and the users of intelligence. Thus, a communication gap resulted in Pearl Harbor’s unawareness of an impending strike. While the Army was expecting a Japanese attack in the vicinity of the Philippines, where the majority of the US Army had its presence, SIS might have posed a question for its report: “Where might Japan commence hostilities in the Pacific with least risk to itself?” This question might have broadened the field of inquiry so as to put all bases in the Pacific on red alert. Comment by Frank, Kevin K: You have not correctly read what these authors have said.You also need to put page numbers where you got the information that you paraphrase. That can be done for Dahl and Piacine- I understand it can't be done for Tagg. Comment by Frank, Kevin K: Nope- SIS translated the "14 Part" document that indicated that the Japanese were going to commence hostilities. But there was no "plan of attack" in the diplomatic traffic. Comment by Frank, Kevin K: Where in these two does it indicate that? That is why you put page numbers. Comment by Frank, Kevin K: What do you mean by this? The Army and Navy absolutely thought that the Japanese were going to attack, but as Tagg notes "Fixated on a most likely course of action in the Southwest Pacific, apparently neither MID nor the Office of Naval Intelligence presented an attack on Pearl Harbor as a real possibility." 
The complexity incompleteness of the intelligence obtained by the SIS—military leaders or, rather, its meaning— was lost in the bridge over that communication gap. The intelligence users did not register the meaning, and the SIS had no other means for conveying it. The complexity of intelligence has to be no greater than the gap in understanding between intelligence producers and intelligence users. If it is greater than that gap, the significance and meaning and purpose of intelligence is lost in the chasm that divides the two. Comment by Frank, Kevin K: The issue wasn't one of complexity- the issue is one of completeness. Dahl's argument is that knowing that the enemy is going to attack is not helpful if you do not know where and how? Tagg acknowledges that the Army was expecting a Japanese attack but in the vicinity of the Philippines, where the major US Army presence was prior to the Second World War.
Simplifying Intelligence
One of the challenges intelligence analysts’ faces is communicating their findings to end users in a way that is both actionable and understandable. Too often, analysts produce lengthy reports that are filled with jargon and technical terms (Betts, 2009)
As a result, the end users may have difficulty extracting the key information from the report. There are a few ways that analysts can simplify their reports for end users. First, they can use clear and concise language in their reports. Second, they can provide definitions for any jargon or technical terms that are used. Third, they can use charts, graphs, and other visual aids to make complex information easier to understand. By taking these steps, analysts can ensure that their reports are readable and useful for end users (Kretz, 2018).
Intelligence producers should use clear and concise language in their reports to intelligence users. This would reduce the risk of meaning being lost due to complexity, ensure better and more immediate understanding of the intelligence, and support the potential for greater impact of intelligence on end user. Thus, in order to ensure that intelligence users are able to understand and act upon the information that they receive, it is essential that intelligence producers use clear and concise language in their reports. The use of complex language can lead to a loss of meaning, and this can prevent intelligence users from being able to gain the full picture from a report (Kretz, 2018). In addition, concise language can help to ensure that reports are read more quickly and thoroughly, and this can increase the impact that intelligence has on the decisions made by those who use it. Ultimately, then, intelligence producers should use the clearest and most direct language in their reports to end users.
Additionally, another consideration intelligence producers should have is that any time an end user encounters a word or phrase that he does not understand, it can be frustrating. This is especially true when one is trying to learn about a complex topic, such as data obtained from new intelligence gathering. Intelligence producers must be aware of this issue and take steps to ensure that their reports are accessible to their audience. One way to do this is to provide definitions for any jargon or technical terms that are used in the report. This will help readers to better understand the information contained in the report and make it more useful to them. Plus, it will show that the intelligence producer is committed to transparency and communication. Ultimately, this too will help to build trust between the producer and the reader. In the case of Pearl Harbor, trust between the military leaders and the SIS had not been established—and how could it with such a communication gap between the two?
Finally, it is helpful to appreciate what an increased emphasis on the use of visual aids to communicate information could do for making intelligence more accessible for end users (Kretz, 2018). One reason visual aids can help is due in part to the growing complexity of the world around us, as well as the vast amounts of data that are produced on a daily basis. In many cases, charts, graphs, and other visual aids can help to make complex information more understandable and easier to digest. For example, a bar graph can quickly convey trends over time, while a pie chart can provide a more detailed breakdown of a particular set of data. In addition, visual aids can also be used to highlight important patterns or relationships that might otherwise be missed. As such, intelligence producers should make use of these tools when trying to communicate their findings to others.
Recommendations
Intelligence producers must emphasize clarity in their reports, explain technical jargon more precisely, and include visual aids in their presentations to better ensure that the significance of their intelligence is not lost on end users of that intelligence.
These recommendations are possible, but they require commitment from leadership to understand the need as well (Tagg, 2017). Anytime a gap is bridged, there should be a meeting halfway. It also requires reform at times, as well, of the way intelligence is shared and how it is used (Dahl, 2011). Users of intelligence must appreciate that producers are doing all they can to make the meaning of their reports as clear and plain as possible—and if it still requires some effort or work at understanding the complexity, they should not shirk the responsibility they have of making every attempt to understand.
Thus, there needs to be alignment between intelligence producers and intelligence users. While it is essential for intelligence producers to collect data and generate analysis, their work is only valuable if it is used effectively by intelligence users. If there is misalignment between producers and users, then critical information may not be disseminated properly, leading to suboptimal decision-making. To avoid this, it is important for intelligence producers and users to establish clear lines of communication and collaborate closely on a regular basis. Only by working together can they ensure that the right information is being shared and used effectively. In the end, alignment between intelligence producers and users is essential for effective decision-making.

Why It MattersConclusion Comment by Frank, Kevin K: This is probably what you should craft into your conclusion.Your Recommendations section should be integrated into your simplifying Intelligence section which discusses the need to do so.
Intelligence that is useable is intelligence that can save lives (Pillar, 2018). It Useable intelligence can influence outcomes (Piacine, 1997). If However, if intelligence is not useable, it takes power away from leadership (Betts, 2009). One way to ensure that intelligence is useable is to provide decision-makers with clear and concise summaries of complex intelligence reports. Another possible solution may be to develop better visualization tools that can help explain complicated concepts more clearly. A third option could be to ensure that a question or problem statement is listed at the top of an intelligence report and that the report answers that specific question.
All of these points were demonstrated, unfortunately, at Pearl Harbor when a communication/understanding gap opened between SIS and military leaders (Tagg, 2017).
It is important to highlight the attack on Pearl Harbor as an example of the need for intelligence that is useable. In the days leading up to the attack, US intelligence via the SIS had been collected in such a way as to suggest (but not make explicitly clear) that an attack was imminent (Tagg, 2017). This information was passed on to some military leaders, but for the most part they did not see it as relevant to their purposes of defending America (Dahl, 2011). They viewed the SIS as little more than a hanger-on in the intelligence field (Dahl, 2011).