Human Rights Violations in Nigeria: An Assessment of the Procedures and Strategies for the International Protection of Human Rights
As the world moves towards a global conscience, it is becoming increasingly clear that those nations that would abuse the doctrines of human rights as acknowledged in the international arenas, and by most of today's nation-states, and certainly by world public opinion will soon be forced to the answer to the global conscience. That is, they will at some future date consistent with the expression of global public opinion be held accountable for acts of aggression arising out of political or religious or economic expansionism. Already the response to these acts of aggression by the international communities in the various forums of the United Nations (UN), the European Union Court and other fronts is debate and attempts to negotiate an atmosphere of calm in which to resolve international differences.
Chief among the issues receiving international political and public attention are human rights violations. Human rights violations brought international pressure and public opinion to bear upon the Apartheid government of South Africa, and, subsequently, over a period of time, political change was realized in that country as a result of world scrutiny and opinion. Today, Nigeria is one country, among many others, which stands accused of human rights violations (Kamminga 1992; Amnesty International 2008). Most notably in the foreground is Nigeria's illegal incarceration of its citizens without charging them for committing a crime, providing them a trial or legal representation, and secretly executing prisoners (Amnesty International 2008). Many such executions are alleged to be a result of the government's efforts to protect its foreign corporate investment relationships in Nigeria's rich natural resources by eliminating voices of opposition that call attention to environmental or political injustices (Livesey 2001 58).
Chief amongst such cases is that of Ken Saro-Wiwa, who, on November 10, 1995, was taken from is prison cell by military personnel acting on behalf of the government (Wiwa 2001 xi). Saro-Wiwa's son, Ken Wiwa (2001) writes that his father was taken to a military prison where, after five attempts, was finally successfully hanged to death (Wiwa xii). Saro-Wiwa had a trial (Wiwa xii), unlike many of those imprisoned in Nigerian jails go to prison and remain imprisoned without a trial (Maier 2000 3). Saro-Wiwa's trial was deemed a miscarriage of justice, and world condemned as such by humanitarian groups and world leaders (Wiwa xii; Jega 200 97).
Writing about the illegal imprisonment of people who speak out against the government, Karl Maier (2000) writes:
Among the victims were the Ogoni rights activist and playwright Ken Saro-Wiwa, who had been hanged, and retired General Shehu Musa Yar'Adua, a political power broker who had died after receiving a mysterious injection in prison. The leading political figures of the day were held incommunicado. They included Chief Moshood Abiola, the Muslim millionaire whose election as president in 1993 was halted by the military despot Babangida, and Obasanjo, the only soldier who had ever handed power to an elected civilian. Nigeria, many feared, would explode into a civil war that could spark a humanitarian disaster (Maier 3)."
Nigeria has been consistent in protecting its position from its vantage point of its United Nations seat. Nicholas Wheeler (2002) exemplifies this use of UN protection when he points out in his book when he discusses the situation that lead to genocide in Rwanda:
In the absence of Western intervention, the only alternative was for African states to take the lead. In its Presidential Statement of 30 April the Security Council had requested the Secretary General to investigate this possibility. In response to Boutros-Boutros Ghali's requests, Ghana, Ethiopia, Senegal, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Congo, Mali, and Malawi came forward with offers of troops for phase two of the deployment of UNAMIR II. In doing so they made it clear that they would need equipment, heavy lift support, and their costs underwritten by the UN. Given the UN's budgetary crisis, financing UNAMIR II depended upon Western states (Wheeler 229)."
What this shows is that leadership in African nations which stand accused of human rights violations are slow to reaction to those conditions in their neighboring African states. It shows, too, that the African states are willing to use public opinion as a means of extorting money from western nations in order to respond to humanitarian issues such as was going on in Rwanda. In other words, the well being of their citizens and African neighbors are weighed against the profit that can be gained from exploiting the very citizens of their country as a natural resource to gain humanitarian dollars. No economic venture is closed to the corrupt and powerful leaders that would circumvent the laws and judicial process in order to benefit from that circumvention.
The Story of Ken Saro-Wiwa
The story of Ken Siwo-Wiwa is one of an activist, a man who posed a threat to the forces that would treat the citizens of Nigeria as perhaps too simplistic in thinking to be aware of what is going on around them. Saro-Wiwa was an educated man, a wealthy man, whose wealth did not overshadow the pride nor the love he felt for his country and for his people. His father, Ken Wiwa writes, was the product of a British classical colonial education (Wiwa 19). Siwo-Wiwa was also a journalist, and a successful entrepreneur (Wiwa xi). His own colonial experience and education left him keenly aware of the motivation behind foreign interests in Nigeria, and prepared him to be able to impart his knowledge and understanding to his fellow Nigerians and to provide them leadership (Wiwa 19). Wiwa was capable of providing the leadership that his fellow Nigerians needed, because the powers of government had, in a post-colonial environment aligned themselves with whatever interests served to benefit the powers in control on an individual level. It was clear that the interests of the Nigerian people and Nigeria as a nation had been subordinated to individual interests within the country, and to foreign interests outside the country which would support the government so long as natural resources continued to exist for exploitation (Livesey 58).
Attahiru Jega describes Nigeria's post colonial economic environment as having been hard hit by the transition away from colonialism, and in a "comatose state (Jega 2000 204). However, others perceive the post colonial period very differently, suggesting that the governmental leaders withheld from the Nigerian people the fruits of commerce and industry (Wiwa xiv). Wiwa says that Nigeria ought to be the economic pride of the black man (Wiwa xiv). It is rich in natural resources (Wiwa xiv). Prior to its emancipation from colonial control, oil was discovered in the Niger Delta region, where the exploitation of oil since 1960 has brought in $600 billion in oil revenues (xiv).
Nigeria has one of the lowest per capita incomes in the world and external debts of $40 billion. Most depressing of all is that, unlike many oil-rich nations, Nigeria has little to show for its wealth. Its infrastructure is prehistoric, overwhelmed, and poorly maintained. Many of the roads are potholed death traps, and the telephone system is notoriously inefficient, almost useless by Western standards. There are frequent power shortages and virtually no running water... Schools and universities are under funded and in a state of permanent neglect; teachers and lecturers are poorly paid, if on time. Nigerians routinely die of treatable diseases like malaria and tuberculosis, while AIDS and stress-related illnesses stalk the collective health of the nation. Most hospitals would be best described as mortuaries; simple and routine operations are often a matter of life and death. Infant mortality is among the highest in the world, and life expectancy is only fifty-four and falling. Life in Nigeria is nasty, brutish, and short, as my father often used to say (paraphrasing Hobbes) (Wiwa xiv-xv)."
When taken into consideration with other segments of the picture coming from Nigeria, such as its response to the UN's request for African intervention in Rwanda that evoked a response equivalent to intervention for dollars. We see that the implication here is that the government is corrupt, withholding from Nigerians revenues that would greatly improve the lives and opportunities of Nigerians. It is out of this thought that Ken Saro-Wiwa's voice rose to lead the Ogoni people in standing up for their rights to their natural resources and as citizens of Nigeria. It was the voice, once counted amongst the elite, that now spoke up for the disenfranchised that resulted in the arrest of Saro-Wiwa (Wiwa 34-60).
As is often the case, a government that holds the people's hero hostage must either release that hero, and succumbs to the ideologies that the hero expresses, as was the case with Nelson Mandela in South Africa. or, the government must eliminate the hero and in so doing hope that the ideologies of the hero dies with him or her. Such was the case with Ken Saro-Wiwa who was hanged with eight fellow activists by the Nigerian government (Livesey 58).
Shell Oil in Nigeria
Discussions on economic hardship, environmental devastation, and political corruption in Nigeria always seem to come back to the Dutch Shell Oil Company. The company is charged by activists and Wiwa as influencing the Nigerian government to act illegally and, if we believe the allegations, monstrously in violation of human rights in order to exploit the oil resources in the Niger River Delta area (Livesey 58; Saro-Wiwa 7). In a final message to the public, just before his death by hanging at the hands of the Nigerian government, Saro-Wiwa blamed Shell for its influence leading to abuses in Nigeria (Saro-Wiwa 7). Saro-Wiwa wrote:
Shell Oil is here on trial, and it is as well that it is represented by counsel said to be holding a watching brief. The company has, indeed, ducked this particular trial, but its day will surely come and the lessons learnt here may prove useful to it, for there is no doubt in my mind that the ecological war the company has waged in the delta will be called to question sooner than later and the crimes of that war will be duly punished. The crime of the company's dirty wars against the Ogoni people will also be punished (Saro-Wiwa 7)."
Nigeria is the sixth largest oil producing nation today (Wiwa xv). Bronwen Manby (1999) says that Shell oil continues to be the biggest corporate exploiter of oil in Nigeria (Manby 281). The company received the bulk of its criticism during the years when Saro-Wiwa was involved in activism in the Niger River Delta region, 1994 and 1995 (Manby 281). 1995, of course, is the year thaqt Saro-Wiwa was hung to death. Manby writes:
While the Ogoni crisis is no longer in the headlines, and while the June 1998 death of General Sani Abacha ended a period of unprecedented repression in Nigeria -- allowing elections that have led to the installation of the first civilian government in 16 years -- protest and repression in Nigeria's oil-producing regions have, if anything, increased (Manby 281)."
If it was the Nigerian government's to silence the protests by making an example of Saro-Wiwa, they succeeded. Manby reports, too, that Shell denies reports that link it to Nigeria's responses using oppression and suppression to silence activist and political groups (Manby 281). Reports from various sources, including Manby, also indicate that Shell has not been a good ecological corporate partner (Manby 281; Livesey 58). In some instances, Shell has been cited as "arrogant," in its responses to discussion on its political and ecological positions and especially as concerns its damage to the Niger River Delta environment (Livesey 58).
In a remarkably candid speech to explain why Shell had "stumbled" (Herkstroter, 1996b, [paragraph]54), the Shell Group Chairman interpreted Spar and Nigeria as institutional challenges, saying that "modern demands [on companies] are... somewhat different to the traditional ones" ([paragraph]21) and that "the institutions of global society are being reinvented" by social and technological change ([paragraph]65). Accordingly, Shell had to learn to operate in "a very fluid world... In which the technological and communications revolution is redefining our perceptions of reality; of authority, and of what is appropriate and what is not" ([paragraph]46). Shell characterized the consequences of this change as a move from a "trust me" to a "show me" world (Knight, 1998, p. 2; see also Faulds, 1998). As Herkstroter (1996b) realized, where "the more traditional structures [of business and government had] failed to adapt," NGOs ("private groups organised around themes or issues") had "gained an authoritative voice" ([paragraph]45). Here, the Chairman appears to be recognizing and responding to discursive struggle and its institutional effects (Livesey 58)."
There are allegations that Shell has been complicit in manipulating the politics in Nigeria and, worse, that the company was active in creating a disparaging image of Ken Saro-Wiwa following his death (Wiwa xii-xiii).
Shell Oil, the company my father had accused of devastating the environment and abusing the human rights of our people, responded to questions about its role in the affair by launching a public relations campaign that spread doubts about his character and his reputation. The multinational distanced itself from the execution, insisting that it was being used as a scapegoat to deflect attention from the real issues in the trial. In a television interview, the head of its Nigerian operations claimed that Ken Saro-Wiwa had been executed for murder (Wiwa xiii)."
Nigeria nationalized its oil industry in 1977, and, today, Shell engages in a joint venture in exploiting the rich resources in Nigeria, owning 30% of the venture. Nigeria is 90% dependent upon oil for its country's revenues (Wiwa 50). What was once a vital and productive farm area for the country now has a declining yield of produce, and the air is heavy with acid rain since Shell is allowed to utilize open-air by product burn-off (Livesey 58). Also, the profit that Shell and the country take from the exploitation of that resource in the Niger Delta region has zero return environmentally or economically to the people of that area (Livesey 58).
Further, in Nigeria in 1995, 75% of gas by-products from oil drilling was flared -- burned off in the open air-as compared to a world average of less than 5%, and less than 1% in the United States (see Lawrence, 1999a, section 8a). Flaring in Nigeria not only caused some of the worst local environmental pollution but also contributed adversely to global warming as a result of the greenhouse gases (carbon dioxide and methane) released through combustion (see Essential Action & Global Exchange, 2000, fn. 7). Similarly, oil spills and exploration, which cut through mangrove swamps, threatened one of the largest and most ecologically sensitive wetlands in the world (see SPDC, 1997a, p. 15) (Livesey 58)."
There is much to be concerned with when a foreign corporation is exploiting the resources of a third world nation. According to the sources cited here, Shell has not been the least bit repentant of its relationship with the government, or really of implications of its complicity in human rights violations.
Human Rights Violations in Nigeria
The dynamics that have been described here between Shell, Nigerian governmental officials, the environment, and the people is the reason that Nigeria continues to be on Amnesty International's list of countries that engage in consistent and persistent practices of human rights violations. Peter van Tuiijl (1999) points out that the United Nations has a Codified Universal Declaration on Human Rights (Tuiijl 493). It is, many people believe, part of the mission of the United Nations to respond to acts of human rights violations. Indeed, following the death of Ken Saro-Wiwa in 1995, there was "talk" of UN sanctions against Nigeria, but sanctions were never instituted against Nigeria (Maier 18). The importance of Nigeria to the United States and to other nations, especially western nations, was too important to alienate the country with economic sanctions (Maier 18).
Visa restrictions and other light sanctions were all the United States and its European allies could or would muster to support democracy in West Africa's regional superpower. When Abacha announced in December 1997 the arrest of his deputy, General Oladipo Diya, a Yoruba, on allegations of plotting a coup, there was hardly a murmur from the international community. Six months later, the "coup from heaven" took place (Maier 19)."
It might be pointed out here, too, that those impacted by the visa restrictions would be news media journalists, especially those independent journalists who are necessary to the industry and to the free world in order to get politically unbiased news. It would also impact those watchdog agencies, like Amnesty International, causing them delays in being able to make the necessary site visits for verification of information and conditions in prisons, hospitals, and infrastructure.
That there were no more stringent sanctions attached to Nigeria following the death of Saro-Wiwa and eight of his activists colleagues, especially when former U.S. President Bill Clinton, British Prime Minister John Major, and even the Queen herself protested the hanging of Saro-Wiwa; and then six months later a "coup from heaven," brought about regime change in that country speaks volumes. It would be great to say that in the days following the coup and the reins of power transferring to General Obasanjo instilled confidence and hope in Nigerians. That, unfortunately, was not the case at the time when the Niger Delta region and Lagos broke out in riots (Maier 19).
Obasanjo pledged to whip Nigeria into shape and to stamp out malfeasance wherever it might lurk. "There will be no sacred cows. Nobody, no matter who and where, will be allowed to get away with the breach of the law or the perpetration of corruption and evil." Nigeria must change its ways in order to "ensure progress, justice, harmony and unity and above all to rekindle confidence amongst our people. Confidence that their conditions will rapidly improve and that Nigeria will be great and will become a major world player in the near future (Maier 20)."
The change of government, for many Nigerians, represented a change only in the main players of the dynamics in Nigeria. Today, Nigeria remains on Amnesty International's list as a human rights violator for false imprisonment, imprisonment without due judicial process, lack of legal representation, corrupt courts, prison overcrowding to the excessive numbers of prisoners, and reports that some prisoners spend as long as ten years incarcerated before going to trial (Amnesty International 2008). The CIA World Fact Book reports that the last two elections in Nigeria, 2003 and, again, in 2007, were "marred" by voting irregularities and violence (CIA World Fact Book 2008). In April, 2007, Umaru Yar'Adua was elected president, bringing about a reluctant end to the presidency of Olusegun Obasanjo (CIA World Fact Book 2008). The CIA World Fact Book reports that the 2007 elected government could, if successful in instituting changes that it espouses as supporting, bring about vital changes in Nigeria that will make a big difference to its economy and as regards its human rights violations. However, a year after those elections, and recently as February, 2008, Nigeria continues to make Amnesty International's list of nations associated with human rights violations (Amnesty International 2008). This, again, goes back to the areas of arrests, incarceration, judicial process and even using the prison system to house mentally deficient individuals like persons with Down's Syndrome (Amnesty International 2008).
There is no measuring the human rights violations of a government from one government administration as its ousted to the next. There is no measuring human rights violations by way of saying they are less serious violations. They are what they are, and until Nigeria makes progress in addressing those issues, it will continue to be criticized as a nation that abuses human rights.
Non-Governmental Organizations
Over the past two decades there are non-governmental organizations in Nigeria, and in Africa regionally, that respond to human rights violations and perform monitoring of violations (Maier 110). Women in Nigeria (WIN) is an organization that is dedicated to the advancement and equality of women in Nigeria (Maier 110). A primary focus for WIN is gain as equal a playing field in rights for women as men now have afforded to them (Maier 110).
In 1985, the Association of Democratic Lawyers formed the Civil Liberties Organization (CLO) (Maier 111). This organization and the Campaign for Democracy (CD) with the CLO and WIN have advocated for rights, freedoms, and civil liberties on behalf of Nigeria's population (Maier 111). Other groups include Women in Development (WID), and National Council of Women's Society's (NCWS), again, advocates for women's rights (Maier 112). Other organizations monitor financial exchanges and the financial health of the government (CIA World Fact Book 2008). Nigeria, like other African nations, is subject to the discretion of decisions made by the There are several pan-African non-governmental organizations which operate as peacekeeping forces in Africa. One, is the African Union (AU, and formerly known as the Organization of African Unity, OAU). Another is the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) ECOWAS was involved in the post-independence transformation of the Congo (Crupi, 2005, 106). The AU is actually a regional organization, and ECOWAS is a sub-regional organization (Crupi, 106). The Southern African Development Community is yet another group, and is product of post-Apartheid South Africa (Howard, 2007, 56). ECOWAS and the AU have different powers of authority, while the SADC really limits itself to a mediating role (Crupi, 106).
The AU was created in 1999, and positions itself as a monitoring group.
The charter of the AU is to promote African solidarity, to defend state sovereignty, to protect people's rights, to advance peace in the region, and to further good governance and democracy (Cupri, 106)."
Even though these organizations have different regional or territorial designations, they are subject to the discretion of the AU and other decision-making organizations that originate in Africa and are concerned with those activities intended to monitor human rights violations, keep peace, prevent and circumvent violence. Of course, these are all discretions that take into account the sovereignty of borders and nations, and it is only with much debate, usually at the level of the United Nations and the AU that decisions to impose the charters of these organizations is decided upon (Cupri 106).
Peter van Tuiilj says that in the past 25 years NGOs have served to fill the institutional and geographical gaps that allow people to exercise their rights (Tillj 493).
The charter of the NGO allows it to supplement, or even to supplant, a weak or absent state government (Tiilj 493). However, in the case of a country like Nigeria, where there are strong corporate interests, it is not likely that an NGO will ever be permitted by the United Nations to exercise its charter in a way that would see it supplant a government on the basis of human rights violations. Unfortunately, while western countries and European countries make strong noise when a particular violation is egregious enough to draw world community attention and public shock and outrage, as was the case of Kenb Saro-Wiwa, then the countries and leaders who seem to have the authority and the power to make changes or to have an impact make what might be described as courtesy noise to pacify a constituency.
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