The Russia-Ukraine crisis through international relations theory

Russia & Ukraine

The current crisis in Ukraine is a good case study for international relations. The primary actors are Ukraine, Russia, the United States and the European Union. In brief, Ukraine has been splitting politically since independence from the U.S.S.R. along ethnic lines. Ukrainians, still seeking for solidify their national identity, are pro-West in their outlook; Russians are pro-Russia in outlook. This schism has defined the country's politics since independence, and has placed the country as the center of a power conflict in Europe between the Cold War powers -- Russia on one side and the West on the other. The West expanded its sphere of influence dramatically when Russia was weak upon dissolution of the U.S.S.R., but Russia has recently gained strength, in particular the result of tremendous wealth from natural resources. Russia has especially strong bargaining power over Europe as many European nations are major buyers of Russian natural gas (Jakes & Burns, 2014). For its part, the United States wishes to contain the Russian sphere of influence in Europe, but has no motivation for armed conflict, which would be politically unpalatable. The current crisis began with the overthrow of the pro-Russian leader by Ukrainian nationalists (Baczynska, Polityuk & Kasolowsky, 2014). Russia seized on the pretext of protecting Russian people to seize control of the Crimean Peninsula -- home to Russia's largest naval base -- but the violence and unrest are continuing, with Russian agitators in the East and the threat of further territorial annexation by Russia (Fedesenko, 2014; AP, 2014). For all the hype over the crisis and cries for action from many different corners, the actions of the respective key players make perfect sense when distilled through the lens of international relations theory.

Realism

Realism is a view of international relations that "stresses its competitive and conflictual side" (Korab-Karpowicz, 2013).

This is the view that best describes the traditional approaches by two of the main actors -- Russia and the United States. The competition and conflict in Ukraine simply reflects the ongoing competition between these two nations -- and the West as a broader group -- for sphere of influence and locus of control in the world. The United States saw its sphere of influence grow significantly with the breakdown of the Soviet Union, but modern Russia sees itself as the rightful heir to the U.S.S.R.'s power in the world. Bolstered by wealth, Russia has long sought to improve its influence.

At present, Russia occupies a position of relative strength. It has strong bargaining power over Europe because of the continent's dependence on Russian natural gas. Russia also has bargaining power over the United States, because the U.S. recognizes that there are high costs associated with open military engagement with Russia. For minor territorial issue, the nuclear option is not on the table, so the threat of mutually-assured destruction is also not a critical factor here, unlike it was during the Cold War. The conflict in Syria highlighted the West's unwillingness to engage in open military conflict with Russia, even in a proxy war. For Russia, seeing a weakened Ukraine and needing only the thinnest pretext, any leader with a realist point-of-view would have seized Crimea. It is strategically important for Russia militarily as home to its Black Sea fleet, it has territorial continuity with Russia and it was for centuries a part of Russia.

For the United States, Crimea was never something it was going to fight over. The Crimea is not strategically important for the U.S. What is more important is the rest of Ukraine. Russia certainly is in a position to make more territorial gains. Many have been speculated- vast swathes of the east; the south through Odessa (a Russian-speaking city) to Transnistria; through the Baltic states to link up with the Kaliningrad enclave. Unlike Crimea, these territories are mostly significant for their symbolism -- acquiring them would re-establish Russia's sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, and bring Russia right to the EU's doorstep (actually, inside its house if the Baltics are invaded).

Liberalism

While Russia and the U.S. are solidly realist, and have responded in line with that, the EU has always been a quintessentially liberal organization. Tang (2008) notes that liberalism falls into a non-realist point-of-view that holds cooperation in high regard, and argues that states cannot assume the worst of each other -- that the world is not a zero-sum competition. This offers an explanation for EU inaction -- it feels that Russia does not intend to pursue significant annexations beyond this point, and that cooperation is ideal because it will defuse the conflict and avoid the worst-case scenario (The Nation, 2014). The realist view blames EU dependence on Russia's gas for its inaction, but the liberalist view points out that the EU is predisposed to cooperation, especially since open conflict with Russia would destroy Europe a lot more than it would harm North America -- it is easier for the Americans to be realist because they have less at stake.

Conclusions

The constructivist view understands that Ukraine will probably be split, with the ethnic Russian parts absorbed into the Motherland. The realists -- Russia and the U.S. -- have probably already accepted this, knowing full well that open conflict serves nobody's interests. The U.S. has to recognize that Russia taking over territory occupied by ethnic Russians is not actually expanding its sphere of influence, even if it appears to be doing just that. The EU might not see this as a great solution, but it would likely welcome a compromise outcome that saw a smaller, pro-Western Ukraine join the EU and NATO, which for the U.S. would have to be seen as a win (albeit a smaller one than the best-case scenario). The ongoing situation in Ukraine is certainly not one of anarchy, despite appearances. The different actors are essentially behaving in very predictable ways according to their established perspectives on international relations. The result of this is that the developments in Ukraine are fairly predictable when evaluate on a macro view, and that the country will likely be split -- all sides probably already understand this and all that's left is to see how it plays out.