IR Review Fox, J. (2001).

IR Review

Fox, J. (2001). "Approaching Humanitarian Intervention Strategically: The Case of Somalia." SAIS Review 2(1), pp. 147-158.

Description

This article describes the decision making process utilized by President Bush, Sr. In developing an implementing intervention strategy in Somalia during the famine and in-fighting of the early 1990s. Falling firmly in the category of theoretical International Relations studies, this article employs a historical viewpoint to discuss the specifics of theoretical application to a unique situation that nevertheless has broader and more broadly applicable elements. Of paramount concern in this article is the failure to analyze the situation in Somalia from a political as well as a humanitarian perspective, with military intervention applied with only a single goal and without taking a Longview of the ramification, repercussions, and implications of the chosen course of action. Fox uses highly detailed descriptive techniques involving the persons and policies involved to form his argument.

The main purpose of this article is to encourage the adoption of more explicit and dedicated principles when the United States and the United Nations are faced with similar situations in the future. Specifically, Fox identifies Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56, on "Complex Contingency Operations," as an explicit tool to be used in the future and an implicit acknowledgement of the failures that occurred during the intervention in Somalia. Though there was likely no reasonable method of achieving defined success in the country, this directive would have led to clearer and more effective decisions.

Analysis

The primary strength of the theory and methods utilized by the author in this article is the direct relation that is established between the discerned lack of political awareness in the intervention and the unquestionable practical effects of the intervention itself. The weakness here is that, given the specificity of the situation analyzed in the article, the conclusions are not nearly as broadly applicable as the author seems to imply. Doubtless the conclusions can be related to other events to some degree, but the author himself acknowledges that a lack of experts on Somalia was instrumental in the ultimate failure of the intervention, and other countries would require other experts and different proposed solutions. Still, the author is quite successful in developing his theory through direct analysis of what key players and documents actually said regarding the issue, basing his theory firmly in facts and drawing conclusions based on effects rather than on theoretical principles.