Iran's global reach and international influence

Iran's Global Reach

The degree of efficacy with which Iran's intelligence agencies could gather meaningful intelligence in support of an armed conflict with the United States in the case of the former taking military action against the latter due to Iran's nuclear program is somewhat difficult to ascertain. The difficulty, of course, lies in the decidedly specious nature of Iran's intelligence capacity which, for the sake of public appearances, is largely posited to include "intelligence about the Middle East and Central Asia and domestic intelligence and monitoring of clerical and government officials as well as work on preventing conspiracies against the Islamic republic" (Cordesman 2007, 13). However, there is also a significant amount of evidence in existence that underscores the fact that Iran's intelligence and military capabilities have expanded throughout the globe, either directly through the nation or through its affiliation with other nation states, which may be able to deliver a significant amount of intelligence to aid in an armed conflict with the U.S. To that end, it is not inconceivable that Iran could gather sufficient intelligence about the United States, although due to the nature of the military network with which such information would be gathered, the expedience and the effectiveness of it would more than likely not be as comparable to that which it could provide for a foe closer to the middle east nation.

The following quotation underscores both the demonstrated level of respect worthy of Iranian intelligence forces as well as the pervasiveness of its surreptitious nature which makes it largely difficult to gauge in terms of its expansion to western powers and operations within the U.S. "Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS is ranked by experts as one of the largest and most active intelligence agencies in the middle East, having masterminded 450 acts of terrorism throughout the world since the 1980s, yet it has been shrouded in so much mystery that apart from the occasional revelations by the Iranian Resistance, little has ever been made public about its operations and functions" (No author 2005). There is a cutting duality to the elucidation of this quotation, which not only underscores the potency of MOIS ("450" terrorist acts since the "1980s") but also the inherent circumscriptions regarding the nature of those acts, since the organization is described as mysterious. Furthermore, it should be noted that most of the known acts of aggression that MOIS has been at least partly responsible for have taken place in regions that are closer to its Middle Eastern basis of operations. Yet the potential for MOIS to expand its operations to encompass the monitoring and surveillance of North America lies in the high degree of autonomy which it has at its disposal, and which is "directly answerable to the Iranian regime's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei" (No author 2005). Its autonomous nature is typified by the fact that it "has a secret budget, and stands above the law" (No author 2005).

In the wake of such descriptions of MOIS's potential and traditional base of operations, it becomes prudent to examine the Iran's international connections which may aid the organization in gathering intelligence about the U.S. In the event that the latter were to induce military action against the Middle Eastern nation due to it production of and proclivity for nuclear weapons. The most salient of these connections include fairly intimate relationships with a group known as the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and with the Al Quds force, which is proven by the following quotation. "The IRGC has contributed some 125,000 men to Iran's forces in recent years and has substantial capabilities for asymmetric warfare and covert operations. This includes the Al Quds Force and other elements that operate covertly or openly overseas, working with Hezbollah of Lebanon, Shi'ite militias in Iraq, and Shi'ites in Afghanistan (Cordesman 2007, 3)." What is significant about this quotation is the widespread network that MOIS has with the aforementioned organizations, that have infiltrated through nation states outside of Iran and engaged in "covert operations," of which intelligence is an essential component.

With the Quds and the IRGC operating as extensions of and possibly even representatives for MOIS, the Iranian capacity for intelligence within parts of the world other than the Middle East becomes manifold. It is also noteworthy to mention that on more than one occasion, these "branches" of Iranian intelligence have assisted in the combatting of traditional U.S. allies such as Israel, particularly when the largely Jewish country was engaged in war with Hezbollah militants during 2006. "Israeli defense experts state that...the IRGC and Quds force…may have assisted… during the Israeli-Hezbollah War…Israeli intelligence officers claim to have found command and control centers…of Iranian design" (Cordesman 2007, 10). This quotation demonstrates that in an indirect capacity, Iranian forces have been involved in military operations in countries allied to the United States, which gives credence to the notion that it is possible for those forces to gather intelligence about the U.S. However, the highly indirect nature of both the presence and the location of where this intelligence may be gathered (far from American borders) leaves a significant room for doubt as to the effectiveness of such intelligence -- while alluding to the fact that such measures could be increased if there was a direct need for it.

In fact, there is other evidence that indicates that the gathering of intelligence directly pertaining to U.S. information is a top priority for the IRGC and Iran's army, both of which have "attempted to deal with U.S. signals and communications intelligence collection capabilities by making extensive use of buried fiber optics and secure communications and developing more secure ways to use the internet and landlines" (Cordesman 2007, 5). These initiatives are directly related to the ascertaining of U.S. intelligence, as well as the protection of Iranian communication from the detection of American intelligence operatives. Furthermore, it has been widely noted that the Quds has been fairly instrumental in anti-American activities in Iraq, by supplying explosives and other forms of weapon to counter-U.S. militants (Shane 2007). This act is significant because it not only demonstrates a history of anti-American aggression on the part of the Quds, but when examined in concert with the counter-U.S. measures induced by the IRGC in preceding quotation, it directly implies an adversarial perception of the U.S. By these organizations as well as opportunities and means to gather intelligence about this North American nation.