Is erdogan an extension of the ottoman empire

The Turkic tribes transformed themselves from a disparate, fragmented state into a hegemonic and organized empire. Lasting for centuries and making a profound impact on global politics, the Ottoman Empire built its status and power on bureaucratic authoritarianism, and also on fusing the power of religion and politics. The bastion of Sunni Islam, the Ottoman Empire colonized regions far beyond what are now the borders of the modern nation-state of Turkey. Moreover, the Ottoman Empire encompassed a wide range of linguistically and ethnically diverse people, capitalizing on access to global trade routes to bolster power and influence in and beyond Eurasia. The use of military might, of economic influence, and also of religious and cultural tools for social control and hegemony all characterized the Ottoman Empire in its heyday.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, shifting balances of power, modernization, and the dismantling of authoritarian regimes trended worldwide and facilitated the breakdown of the Ottoman Empire. A new identity for the modern nation-state of Turkey emerged under the secular leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Atatürk transformed many of the Ottoman political, social, and economic institutions under the rubric of nationalism and republicanism. Yet at its best, Turkey could only be called “semi-democratic,” due to the persistence of authoritarian elements within the regimes of the last century (Somer, 2016, p. 481). Turkey even prior to the ascendance to power of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, was a “flexible authoritarian regime,” with a hegemony described as “fragile,” (Metinsoy, 2011, p. 1). The nature of its authoritarianism and hegemony may have shifted between the early Ottoman Empire to the current Erdogan regime, but the core features remain the same.
Both as the Ottoman Empire and as Turkey, the prevailing model is that of the “strong state,” in which “the state is always prioritized at the expense of individual freedoms and civil society,” (Gardels, 2018, p. 1). The Ottomans recognized the importance of military prowess in suppressing revolts and dissent, while also perpetuating patriarchal norms too. Erdogan’s tactics have been the same: using force to suppress dissent and preventing the emergence of pluralism or alternative voices that would threaten the fragile hegemony (Gardels, 2018). Erdogan has to consider social media and other technological advancements that enhance the flow of information and potentially empower the people, but in general has used the same tactics of authoritarian rule to ensure the stability of the regime. Religion has been a fundamental tool of social control among the Turks, during the Ottoman Empire and also now as Erdogan panders to religious conservatives for their ongoing support for the regime. Religion is what unified the Turkic tribes during the birth of the Ottoman Empire, helping to distinguish them from their Shi’a counterparts in Central Asia and the Arab world. Of course, religion also differentiated the Ottomans from their Christian neighbors in Europe. Hegemony has been perpetuated through religion and cultural identity.
The Erdogan approach to Turkish governance has been remarkably similar to that used during Ottoman times. In fact, Erdogan has invoked Ottoman history and identity to call attention to his grand vision for Turkey’s role in the new world order. The president has “called Turkey’s identity essentially Ottoman,” in order to stimulate the ethnic pride in the once-great empire, and “Turkish society is being recreated in his vision of the Ottoman past,” (Yavuz, 2018). When Christian Constantinople fell to the Ottomans in the fifteenth century, the establishment of an Islamic cultural hub in Eurasia helped to create a new balance of power in the region. Now, Turkey serves in a similar role, being perched as it always was between Christian Europe and the Shi’a Middle East. Economics and trade might have prevented the Ottomans from making unnecessary encroachments into Europe, and the same may be true of Erdogan’s postmodern Ottoman nation-state. While it is unlikely that Erdogan will spearhead the level and type of grandiose urban planning projects that Suleiman did, certainly the current president seeks to re-establish Turkey’s hegemonic power in opposition to the globalizing forces of secularism and free market capitalism. The Ottoman Empire once extended into regions that Erdogan would be hard-pressed to win back; and yet the cultural traces linger in the Levant and the Maghreb as well as into Balkan Europe.
Nostalgia may indeed be what drives Erdogan’s supporters to embracing authoritarianism over the promises of democratic republicanism. Yet any cursory glance at Turkish history shows that at no time was there any tendency towards Western-style individualism. Even when secularism was the fundamental tenet of modern Turkish identity, the conservative religiosity and Turkic ethnic identity consumed so much of the general public as to prevent Turkey from ever aligning itself fully with the European Union. Instead, Erdogan has been “articulating a supra-religious and supra-ethnic Ottoman identity,” which extends from same the means by which the sultans extended their rule throughout the Mediterranean (Yavuz, 2018, p. 1). During Ottoman times, there was no semblance of democracy and no attempt to empower the people even symbolically; and by extension now the nation is ruled by a single-party authoritarian system. Erdogan might not call himself a sultan but just uses modern parlance for his position of power. The difference between the 21st and the 15th century is that the people of modern Turkey and especially of cosmopolitan Istanbul know better; they know the potential of democratic institutions to promote social justice and human rights. The Ottomans did need to use military means to ensure conformity with the regime, but would rarely have had to contend with feminism or the use of social media to question the validity of the authoritarian model.
Turkey has been pluralistic; even more so under Ottoman rule than now. The Turkic tribes aside, the Ottoman Empire extended its reach to places as diverse as Europe, the Levant, and North Africa. Now that the geo-political boundaries of Turkey have shrunk, there is still a great degree of diversity that impedes the legitimacy of Erdogan’s hegemonic methods. The Kurdish population is the most obvious of ethnic dissenters, but it is half the population—women—that could seriously undermine the authority of Erdogan. As Gardels (2018) points out, “Turkey’s women have been at the forefront of opposition rallies and campaigns,” (p. 1). This would not have been so during the Ottoman years, showing that the hold Erdogan has on power in Turkey may in fact be more tenuous than the sultans’ reach ever was. Social media, globalization, and other irreversible and irresistible forces may also prevent the total loss of Turkey’s democratic institutions that were erected during the Ataturk years. Unfortunately, Erdogan has changed the actual constitution and other legal documents in ways that legitimize and safeguard his power, allowing him to exert a level of control and subordination that has not existed since the Ottoman Empire.
One of the reasons why authoritarian regimes last as long as they do is that they create stability through effective social control. Since the conversion of the Turkic tribes to Islam, and via the proliferation of explicitly and unique Sunni identities, the Ottoman Empire solidified its power via the dissemination of information and the colonization of neighboring regions. The manufacturing of an Ottoman identity and aesthetic helped also to create unity in diversity, to leverage identity construction for political purposes. Ottoman hegemony has been built on an ascription to cultural norms and values that distinguish the Turkic people from their neighbors, but which also allows for subcultures to become part of the Ottoman rubric. Jews, Armenians, and Eastern Orthodox all found themselves comfortably coexisting with their Sunni counterparts under Ottoman rule (Ergul, 2012). The nationalist model of the Erdogan years is the same concept using different terminology, albeit with far shorter geographic boundaries. Identity construction is the cornerstone of political and cultural hegemony, and Erdogan milks the process of identity construction through his political maneuvers and public relations campaigns. By presenting his authoritarianism as the means by which Turkey can become “great again,” Erdogan seeks public support to recreate the Ottoman glory days (Yavuz, 2018). Erdogan has firmly aligned himself with Islamist conservatives who, like their Ottoman counterparts, tacitly permit diversity within their midst but only insofar as Turkish Muslim hegemony characterizes power and authority.
Essentially, Erdogan really is a natural extension of the Ottoman Empire. The hard work Ataturk exerted to help the fledgling republic find its footing in the modern world is not gone and forgotten, though. Through the leveraging of grassroots movements and social media, it is possible that the future of Turkey lays not in the hands of an authoritarian ruler but of the diverse people. The anti-Muslim, anti-immigrant sentiments brewing in Europe and North America may fuel the antagonism that leads to a ready identification with the nationalist, protectionist leanings of the Erdogan regime. While Erdogan certainly has his detractors—which the president so blatantly silenced via use of force—his supporters come from a Turkish heartland eager for the unifying force of authoritarianism and hegemony. To surrender to the temptations of capitalism, secularism, and democracy would mean capitulating to the European cultural model—and therefore allowing European hegemony. Erdogan enjoys support from those in Turkey who would prefer Ottoman hegemony over any other as a matter of identity politics.









References

Ergul, F. A. (2012). The Ottoman Identity: Turkish, Muslim orRum? Middle Eastern Studies, 48(4), 629–645. doi:10.1080/00263206.2012.683337
Gardels, N. (2018). Authoritarianism is changing the very fabric of society. The Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2018/06/26/turkey-election/?utm_term=.1a34d2cb5e88
Metinsoy, M. (2011). Fragile hegemony, flexible authoritarianism, and governing from below: Politicians' reports in early republican Turkey. International Journal of Middle East Studies 43(4): 699-719.
Somer, M. (2016). Understanding Turkey’s democratic breakdown: old vs. new and indigenous vs. global authoritarianism. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 16(4): 481-503.
Yavuz, M.H. (2018). Erdogan’s Ottomania. Boston Review. 8 Aug, 2018. http://bostonreview.net/politics/m-hakan-yavuz-erdogan-ottomanophilia