Islamic History in Russia and Central Asia

Islamic History In Russia and Central Asia

Approximately twenty million of the world's one billion Muslims live in Russia, even more in Eastern Europe. The media and academics alike are scurrying to react to this seemingly new wave of Islam in Russia, however attention is mainly focused on extremist activity. "Fundamentalism," "Wahhabism," "Islamism," and other such banner concepts are tainting our perception of Islam in Russia. The place of Islam in Russia is being assessed primarily as a factor of danger that threatens its national security and the interests of its citizens.

This current wave of Islamic activity in Eastern Europe is largely an extension of thousands of years of history. In Russia, Islam was the unfortunate foe of Communist politicians who challenged the very notion of religious freedom. Indeed, Islam has endured centuries of antagonistic regimes and related controversy. The following analysis will consider in what ways the demise of Communism is likely to impact the growth of Islam in Russia and Eastern Europe.

To speculate about whether or not the removal of Marxist-Leninist ideology from the Central Asian scene will prove a blessing requires that the region be understood with political, religious and global considerations in mind. By the mid-1980s, the Soviet Union was in decline. Communism was being fundamentally and practically challenged, and political analysts speculated about its replacement.

In the U.S.S.R.'s Central Asian republics, Islam hung like a question mark over the land. The growing access between these republics and the rest of the Muslim world made the religion an obvious contender to replace communism. But what was even less clear, and hotly debated, was the type of Islam that would emerge. Analysts worried that an anti-Western, fundamentalist variety was surfacing.

After living three generations under a Communist regime, where the practice of religion was altogether discouraged by the government, new freedoms moved many Russians and Eastern Europeans to embrace Islam. This rebirth of Islam was exemplified in Tatarstan, an autonomous republic of the Russian Federation, where half of the population is Tatar, a Muslim sect originating in the 10th century.

In 1990, at the time of perestroika, there was merely one mosque in Tatarstan. Today, there are more than fifty. In the mosques and in the madrassas of Tatarstan, thousands of Tatars relearn the basic tenets of Islam. This trend demonstrates the profound impact that Islam has had on post-communist attitudes toward Islam in Russia and Eastern Europe. It has, at least, provided a context for religious exploration and freedoms. The elimination of Communism opened floodgates that had been sealed shut long ago.

Most Eastern Europeans who returned to Islam suggest that they have merely resumed practising a religion they never entirely gave up. Some, albeit the minority, admit they were members of the Communist Party. Perhaps most striking is that those who practise Islam today are part of a popular trend that mixes the rebirth of nationalism and the rebirth of Islam. It is tricky, therefore, to assess how many newly aligned Muslims feel truly connected religiously, and how many are conforming to popular behaviors.

The trend toward Islamic observance was tempered by shades of fundamentalism. Fundamentalism surfaced in Russia in the early 1990s, when the doors to Muslim communities were open to proselytizers from all religious walks of life. In areas where poverty and clan conflicts were common (and they were profuse) they were met with marked success.

Two reasons behind the increasing radicalization of Islam in Russia have been suggested: the availability of foreign financial aid and the economical state of Eastern European communities. Fundamentalists have received millions of dollars from international Muslim organizations since the decline of Communism, and this significant support has influenced communities in Russia, often making them more radical.

There is typically agreement amongst experts that the ability of militants to recruit followers and fighters is directly related to the social and economic conditions of the countries in which they operate. It is understandable that unfavorable social and economic conditions generate a much riper and receptive environment for the growth of radical ideas. It is no surprise, therefore, that Islamic radicalism has made such considerable inroads in Central Asia, especially in overpopulated and economically depressed communities.

Along these lines, after Chechnya emerged independent in 1996, hundreds of enthusiastic young men from the country's Muslim communities moved there to learn more about Islam and jihad in militarized camps set up by Arab warlords. They appealed to the interests of destitute, beaten and resigned men. They soothed their vulnerabilities and offered elevation.

In September 1999, nervous about the rising fundamentalist tide, legislators in Dagestan banned Wahhabism, a radical form of Islam, and religious extremism in the republic. Those who refused to comply were either prosecuted or left the republic, but most became even more steadfast in their beliefs. Journalists who covered the story were primarily interested in the social and economic causes that sparked the military operation. Islam was mainly ignored as a variable, and yet this factor played an important role in the crisis and its consequences.

The chances that the Russian government will co-opt Muslim extremists and draw them into a political dialogue are extremely small. Alternatively, experts propose, the Islamic movement is likely to become ever more marginalized, and its potential as a violent threat will continue to grow, especially in overwhelmingly Muslim regions. This legacy left by the lifting of the Communist veil in Eastern Europe is far from a blessing indeed.

The events of September 11, 2001 even further positioned the spotlight on radical, fundamentalist Islamic groups, challenging the whole world order. Tragic events of summer 1999 in Daghestan, when armed terrorists invaded the republic under the banner of Islam to justify their aggressive plans, had already painted the portrait of the Muslim as violent in Eastern Europe. After September 11, the rest of the world came to share that perspective.

September 11 notwithstanding, there are certain important conclusions that can be drawn regarding the emergence of Islam and associated radical trends in Russia and Eastern Europe. It is clear that the evolution of the Central Asian republics, including Russia, in the past ten years is directly related to their historical experiences, both before and after Communist rule. The dynamics of post-Soviet regional and worldwide political relationships, especially the growth of regional hostilities, have created a volatile external environment that has had a negative effect on the internal development of the Central Asian states. Economic hardship, and social inequities created a hotbed for the introduction of fundamentalist ideals.