The objective of this study is to analyze the incident of the earthquake tsunami of March 2011, in Japan and to propose three important lessons that might be learned from this incident by those wishing to improve the quality of emergency response and recovery of those affected by such an event. This work will discuss the issues related to mental health and societal consequences and what the impact was to the citizenry and finally, why it is important to understand these issues. This work will identify possible lead agencies for such a catastrophe in the United States and discuss possible roles of Non-Governmental Agencies (NGOs).
Japan Tsunami Disaster March 2011 -- Present
The objective of this study is to analyze the incident of the earthquake tsunami of March 2011, in Japan and to propose three important lessons that might be learned from this incident by those wishing to improve the quality of emergency response and recovery of those affected by such an event. This work will discuss the issues related to mental health and societal consequences and what the impact was to the citizenry and finally, why it is important to understand these issues. This work will identify possible lead agencies for such a catastrophe in the United States and discuss possible roles of Non-Governmental Agencies (NGOs).
Japan is still feeling the impacts from the earthquake tsunami of March 11, 2011, and the radiation leak at the nuclear plant resulting from this incident. It is reported by the New York times that the recovery effort in Japan is ongoing after the country lost approximately 20,000 lives in the disaster following the 9.0 Richter scale earthquake. The nuclear crisis has been compared to Chernobyl with explosions and leaks of radiation from three reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant.
I. Leadership
The crisis resulted in a change in leadership with the governing Democratic Party electing Mr. Nodaas as the new prime minister in August 2011 according to the New York Times. Mr. Nodaas replaced Naoto Kan cited as failing to "galvanize Japan after the disaster" and being "forced to resign." (New York Times, 2012) The New York Times reports that the "operator of the Fukushima Daiichi plant, admitted for the first time that it had failed to take stronger measures to prevent disasters for fear of inviting lawsuits or protests against its nuclear plants. The admission, an apparent bid to inspire confidence, also seemed to confirm one of the main arguments of the company's critics: that it refused to recognize and fix problems because it did not want to jeopardize the so-called safety myth that Japan's nuclear technology was infallible." (New York Times, 2012) In fact, it is reported in a European Commission report released in October 2012 that nearly all "of the more than 130 active nuclear reactors in the European Union need safety improvements, repairs or upgrades, at a cost of up to 25 billion Euros ($32 billion)…" (New York Times, 2012) Also reported is that "some insiders from Japan's tightly knit nuclear industry have stepped forward to say that Tepco and regulators had for years ignored warnings of the possibility of a larger-than-expected tsunami in northeastern Japan and thus failed to take adequate countermeasures, such as raising wave walls or placing backup generators on higher ground." (New York Times, 2012) The government awarded contracts for clean up and rehabilitation to three large construction companies that had no expertise in the cleanup of nuclear waste and radiation according to the New York Times report. The efforts for disaster response and cleanup is reported to have been "hindered at times by a debilitating breakdown in trust between the major actors: Mr. Kan; the Tokyo headquarters of the plant's operator, Tokyo Electric Power, known as Tepco; and Masao Yoshida, the manager at the stricken plant. The conflicts produced confused flows of sometimes contradictory information in the early days of the crisis…" (New York Times, 2012)
II. Three Important Lessons
Three important lessons that might be learned from the incident that occurred at the nuclear plant in Japan following the earthquake tsunami in 2011 include first, that it is critical that officials at nuclear plants be honest about the state of the nuclear plant stability following such an incident. The second lesson is the importance of honest and open communication between major actors in such an incident to ensure that the status of such an incident is known to all actors so that everyone involved can take the necessary precautionary steps. The third lesson is the importance of keeping nuclear facilities upgraded and in proper working condition in lieu of shutting down facilities that are not operating safely. There is also a fourth lesson involved and that being that plans should be made before disaster strikes about who will be appointed to work in cleaning up after such a disaster ensuring that they are properly trained, equipped and licensed to conduct such a critical cleanup effort.
III. Mental Health Following Such a Disaster
Many of the mixed communications that took place in Japan can likely be attributed to a lack of rationale on the part of those involved due to the stress of such a situation and the heavy load of responsibility in attempting to mitigate such a disaster as occurred in Japan following the 2011 earthquake tsunami. The government of any country, including Japan should ensure that mental health professionals are available to respond to individuals who shoulder the weight of response in such a critical incident and as well, responding to the deaths of 20,000 citizens in terms of the mental health needs of their family and friends is an important issue to be addressed by the government and its organizations.
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