Jeremy Bentham: life, philosophy, and legacy

¶ … Legislation," Jeremy Bentham outlines his theory of utilitarianism, which includes a large portion regarding the proper role of punishment in any system of justice. Bentham argues that law and society should be organized around what he calls "the principle of utility," which, among other things, leads to standards for the application of punishment that attempt to preclude the kind of retributive punishment which has been common throughout human history. Examining the principle of utility and some of its implications for society will help to demonstrate why Bentham's theory of utilitarian punishment is perhaps one of the most ethical modes of punishment devised, and how far modern societies have to go towards attaining this far more beneficial form of justice.

Before considering Bentham's interpretation of punishment and its role in society (which this essay agrees with), it will be helpful to first discuss the principle of utility in general. Bentham argues that "nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure," and while this is an oversimplification that cannot account for some of the nuances of human experience (masochism, for example), it is nonetheless a useful way of boiling down human experience into those elements most important when considering the role of society in regards to punishment and justice (Bentham 51). From this initial observation regarding the role of pleasure and pain in human experience, Bentham defines the principle of utility as "that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question: or, what is the same thing in other words, to promote or oppose that happiness" (Bentham 52). Bentham proposes this principle as the standard for judging every action, whether committed by an individual or a community, because he recognizes that generally all previous standards for justice and punishment are based upon largely arbitrary rules, often born out of religious belief or other nonsensical ideologies. Thus, Bentham bases his theory on this principle in order to provide a relatively simple, concrete way of judging every possible action that does not depend on the dictates of a fictional book, but rather the most basic dichotomy of human experience. The truly transformative nature of this project is revealed when one considers the implications of applying the principle of utility to the application of punishment, but before one can consider Bentham's view of punishment, one must consider his interpretation of human behaviour in general.

Bentham views all human behavior within the rubric of the principle of utility, and as such, argues that any given behavior can be analyzed "according to the sum total of its consequences: that is, according to the difference between the sum of such as are good, and the sum of such as are evil" (Bentham 54). While some might claim that this represents a kind of moral relativism because it does not state that certain acts are unequivocally evil, but rather argues that the specific consequences of any given act are what give it its moral worth (or lack thereof), because Bentham's argument is based on the principle of utility, Bentham is actually providing a more robust, coherent, and consistent means of evaluating human behavior than anything offered by preexisting religious or moral codes. Recognizing that the principle of utility offers a consistent approach to human behavior reveals just how fickle and arbitrary preexisting standards of judgement and punishment are, because they claim to define a number of absolutes regarding human behavior that are not born out in the reality of human experience. Having understood how Bentham's principle of utility affects the consideration of human behavior in general, one can now begin to appreciate Bentham's interpretation of punishment.

Bentham's principle of utility brings him to an observation that one hopes would be obvious at this point in human history but which has not been effectively appreciated by society, namely, the fact that "all punishment is mischief: all punishment in itself is evil. Upon the principle of utility, if it ought at all to be admitted, it ought only to be admitted in as far as it promises to exclude some greater evil" (Bentham 57). While some may crow about "necessary evils," a look at the justice system of most major countries, from the United States to China, reveals that punishment is not considered as a last resort, but rather as a pillar of society, regardless of whether or not those punishments actually succeed in preventing greater evils. For example, proponents of the death penalty argue for its continued use even though numerous studies have shown that its general deterrent effect to be minimal at best, and there are plenty of people arguing for the authorized torture of individuals when they are suspected of knowing crucial information even though it has long been known that more often than not, the information gleaned through torture is simply what the torturer wants to hear, rather than anything relating to reality.

Both of these cases represent a violation of the second, third, and fourth instances in which "punishment ought not to be inflicted," which is are instance in which the punishment "[2.] must be inefficacious: where it cannot act so as to prevent the mischief," "[3.] it is unprofitable, or too expensive; where the mischief it would produce would be greater than what it prevented," and "[4.] it is needless: where the mischief may be prevents, or cease of itself, without it: that is, at a cheaper rate" (Bentham 58). Along with cases "where there has never been any mischief," these three instances represent what Bentham views as cases in which the administration of punishment, or a specific kind of punishment, should not be inflicted because the harm will outweigh the good. Unfortunately, Bentham's principle of utility is not nearly as widely considered as it should be, and as such there are large swaths of humanity who believe that in many cases the harm caused by a punishment will never outweigh the good, because the rightness of that punishment is de facto promised by a fictional character like a god, thus rendering any potential harm moot.

Beyond recognizing that punishment is itself inherently offensive, the principle of utility further leads Bentham to recognize that in any instance in which punishment is justified, it must only be administered in the proper proportion, meaning the bare minimum necessary to achieve the desired outcome. Thus, just as Bentham highlights "four cases in which [punishment] is not worth while," he proposes "four subordinate designs or objects" which serve to uphold the standard of the principe of utility in the administration of punishment (Bentham 62). The first object is rather obvious, but it is worth stating because so many justice systems seem to miss it, instead focusing on the retributive punishment of offenders rather the preclusion of further offenses. Bentham argues that the "first, most extensive object, is to prevent, in as far is possible, and worth while, all sorts of offences whatsoever" (Bentham 62). This is a crucial goal to note because it forces one to recognize that the prevention of all offenses should be considered equally, such that the abuse of power by the police or prison guards should be considered just as serious of an offense as those committed by their prisoners. This goal is the ideal goal of any justice system, and even though many justice systems do not operate in a way that would actually help achieve it, they would at least acknowledge its importance. Where the disruptive, progressive nature of Bentham's theory really shines is in the remaining three objects.