Juliet Mitchell\'s Introduction to the Selected Melanie

Juliet Mitchell's Introduction To The Selected Melanie Klein

In her introduction to The Selected Melanie Klein, Juliet Mitchell provides an overview of the relationship between Melanie Klein's psychoanalytic theory and that of Freud. According to the author, Klein is in fact a more autonomous intellectual thinker than is commonly attributed to her, and much of the introduction is devoted to elucidating the distinctions between the two. Mitchell's main areas of focus (with regard to Klein) include subject-object relations, and whether the distinction between conscious, unconscious, and preconscious minds should exist.

According to Mitchell, one of the major tenets of Klein's psychoanalytic theory involves the assertion that people are born with the id, ego, and super-ego indistinct from one another. However, Mitchell never discloses exactly when such a distinction manifests itself. Because Klein worked predominantly with young children, it is difficult to ascertain whether she feels that the split between id, ego, and super-ego ever occurs. Given that Klein worked with infants, inability to differentiate between id, ego, and super-ego also seems hardly surprising. It is highly unlikely that many infant children would be able to understand the role of the societal structure in influencing how they perceive the world.

Klein's position on the relationship between id, ego, and superego is difficult to ascertain. Specifically, when she notes that the three aspects of the psyche are indistinct from one another in the infant child's psyche, does she contend that the three facets play an equal role, or are they less pronounced because neither of them are able to manifest in a singular manner? It is also interesting to ponder whether Klein's stance on the superego would have changed had she worked in the intellectual climate of Lacan rather than (or in addition to) Freud, as Lacan placed a far greater emphasis than Freud on the societal influence of the superego in shaping the formation of child subjectivity. In his description of the mirror stage, Lacan argues that the formation of subjectivity occurs at a period during child infancy, in which the child comes to realize that their body exists distinct from the mother. Presumably, Klein worked with children who had already experienced the mirror stage, but one still has to wonder exactly which time Klein felt that children were able to understand that they were not attached to the mother. For example, Mitchell uses the term "polymorphously perverse" to describe the initial period of the child's life, but the association between this "polymorphously perverse" period and the construction of one's subjectivity remains unclear (16).

At the same time, it does stand to reason that the id and ego would be inextricably linked in infant children. The fact that children never want to leave their mother, for example, speaks to the close association between ego and id in children. Additionally, the role of toys attests to the inability of the child to differentiate between his own body and that of an external object. In this regard, Klein's insistence on studying the manner in which children play with toys reflects the integral nature of play objects in developing the child's psyche. For example, if a child is unwilling to part with the toy object, such behavior would reproduce the child's initial behavior (pre mirror-stage behavior) upon leaving his mother's womb.

One aspect of Klein's use of child play that remains unclear involves the importance of parents in the child's play. Specifically, was it common for the parents to be physically present in the room with both Klein and the child? If so, it could be inferred that the child's behavior with the toy may be highly contingent on the mother's behavior in the room with him; if the mother ignored her child, the child might play with the toy while exhibiting greater anxiety.

Mitchell writes that "we have to consider each child's use of symbols in connection with his particular emotions, anxieties and in relation to the whole situation which is presented in the analysis" (18). In this quote, the relevancy of child's play as an active component of the psychiatric evaluation manifests itself. Moreover, Klein's argument that the child's playing constitutes a surrogate for language also makes intellectual sense. The meaning of "symbol" is ambiguous in this context, but likely suggests the presence of ritualistic behavior. While it is likely that the way in which a child plays elucidates central aspects of their psyche, Mitchell does not discuss the greater implications of Klein's disregard for language. Specifically, language is embedded reflects society to a greater extent than toys; the specific words that one uses and the names that are given to objects both reflect the society in which one lives. In this regard, language is a product of the superego, while toys relate more exclusively to the id and ego (subject and object) formation. In this regard, the distinction between playing with toys and talking reflects the way in which Freud privileges the superego to a greater extent than Klein.

Mitchell also notes that "It is in the light of the concept of phantasy that we must view Klein's major…innovation in child analysis: the use of toys bridges external and internal reality" (23). While it is understandable that toys hold such significance, the topic of phantasy (the externalization of interior processes) begs the question of how playing with toys can demonstrate the subject-object differentiation without the use of language. For example, if the child refers to their toy by its title, that would reflect an awareness of the differentiation between subject and object. In this regard, it is difficult to conceptualize how Klein was able to conduct her sessions without deploying language.