Junior leaders' roles in Nigeria's counterinsurgency against Boko Haram

Junior Leaders in Counterinsurgency and Complex Military Operations: A case study of the Northeast Nigeria

Counter Insurgency

Complex Military Operations

Junior Leaders in Armies in Counterinsurgency

The Nigerian Context & North Eastern Conflict

The Troubled North East Nigeria & the Boko Haram

The Counter Insurgency Operations in North Eastern Nigeria

The Boko Haram Counterinsurgency and the Junior Leaders

Counter Insurgency

Government Counterinsurgency Guide describes counterinsurgency or COIN as the military and civilian efforts that that are undertaken simultaneously in order to defeat and contain insurgency and the causes of the insurgency (Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Department of State, United States Government, 2009).

It is also important to understand the definition of insurgency to understand the actual meaning of counterinsurgency. Insurgency is an attempt by rebels that takes recourse to subversion and violence in order to challenge and nullify existing political control over a region. Therefore the aim of insurgency is to gain political control over a region which means establishing rules and regulations of the insurgents within an identified area or region. Generally, insurgency is accompanied by armed political struggles to create space for their political, economic and influence activities (Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Department of State, United States Government, 2009).

Ideal and effective counterinsurgency operations and campaigns integrate political, security, economic, and informational components and utilize the resultant data and expertise to reinforce governmental legitimacy and effectiveness and reduce and ultimately eliminate the insurgent influence over a region and the population of the region (Kilcullen, 2010).

The counterinsurgency strategies are so designed that can, on one hand, help save the affected population from insurgent violence while on the other, it can help reinforce the legitimacy and capacity of government institutions while eliminating the insurgent's influence over a region.

Insurgency operations are generally comprised of a mixture of subversive and clandestine activities, sabotage, political, economic and psychological actions aided by armed conflicts against the established political or military established of a region.

Counterinsurgency operations are created and strategized so as to counter the tactics that insurgents use to create fear among the population and try and establish their influence over a region and hence COIN operations are composed of intelligence gathering, covert attacks and collaboration with the general population in many cases (Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Department of State, United States Government, 2009).

Therefore similar to insurgency, countering it also involves a protracted and often log drawn armed political struggle that includes a wide range of activities conducted by the existing government against whom insurgent activities are conducted of which the security aspect in just one but important issue.

While counter insurgency operations are generally conducted by the armed force, it is also necessary to include the population in most cases and hence the concept of a joint action force incorporating the civilians is gaining importance in counter insurgency operations (DeVore, 2013).

The joint forces, formed to counter insurgency has to be formed keeping in mind the political control of the region, the population centric nature of the action, assessment of the risks and gains and the understanding of the operational environment (DeVore, 2013).

Another important aspect of counterinsurgency strategy is t nullify the basis of the popular support that insurgent groups often get form the locals of a region. This is often called a COIN narrative that tries to explain the negative effects of the insurgency activities of insurgency.

The important aspects of a counter insurgency operations include several aspects like the assessment of the situations and the extent and influence of the insurgency over a region and supporting activities for the strategic narrative and the incorporation of the strategic narrative into actions down to the lowest level of the individual counterinsurgent.

It also involves the assessment and strategizing against the cyberspace operations of the insurgents, possibility of air operations in counterinsurgency, intelligence collection through satellite communications and the use of positioning and navigation, use of the naval forces if available, counter-improvised explosive device operations, counter finance threats to the insurgents and managing of public and public affairs.

Complex Military Operations

In the modern day society, wars are considered as a complex encounter between complex systems in complex environments. Complex environments, in war situations, happen when multiple interacting elements whose actions are not easy to understand and assimilate immediately and the external force effects are not linear in nature.

Focusing on the simple linear, transparent, classically logical Newtonian constructs is no longer relevant in war especially in situations which are concerned with counterinsurgency operations is one of the latest trends of warfare given the context of insurgency and proxy wars that are taking place around the globe (Peterside, 2014).

For example, the conflicts between the U.S. And USSR would be considered to be less complex in nature and understanding than the present war against terrorism. In the former, both the parties understand the ways and means the opposition could attack and hence counter attacks could be easily designed and strategized. However modern day insurgency, including terrorist attacks are subversive and clandestine in nature, and are hence difficult to infer and understand. Therefore counter terrorism and counter insurgency operations are getting more and more difficult and complex to design. Moreover there are numerous considerations that need to be taken into account that are a result of the growing complex nature of armed conflicts and war like situations, are becoming more and more important and such considerations were not part of the traditional warfare that the armies and the security forces were used to handle.

There is more need for carefully selection and more accurate targeting in the present day conflict situations as the complexity increases in military conflicts. The costs of errors in these strategies and choices have also become more impactful.

High complexity challenges are presented by hidden enemies in high complexity terrains and especially if the enemy manages to co-mingle with bystanders or local populations, as often happen with insurgency.

In the modern day world, many nations are faced with security challenges unlike any it has faced before and many such security challenges require lengthy involvement of the army and the security forces in stability operations. The ever changing mix and number of actors involved makes these challenges exceedingly dynamic and complex. The fast changing pace and dynamics in the strategic and operational environments and the possible response actions are also challenges that make the modern day conflict situations complex (Peterside, 2014).

Junior Leaders in Armies in Counterinsurgency

In any war situations, the level hierarchy in the army or the fighting forces is of primary importance. While strategy is formulated at the highest political level mostly, the order and executive details are formulated down the line. The actual execution of the strategies is however done by the junior leaders in the forces who do implement the strategies on the ground. There is hardly any information flow from bottom up.

But this is applicable in traditional war situations. Insurgency is clandestine and involves subversive activities that are conducted suddenly and without any warning and the insurgent elements are often not discernable from the general population. Therefore this is not a traditional warfare situations and the environment of the war is very different.

One such example is the situation that followed the 'Operation desert storm' in Iraq where the U.S. And allied forces stayed back to help establish a political transition. The warlike environment was very different from the traditional war with covert attacks and subversive activities by the rebels.

According to reports and studies conducted on the impact of such an operational environment, "the complexity, unpredictability, and ambiguity of postwar Iraq is producing a cohort of innovative, confident, and adaptable junior officers. Lieutenants and captains are learning to make decisions in chaotic conditions and to be mentally agile in executing counterinsurgency and nation-building operations simultaneously. As a result, the Army will soon have a cohort of company grade officers who are accustomed to operating independently, taking the initiative, and adapting to changes." (Wong, 2004)

Therefore in the changed scenario of insurgent wars being faced by many armies and forces around the world, the roles of the junior leaders in the forces becomes critical and important. This is because even as the strategies are handed down from top, the junior leaders are the ones who have to take that split second decisions and they are the ones who take the risks and assess the situations in counterinsurgency operations. Hence the importance of the junior leaders of armed forces engaged in counter insurgency operations needs to be acknowledges and encourage and the newly developed adaptability in the junior officers has to be incorporated in the future leaders of the armies and forces (Awodola & Ayuba, 2015).

In the modern day operating environment for armies and counter insurgency forces, there are a number of critical factors that need to be addressed, especially with respect to the junior officers and leaders who fight it out regularly on the ground against the insurgents.

It has been acknowledged by military and defense analysts that executing maneuver independent of strategic policy is no longer the sole proprietorship of the tactical leaders. Working knowledge of the strategic objectives of an operation, the operational goals, the cultural and tribal environments of the region of conflict and the nation's policies have to be critically applied by the junior leaders in order to conduct successful counter insurgency operations.

Often the junior leaders are not utilized by armies and forces by limiting the scope of tactics and the tactical level of war to mere simple maneuver and the utilization of force. The task of delivering and explaining the policies formulated by the politicians of a country or region to those of the nation or region lies with the junior leaders. Therefore the junior leaders need to be educated and such role incorporated into the induction process.

The expectations and requirements which will be levied on future junior leaders can be achieved through the expansion and the scope of tactical warfare. The expectations form the junior leaders are therefore no longer limited to the simple maneuver and battle drills, regardless of whether the armies and the security forces get involved in counter insurgency operations or in conventional wars.

The Nigerian Context & North Eastern Conflict

Nigeria is composed of 36 states and a Federal Capital Territory (Abuja). There are six geopolitical regions that compose Nigeria - North-east, Northwest, North-central, South-east, South-South and South-west.

There are number of (774) local government areas that are recognized by the federal government of the country. Nigeria has an area of 923,768 square kilometers and is the fourth largest country in Africa and is land locked on three sides with the Atlantic Ocean on the Southern side of the country.

Prior to 1914, the country did not exists but was composed of a loosely attached confederation of 4 different 'empires', some of them stretching into parts that are not part of current-day Nigeria (Awodola & Ayuba, 2015).

Religion varies considerably in terms of religion and the religious trends from one region to another. This is one of the prime reasons for the glaring distinctions that identify regional and ethnic groups in Nigeria. According to the latest studies however there is a distinct divide between Christians and Muslims with each religion having almost equal number of followers in addition to a very small population that practice traditional religion.

Muslims primarily reside in the Northern part of the country while the Christians live in the southern and central parts of the country. The Sunnis are the predominant sect of the country.

The role of ethnicity and religion along with regional sentiments are very important in Nigeria in terms of individual and group identities. There are often complex and sometimes conflicting interactions between the above mentioned two factors -- religion and ethnicity, along with regionalism.

The predominance of Muslims in the Northern part of the country coupled with the economic drawbacks of the regions sowed the seeds of discontent among the populations against the government.

Since 1999, when the country returned to democratic governance, there has been an upsurge in insurgent activities in Nigeria (Adebayo, 2014). The rising waves of insurgency had overwhelmed the police which are the primary institution that is responsible for the maintenance of law and order and its enforcement for internal security. This resulted in increased role of the army into the maintenance of internal security threats arising from ethnic violence and insurgency.

To counter the insurgency and the associated violence the federal government had been forced to deploy military-dominated Joint Task Forces (JTFs) to perform internal security duties, primarily in the conflict affected regions of the country.

A number of counter insurgency campaigns have been designed and implemented by several joint military and security task forces who were mandated by the government to conduct the operations. Internal security roles in the country have been assigned to the Army, Navy, Air Force and the paramilitary Police on a regular basis in Nigeria.

However there have been rising allegations of violation of human rights by the joint task forces as the forces have been accused of using brutal show of force that often results in high civilian casualties. Human rights cite the example of the killing of hundreds of civilians in November 1999 when a detachment of the Army bombarded Odi community in the Niger Delta in retaliation to the killing of 6 policemen by local insurgents.

The Troubled North East Nigeria & the Boko Haram

While conflicts in other regions of the country have slowed down relatively, the North Eastern region of the Nigeria has been riddled with ethnic violence. This has been compounded by the ongoing sectarian insurgency resulting in the escalation of violent confrontations between security forces and sectarian insurgents. This has not only increased casualties on both sides but has also resulted in high civilian fatalities. In addition, human settlements have been destroyed and livelihoods lost.

The region comprises of 6 states which are comparatively sparsely populated and poorer in terms of wealth and heath compared to the Central and Southern regions of Nigeria.

Since 2009, the conflicts between the security forces -- often joint forces, and the insurgent forces of Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihadl group (People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad), also known as Boko Haram, have increased in the North Eastern region of the country.

Boko Haram had been active in the region for more than a decade now but its activities increased since in 2002. Earlier the group was formed after breaking away from the reformist Salafi/Wahhabi groups in northern Nigeria.

The primary reason for the forming of the group was to challenge the established suffix orders in the region and professes that the Muslims should live according to the rules and modes of conduct established by the Prophet Muhammad and the first three generations of his followers. The Boko Haram wanted to restore the Islamic doctrines in the pure form' and it condemns secular education and any form of government or civil service work.

While barring other Muslims from education and directions of following strict Muslim laws, the group itself extensively uses technology that includes the internet and mobile phones. The group has also acquired technical skills and expertise to manufacture bombs including car bombs.

However despite the government being warned on several occasions about the possible arming of the group between 2002 and 2009, there was no action taken by the Nigerian government. The government chose to overlook the situation which proved to be fatal.

After its emergence and within seven years of its formation, the group became violent after action against its members by the security forces. In June 2009, an operation known as 'Operation Flush' was initiated against the Boko Haram by a joint police and military unit. This was after minor clashes between the security forces and the group members over the issue of enforcement of a government law regarding the mandatory use of helmets by all motorcyclists. The action turned violent from protests by the members of the group and security forces killed about 17 members of the group (Forest 2012, p.63).

Taking advantage of the public outrage against the police brutality, the group organized sporadic violent attacks against the police and other Government institutions all across the troubled areas of the north-eastern states of Nigeria. This resulted in continued clashes between the group and the security forces that left more than 800 people dead. This number included extra-judicial executions organized by the leader of the group, Mohammed Yusuf in July 2009.

These extra-judicial killings were the turning point in the history of North Eastern Nigeria as the group turned radical and increasingly violent over the next few years. After the death of its leader radical Mohammed Yusuf, a more radical leader Abubakar Shekau took over reigns of the group. This was also the period when the group laid silent for a brief period since 2009.

The group has turned more violent under Shekau and has carried out more violent attacks that include suicide bombings and targeted murders in North and North Eastern Nigeria (IRIN News, 2013). The increase in violence of the group resulted in the government deciding the deployment of joint military and security task forces in the affected regions of the country.

The Boko Haram Counterinsurgency and the Junior Leaders

For many countries and armies, especially the U.S., the more than a decade long bitterly fought war in Iraq and Afghanistan has de-popularized the population-centered counterinsurgency strategy. The main reasons for this are such approach is considered to be too difficult and unrealistic as the Americans have found out both in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The alternative of the population-centered counterinsurgency approach, according to critics of the approach, is the limited counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategies that are aimed at disrupting and dismantling terrorist groups.

While this can be an option for countries whose armies fight in another soil, for Nigeria, experts believe, the option is not viable as simple counterinsurgency measures would not yield the results. The strong inner forces that Boko Haram has managed to create in the regions that were within their control need special measures. Therefore the Nigerian government needs effective population-centered counterinsurgency strategies or else they would have to forgo large parts of the national territory to millenarian Islamist rebels and see the rise of domestic anarchy.

These issues could enrage and alienate the already fragmented Nigerian population

The present strategies entail that the Nigerian government utilize a population-centered approach in the fight against Boko Haram and establish a secure enough environment and change the outlook of the security forces.

As already mentioned, Boko Haram relies on popular public sentiments to establish their rule. The movement started with the popular public sentiment against the killing of people from the region in 2009 by the Joint Forces of Nigerian government. A section of the critics believe that large sections of the population support the Boka Haram in their effort to oppose the oppressive Nigerian government. Therefore any counter insurgency operation cannot be strategized without including the people.

While doing so the Nigerian government would also require to continue cooperating with the international coalition to continue with the gains that the joint forces have made. However the local population would come in handy when fighting the Boka Haram, for example, in the hostile terrain of the Sambisa forest (Elden, 2014).

The support amongst the local population helps the insurgents to succeed. There is hardly any capacity with insurgents to win a conventional war that involves constant battles out in the open, the insurgents rely on clandestine and hidden operations and attacks. This also means that the Boko Haram would have to recruit people into their ranks form among the local population. The Boko Haram enjoyed this support from the locals earlier that helped their dominance.

Draining the support is the only way to defeat an insurgency and this results in a primarily political battle rather than military battles. Therefore the government has to reach out to the people and at this stage in the North Eastern region of Nigeria, the security forces are the only means to reach out to the local population.

Therefore the strategies that are available with the Nigerian government entail the importance of being creative and integrating with the local population and taking quick and fast decision when engaging the enemy in hostile territories. The people centric approach to fight counterinsurgency is therefore critical for sustaining the advantages that the joint forces have gained as well as instill confidence among the population about their safety and security.

In this situation, therefore it is imperative that the security forces should rely on the interactions that the security forces have on the ground with the local populations and decide strategies and formulas for counter insurgency operations based on the feedback given by the ground forces. The junior leaders in the security forces are the ones who do the actual ground work and are engaged in the security activities on the ground (Elden, 2014).

Moreover, it should also be realized that the war against Boko Haram is not a conventional war and hence the strategies and the rules and regulations of a conventional war are not applicable. This is a complex war where the local population is involved and hence the tactics of this war a different form the conventional wars. In complex situation wars, the junior leaders acquire importance due to the requirement to understand the complexities that happen on the ground, react to the complex situations and change ground strategies according to the needs of the situations. Therefore the role of the junior leaders among the security forces fighting the Boko Haram is critical to achieve and sustain success against the insurgency ('CHAD - NIGER - NIGERIA - CAMEROON: New Force to Fight Boko Haram', 2015).

Therefore the junior leaders of security forces are the ones who should be given the due importance in dealing with and fighting the insurgency threats that is posed by Boko Haram.