Just War Theory Is Based

Just War Theory is based on the ideal that war should be "restrained, made more humane, and ultimately directed towards the aim of establishing lasting peace and justice." Adherents may believe that war is inevitable and therefore should be regulated so as to allow as little damage as possible; they may also believe that war is a barbaric tradition that should be contained as soon as possible via mutually agreed upon codes of conduct, then phased out.

While humanizing war efforts is effective in minimizing cost, trade damage, and loss of life, it also has another significant advantage: by agreeing upon certain conventions for war, the two enemies have established that the war is between two rational parties that, despite their irresolvable conflict or conflicts, understand that war is an ends to a means and not a trend to be set and never revoked. "It is only when the enemy is seen to be a people with whom one will do business in the following peace that tacit or explicit rules are formed for how wars should be fought and who they should involve."

In order for a war to be considered "just," it must fit a set of predefined criteria:

just war must be declared by a legitimate authority.

I just war must be declared and prosecuted with the right intention. (in defense of one's country; to redress a grave wrong; to rescue a threatened people.)

There must be a strong probability of success.

The good obtained must be proportional to the harm done.

War must be a last resort (i.e. reasonable peaceful means of address must be exhausted).

Once upon a time, the beginning of a war was indicated by the pillaging of country-side villages as an army marched to attack. In a modern era of light-speed communications and complex diplomacy, however, channels of authority must be strictly adhered to so that, when the war is officially declared, it is recognized as legitimate and representative of the entire nation or group from whence the declaration came.

When President Bush declared war on Saddam Hussein (and terrorism, despite protests that one cannot declare war on a person or an ideal), he has both the popular support of the nation which he represented -- thanks, some would say, to the gut reaction to the 9/11 attack -- and support from his advisors and subordinates. Because President Bush was recognized by his countryman and government as one with the authority to declare war on behalf of the United States of America, his declaration was legitimate and accepted by the world at large.

Popular support does not, according to Just War Theory, offer justification in and of itself. When Saddam Hussein found himself in military and monetary trouble and attacked Kuwait, a small country of which "the borders are not readily defensible and the population is not necessarily cohesive," primarily for its considerable oil resources, much of the world disapproved. So much so, in fact, that the United States took action and fought against Iraq, though U.S. interests in Kuwait that were not terribly different than Iraq's may have played a part in that decision.

Regardless of moral or immoral intent, war has a tendency to be an incredible drain on resources, both capital and human. For that reason, even a moral war does is not justified if it does not have a reasonable likelihood of achieving its goal. This criteria for a just war seems almost too obvious to mention, but for political reasons some wars are begun without properly-defined goals; without goals, there is categorically no opportunity for success, and once those goals are formulated, it may be that it is too late to pull out without losing face.

An all-too-common example of this is the Vietnam war, which may have been entered simply because, after the McCarthy Witch Hunt, no politicians were brave enough to avoid publically condemning communism for communism's sake: "As a consequence of McCarthyism, no U.S. politician [was] willing to appear to be 'soft' on Communism." Going to war was a reactionary measure, and by the time a concrete goal was formulated, it was: how can we get out without losing face?

Perhaps the most complicated precept of Just War Theory is that the war should do more good than harm. The difficulties lie in the definition of good and harm, as obviously the definitions of the two parties at war are at odds, or there would not be a war. During the American Civil War, the North was obviously convinced that slavery was an abomination and should be halted, and the South was just as obviously convinced that slavery was a perfectly moral trade, and the North's poorly-treated factory workers made them not only wrong, but hypocritical. Six-hundred thousand Americans died, both slave and free. Was more harm done, or was more good done? The victors would clearly make the claim that more good was done, but it is no easy feat to find an objective eye.

The safeguard against subjectivity in Just War Theory is the final criteria: that war should only be used as a last resort. All possibilities for diplomacy must be completely exhausted before war is a viable option. In the first world war, over eight million people died, and the effects of attempted genocide still haunt an entire race years later. War has awful consequences, and a failure to pursue other means of resolution is simply irresponsible.

Historically, conventions of warfare are defined by just ad bellum -- when is it right to go to war?, jus in bello -- rules of engagement, and jus post bello -- how should a war end, and how should victors act?