Justice in the Republic in Book II

Justice in the Republic

In Book II of The Republic, Plato attempts to define and describe the role of justice in society by having his characters argue for two different approaches to the topic. While Socrates asserts that justice is good and desirable both in itself and because of the ends it creates, Glaucon rejects this assertion by pointing out that justice is nothing more than coercion. The debate is particularly interesting because it demonstrates what might be called the root of ethical or moral problems that arise within societies determining public policy, that is, the fundamental disagreement regarding the innate value or goodness of people. Socrates' assertion suggests that there is something inherent in people that will encourage them to value justice for its own sake, but Glaucon realizes that people are ultimately motivated by pragmatism, despite any high-minded assertions to the contrary.

The debate in Book II begins with Glaucon telling Socrates that he is not convinced of the latter's argument regarding the innate appeal of justice. Glaucon proposes three categories or classes of things depending on how they are valued. First are those things which are good in and of themselves but which have no larger end, then those things which are both good in and of themselves and are good because they produce a positive end, and finally those things which are onerous in and of themselves but which are nevertheless valuable because of the good they produce. Socrates argues that justice is in the second category, while Glaucon argues that it should be considered in the third category due to the way justice actually functions in human society.

Glaucon uses the example of the ring of Gyges to make his point. The ring grants the wearer invisibility, and Glaucon suggests that if a just and an unjust man were both given access to this kind of power, the results would be largely the same because the impunity offered by invisibility would encourage both men to abandon whatever allegiance to the law they might have. The ring of Gyges is a perfect example of how "all violate justice whenever they imagine that there is nothing to hinder them," because the ring's magical power can quite easily be replaced with the impunity offered by money or fame in contemporary society (Plato, 1908, p. 43). Particularly in the United States, there is a two-tiered justice system wherein the poor receive harsh sentences while the rich tend to go free, often only having to pay monetary punishments which by definition are not especially punitive. Despite the fact that many of the rich and powerful belong to religious institutions that preach justice and equality, the fact is that in practice impunity from the law means that humans will act unjustly for their own benefit. Glaucon goes even further than this, however, and it is during his conclusion to the ring of Gyges example that he reveals how naive and ultimately dangerous Socrates' assertion is.

Glaucon notes that if someone were given the power of invisibility and yet refused to take advantage of it, "all who were aware of it would think him a most pitiful and irrational creature, though they would praise him before each other's faces, to impose on one another, through their fear of being treated with injustice" (Plato, 1908, p. 43). This is a key detail to note because Glaucon is pointing out the double standard inherent in most discussions of justice; namely, the fact that the socially acceptable position to take regarding justice is entirely different from the socially practiced position. Socrates' assertion that justice is good and beneficial in its own right is essentially the socially acceptable, popular conception of justice, but it is merely a cooperative fantasy maintained so that people do not have to face the reality of the situation, which is that the rich and powerful have no one to answer to but themselves.

By pretending that everyone values justice in its own right, people can go on believing that they live in an inherently just society where instances of injustice can be considered aberrations or outliers. In reality, all extant human society is inherently unjust, and it is only the threat of personal harm that keeps individuals from acting unjustly to fulfill their desires. Socrates position is actually dangerous because it serves to paper over the very real injustices in society by pretending that a professed love for supposedly inherent value of justice is the same as justice being inherently valuable to the individual. Pretending that a professed love for justice is the same as justice actually existing, as Socrates essentially does, is precisely the kind of position that has allowed religious institutions to perpetuate their cruel, inhumane standards for centuries in the name of social cohesion and welfare. Only by recognizing that everyone, regardless of his or her professed morality, will break the rules if given the opportunity can people hope to maintain an actually just society, because only then will public policy be based on an accurate understanding of human behavior.