Kant and Aristotle Theory of Ethics

Kantian Ethics
Conceptual relativism is a thinly distinguished relativism in which what prevails is opposed to epistemic patterns or ethical considerations. In conceptual relativism, ontology is made relative to conceptual themes, science structures, and categorical definitions. The anti-realist thesis is what drives this type of relativism. Antirealism claims that the world does not come to us already made for use, but we are the one who keeps providing various ways of classifying it and conceptualizing it. Sometimes we even provide incompatible schemas for this conceptualization (Baghramian, 2015). Kantian-based ethics only renders minimalist duty. It dismisses the actions which are explained incoherently since they do not constitute actions by its interpretation. It may allow critical crimes if the proponent is fanatical enough. There is nothing in the development of the theory by Kant that supposes that the agents discussed are humans. It applies just as well to other creatures, or computers which have been made intelligent enough to play agents. The expectation we should, therefore, have is one of a skeletal theory. Practically, individuals who look for ethical guidance are not biased. To them, Kantian views assist them in organizing their thoughts. Such a position is a welcome relief in a world of relativism and ethical nihilism (Hooker, 1996). However, there has been consideration and conclusion that the mind of humans isn’t passive. It is not just preoccupied with representing independent reality; instead, it plays an active role in constructing, or at least, shaping the reality. Conceptual relativism postulates that humans may build reality in various ways as a result of using different cultures and languages (Baghramian, 2015).
Ethical Import of Autonomy
There is a contrast between values and facts, and between synthetic and analytic, for the positivists. The first one is between values and “facts,” while the second one contrasts tautologies with “facts.” The intuitive contrast between “what ought to be” and “what is” highlights a critical vacuum between clear domains. Sometimes the gap is defined as what differentiates “values” and “facts.” To prevent misunderstanding, there is a critical gap that can be thought to prevail even when values double up as special facts (Vayrynen, 2016).
The bottom-line is that normative and evaluative explanations guide the course of action and commend. On the other hand, non-evaluative statements do not play such a role. The resultant view that there is no inference of reason to any evaluative conclusion from premises of non-evaluative nature is often referred to as “ethical autonomy.” There have been deep concepts thought to leverage arguments in various debate forums relating to the nature of evaluative thinking. They highlight questions such as whether a robust distinction of fact-value exists, and whether the claims exhibit some notable objectivity of how classifications of evaluative nature relate to those that are of non-evaluative nature. To render justice to the full extent and diversity of moral thoughts and the complexity of such thoughts, there should be more focus on deep concepts (Vayrynen, 2016).
Voting and Morality
The expressive voting theory has it that voters cast their votes to express what they think. Basing on the theory of expression, voting is, basically, consumption as opposed to productive action. It is compared with watching a movie or reading to derive pleasure from doing so to polish a skill. This theory postulates that even if voting is a private act, voters regard the action of voting as aptly expressing commitment to a political formation. Before one inquires whether “ one person-one vote” is valid, there is a need to first determine who counts as an element within the demos. It can be regarded as the headache of constructing the demos. By definition, democratic practice embraces people’s rule. However, the headache arises when seeking the answer to the question as to who the “people” are. Before declaring that democracy is a fair way of constructing governance plans and enacting them, there is a strong need to know who should count (Brennan, 2016).
One possibility of navigating the complexities of the answer to who counts is to regard people with affected interests as forming part of the policy. The principle shows that for a lot of decisions, the nation-state is bigger than the demos, although it is larger for others (Brennan, 2016).
Consequences and Virtues Factored
It is impossible to separate character from the person. If one is regarded to be of good character, it means that their habits, emotional responses, and actions are focused on the moral. It is impossible to separate public actions from private ones in this argument. Either way, one’s character is affected. The public acts influence one’s character even when their private persuasion contrasts with such action. Their character is somewhat affected. Actions not only reflect the positive and negative aspects of one’s character. The action one undertakes also affects their character. The more an immoral action is undertaken or commends it, the more they embrace it, and it becomes part of their character. To be regarded to be of good character, one should desire and know “good” while pursuing it both publicly and privately. Virtue aids the process; it is the action of good character. The growth of virtues, particularly prudence, constitutes good character (Mitchell, 2015).
A similar scenario suffices where one informs another that the zip of their pants is open in a public setting. A move like this informs us how the informer was brought up, and their character. If such a person is a good one in private, then the same should be reflected in public settings. The actions of an individual of high-character should reflect the same in either forum. If someone is of good character, they keep trying to enhance their good deeds and their virtues. Character and action among humans cannot be separated because people are inherently self possessing, governing, and determining. Is it likely for a character to be compartmentalized to prevent it from being affected by some actions or to show that one has multiple character denotations? How character relates to such a person is a key consideration to answering such a question, the control one has over the development of their character, and the influence of their actions on their behavior (Mitchell, 2015).
Aristotelian Virtues and Kantian Duties
Normative ethics apply virtue ethics to a large extent. It could be classified as the one that insists on virtues, as opposed to the method that insists on duties and rules (deontology) or what emphasizes action consequences – consequentialism. Suppose it is apparent that a needy person should be assisted? One should be informed that their face was left with the aftermath of their sneeze. According to a utilitarian, the effect of such an action will enhance wellbeing. Deontologists will point out that such action is aligning to the moral rule demanding that you only do unto others what you would wish to be done unto you. A virtue ethicist will, on the other hand, view such help as an act of benevolence or charity (Hurthouse, 2016).
The virtue ethicists, when adopting Aristotle’s thoughts, draw a clear line between “continence” and perfect virtue ( Hurthouse, 2016). The two philosophers, Kant and Aristotle, do not differ on how they rank characters, as far as preferability is concerned, but only in their estimate of the level to which a human is expected to rise. In this scenario, someone moral would prefer to think that they should handle other people as they wish to be handled.
References
Brennan, J. (2016). The ethics and rationality of voting. Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/voting/
Hooker, J. N. (1996). Kant and Cultural Relativism. Pittsburgh: Carnegie Mellon University.
Hurthouse, R. (2016). Virtue ethics. Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/
Mitchell, L. (2015). Integrity and virtue: The forming of good character. Linacre Q, 82(2), 149-169. DOI: 10.1179/2050854915Y.0000000001
Baghramian, M. (2015). Relativism. Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/relativism/
Vayrynen, P. (2016). Thick ethical concepts. Retrieved from https://seop.illc.uva.nl/entries/thick-ethical-concepts/