King Richard II Role in the Peasants Revolt

Introduction
In June of 1381, England reeled from the social and economic effects of the Black Death and the Hundred Years War. The plague took no mercy based on socioeconomic class and affected nobility every bit as much as the peasant classes. Because of the egalitarian nature of the Black Death, the labor force of England suddenly found itself with improved bargaining powers vis-a-vis the elite. The population had thinned out to such a degree that labor supply could not keep up with the monarchy’s demands. Widely believed to be precipitated by both years of mismanaged economic growth culminating in the poll tax, the peasants; revolt was led by Wat Tyler who represented scores of laborers from multiple social classes. The peasants’ revolt also represents the first major populist uprising in Europe, illuminating the stark class cleavages in British society, particularly presaging a different relationship between monarch and people. While Richard II’s meek attempt at appeasement did not inspire confidence in the crown, the revolt cannot be traced to the boy king alone but was the result of generations of change and frustration within the Plantagenet monarchy.
Workers Unite
The peasants’ revolt was systemic, caused by decades of economic mismanagement and worker exploitation. While it was easy to perpetuate the system of serfdom when there was a glut of labor, the Black Death culled the labor force and inadvertently empowered the working classes. Many centuries before socialism took root in the European consciousness, the people of Britain expressed values and political ideologies that remarkably resembled class conflict theory. One manuscript of the Chronicles of Jean Froissart from 1483 describes the peasants as “too severely oppressed,” and complained that their lords “treated them as beasts,” (Chronicles of Jean Froissart (1483). The awakening of a collective consciousness among the peasant class perhaps seemed sudden to Richard II, who was only fourteen at the time of the rebellion. Yet the trouble had been brewing for decades, as “between 1377 and 1381, a number of taxes were levied to finance government spending,” (“Peasants' Revolt (death of Wat Tyler),” n.d.). Rather than take steps to avoid class conflict, Richard II and his chief advisors made no changes in their approach and continued to levy taxes on agricultural workers, even attempting to establish a fixed minimum wage after the plague had ended (“Peasants’ Revolt,” n.d.). According to what was penned in the Chronicles of Jean Froissart (1483) regarding the manner by which the monarchy handled brewing labor disputes: “this they would not longer bear, but had determined to be free, and if they laboured or did any other works for their lords, they would be paid for it,” (p. 1). Had the Plantagenet monarchy cultivated the foresight to recognize shifting social and economic realities even before the Plague hit, then it is highly possible that the peasants’ revolt could have been avoided.
A Crack in the Crown
In addition to the inability of the Plantagent monarchy to foresee the economic, political, and social turbulence before and after the Black Death, another reason the monarchy indirectly caused—or at least failed to prevent—the peasants’ revolt can be traced to generational differences. The young Richard II did actually make concessions to the peasants and promised to meet many of their demands. Although the King reneged on his promises, some historians believe that Richard II actually did sympathize with the peasants (Barker, 2014). If Richard II sided with the peasants, it would have represented a clear break with the family’s overall position on how to handle the revolt, and more importantly, how to retain power and pass through its self-serving economic reforms. Moreover, trouble had already been brewing in London prior to the peasants’ revolt of 1381. As Dobson (1983) points out, Richard II “inherited the crown of England from his grandfather under the worst of circumstances,” referring in part to the Plague but even more so to the Hundred Years War—particularly the most heated battles taking place on English soil between 1369 and 1389: England’s “most serious military challenge” to date (p. 91). Richard was far too young to address the complexities of military strategy effectively without counsel, and counsel he received from those who were stuck firmly in the past. Older generations of rulers in the Plantagenet family lacked the creative thinking skills to resolve their problems in a progressive manner; the King might have been able to do so had he been given a chance.
Ruling in the king’s stead was a counsel that was elected by common law that consisted of an odd motley of persons including bishops, earls, and even a civil lawyer (Dobson, 1983). Clearly, the Plantagenet monarchy itself lacked the power and fortitude it needed to manage the war with the French, which is why the peasants’ revolt arrived on its clock. War was also a costly affair, which is why the monarchy—and the governing counsel that actually made the decisions that led to the peasants’ revolt—passed the taxes onto the people. When Wat Tyler and the laborers from Kent and Essex arrived in London and stormed the Tower, the King perhaps realized for the first time the real repercussions of his weak rule and saw the direct impacts of his throne’s official decisions on the lives of the people.
On official record, King Richard II used harsh and severe words against the peasants, telling them “You will remain in bondage, not as before but incomparably harsher. For as long as we live… we will strive with mind, strength and goods to suppress you so that the rigour of your servitude will be an example to posterity,” (Barker, 2014). Clearly the King is towing the line of his family’s position and that of his legal counsel. In private, however, the King likely harbored far different views, those more befitting a young man who would have been open to sensing a turning of the tides and a shift in the social and political landscape during his generation. To the faces of Wat Tyler and company, the King was remarkably conciliatory. He did not have to meet with the rebels in person, but he did do so at Mile End on June 14, promising to overturn the new labor and taxation rules. As of June 15, the King’s concessions still stood.
Why Appeasement Failed
The peasants did not target King Richard II, even though may have temporarily been in “fear of his life,” (Trueman, 2015, p. 1). In fact, when the murderous group returned the day after the King met with the rebel leaders at Mile End, their targets were chosen deliberately. It was the treasurer and the archbishop who were killed, not the King. Furthermore, the King had no need to let the rebels go and could have immediately cancelled his concessions had he genuinely sided with the more resolute and conservative among his peers. Richard remained committed to keeping his promises: “not only did Richard fail to cancel the grants he had already made but his clerks continued to issue new charters granting them their freedom, sealed with the Great Seal of England,” (Barker, 2014, p. 1). More than two weeks later, the King capitulated, and his doing so was likely due to the political bickering taking place behind the scenes. If the King had been able to sway his advisors that appeasement was the best path forward, it is even possible that the assassinations might not have taken place.
What manifested during the peasants’ revolt can be traced to a point prior to the King’s Coronation. There were those who vied for power and who used the opportunity of having a minor on the throne to exert authority through the symbol of the Plantagenet ruler. Several people within the dynasty might have had eyes on the throne including the King’s uncle, John of Gaunt, Archbishop Simon Sudbury, and Treasurer Robert Hales (Barker, 2014). These were all men who had nervously watched the crown coffers dissipate during the Hundred Years’ War, and who also heard litanies of complaints from lords in the wake of the plague (Dobson, 1983). King Richard II could have brokered a deal with the peasants, as he did seem to recognize and acknowledge the legitimacy of their complaints. On the other hand, it was the incompetency of the rest of the royal family and their cohorts that precipitated the rebellion.
The boy king can easily be forgiven for not keeping tabs on the goings-on in Essex and Kent, where the landowning class would have, could have, and should have been able to inform the crown about rising discontent. In Essex especially, the laborers had been formally organizing for many months prior to the march on London (Dobson, 1983, p. 101). An intelligent, cohesive executive would have been in constant communication with key lordships around the country, making sure to receive feedback that might inform better public policy. A fourteen year-old boy certainly could not have conceptualized political strategy to this degree. Yet a fourteen year-old boy can and did have the social intelligence capacities to recognize what do to on June 14, 1381. Richard would have acted in a more judicious and decisive manner had he known the peasants were planning a revolt, whereas those who were truly the power behind the throne possessed nothing but hubris, leading to several assassinations and a violent squelching of the uprising. The monarchy prevailed, no doubt, but not without severely damaging its reputation and revealing cracks in its armor.
Conclusions
The Black Death and the Hundred Years War could have been handled more effectively had King Richard II been given more leeway to take decisive political action. As a boy king, Richard II was used to a team of elders advising his affairs, even though he ultimately showed that he did indeed possess tremendous leadership skills and courage by meeting with the leaders of the revolt in London. The fragmentation of the Plantagenet dynasty and schisms within crown counsel were to blame for the events of 1381, not the King himself.






References
Barker, J. (2014). The peasants’ revolt. HistoryExtra. https://www.historyextra.com/period/medieval/the-peasants-revolt-did-richard-ii-side-with-the-rebels/
Chronicles of Jean Froissart (1483). Shelfmark: Royal MS 18 E I f.175. Excerpt from: http://www.bl.uk/learning/timeline/item132518.html
Dobson, R.B. (1983). The Peasants’ Revolt of 1381. New York: MacMillan.
“Peasants' Revolt (death of Wat Tyler),” (n.d.). British Library. http://www.bl.uk/learning/timeline/item132518.html
“Peasants' Revolt,” (n.d.). Encyclopedia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/event/Peasants-Revolt
Trueman, C.N. (2015). Peasants revolt. The History Learning Site, 5 Mar 2015. https://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/medieval-england/peasants-revolt/