The North, however, was more nationalistic in its ideas, and believed that the entire peninsula should be united based on a common language and culture. At the time, primarily because of the tremendous loss of resources from World War II, the South was unable to fight off the North completely (Stokesbury, 1990, 25-61). Based on the tense atmosphere between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Iron Curtain descending on Eastern Europe, and the Soviet push towards nuclear parity with the U.S., most of the Western governments assumed that all communistic leadership, regardless of location and nationality, were controlled either overtly or covertly by Moscow. So, when the North Korean government began its guerilla attacks against the South, the United States saw this as direct aggression from the Soviets and a desire to export communism even further. Added to this was the looming war in China, and the fear that the most populace nation on earth would become a communist state (Wainstock, 1999, 137). Attempting to diffuse the situation somewhat, however, U.S. troops withdrew from Korea in 1949, leaving a desolate and ill-equipped army; the Soviets officially left North Korea in late 1948. One of the major changes in academic research regarding the Korean conflict has been the declassification of Soviet documents and a new insight on Josef Stalin's involvement and views on the...

In fact, it seems that until the end of 1949 Stalin believed there would be an Allied invasion from the South consisting of U.S. And South Korean troops. This view was based on Stalin's paranoia regarding President Harry Truman, and the U.S. being the only nuclear power at the time. We now know that the Soviets were actively trying to bridge that gap through whatever means necessary. Stalin was actually hoping for a peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula, albeit one that favorite the communist regime of Kim Il Sung (Lashmar, 1996).
Soviet personnel posted in Korea told Stalin that there were a number of 38th parallel violations by South Korea, but that the north did not have adequate personnel or armaments to adequately defend the nation. In March, 1949, Stalin told Kim, "The 38th parallel must be peaceful. It is very important"(Bajanov, 2000). Tensions continued to escalate, however, and from Stalin's point-of-view, arms buildup in the south could only result in war. Stalin, it seems, was perplexed and continued to criticize his ambassadors for failing to deflate the tension. Kim, however, saw his hegemony and the regime he created at risk. On March 7, 1949 Kim told Stalin that the situation made it necessary to make plans to liberate the entire country through military means. Stalin, though, emerged as a voice of moderation -- possibly due to fiscal issues (e.g. The Soviets were hit very hard by World War II and had not yet rebuilt their infrastructure). Stalin did finally concede that if the north were attacked and unification efforts failed, the Soviet Union would not look critically at war as an option. Kim's position remained firm: a) despite a great deal of effort, peaceful reunification was impossible under the current circumstances, b) in general, most of the Korean people wanted liberation and would resent whichever government that lost that potential, c) in 1949, northern forces were superior to the south (in contrast to the Soviet view of the situation), d) after the American withdrawal, there was far less emphasis or importance on issues surrounding the