Terrorism Situation Analysis - Preemptive

Terrorism Situation Analysis - Preemptive Action Against Iranian Nuclear Facilities

NATIONAL SECURITY MEMORANDUM: CRITICAL SITUATION ANALYSIS

SECRET

Preemptive Action Against Iranian Nuclear Facilities

Situational Overview:

Intelligence information developed by the Israeli intelligence agency (Mossad) and provided to this office suggest that Iranian nuclear facilities near Teheran are much closer than previously anticipated to producing as many as five functional fission nuclear) weapons of the highly-enriched-uranium (HEU) type, as well as cruise-missile- type delivery systems with an effective range of approximately 900 kilometers.

This office has received a highly confidential request directly from the Prime

Minister of Israel urgently requesting both tactical and operational military support for a proposed joint action of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and the United States Armed

Forces to neutralize the threat through combined tactical bombing operations in a preemptive nuclear strike conducted by U.S. Air Force resources, with plausible deniability facilitated by simultaneous conventional IDF tactical bombing of the adjacent area (including cruise missile launch facilities) using conventional (non-nuclear) ordinance.

At the present time, the U.S. Secretary of State opposes the request in its entirety; the Secretary of Defense and the Vice President support it in principle and rely on the analyses and recommendations of this office with respect to (1) approving the proposed U.S. military involvement in principle, and (2) evaluating the tactical outline proposed by the Israeli Defense Minister, or, in the alternative, proposing a suitable alternative. The Secretary of Defense has also proposed inserting a covert U.S. Delta

Force commando infiltration team into Iran, in mufti, to conduct an on-the-spot evaluation of the suspected facilities and, if necessary, to neutralize senior officers of the Iranian air defense directorate shortly before the combined U.S.-IDF air force strike package enters Iranian airspace.

Issue Analysis and Recommendations:

Intelligence Verification

The source of the intelligence developed by the Israelis consists of information provided by Mossad pursuant to their custodial interrogation of several armed Hamas operatives after their apprehension by the IDF in Gaza several months ago. Earlier (last year), the IDF also seized several Lebanese civilians suspected of aiding Hezbollah. The conclusions drawn by Mossad represent the analysis of confessions elicited from these sources after aggressive interrogation techniques employed at the Joshua Military Prison.

Our initial concern relates to the accuracy of the information elicited by interrogative techniques not subject to U.S. law and control and conducted without independent monitoring or oversight. In this regard, we are more troubled by the prospect of false information elicited by those measures than by the matter of human rights violations resulting in accurate information, whether or not the means of interrogation exceed the pertinent limitations of U.S. policy or international law.

The Defense Secretary has proposed taking custody of the subjects currently under IDF/Mossad control for interrogation by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) pursuant to the new protocol approved by the President with regard to interrogating terrorist suspects. The Secretary has communicated his intention to "take whatever steps are necessary" to confirm the information at issue

Analysis and Recommendation:

It is the recommendation of this office that the President communicate to the Israeli Prime Minister that, as an absolute prerequisite to considering the request for U.S.

A involvement in a preemptive operation against a sovereign nation (Iran), we must insist, categorically, on unrestricted and unmonitored access to the subjects for interrogation by the CIA. Owing to the current (unsatisfactory) state of interagency cooperation and sharing of intelligence information (Larsen, 2007) and the seriousness of miscalculation in authorizing military action of nature and extent requested by Israel, it is also the recommendation of this office that the CIA undertake this series of interrogative procedures in conjunction with high-level representatives of domestic agencies, notwithstanding traditional jurisdictional boundaries. Specifically, this office recommends that the President direct the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigations

FBI) to assign agents from that agency's Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) headquarters to participate jointly with the CIA in order that all relevant intelligence already in the possession of both agencies individually be available for any such interrogation.

This office is not concerned with the Secretary's expressed sentiments to "take whatever steps are necessary" with respect to the interrogation, primarily because the nature of this particular series of interrogations is to confirm the accuracy and veracity of information already elicited. Since the purpose of the interrogation is to identify false information and to determine whether coercive measures resulted in false confessions, interrogative excesses by U.S. agencies are not a necessary area of concern (Dershowitz, 2001). This office is confident in the investigative abilities of the CIA and FBI to determine the reliability of the intelligence purportedly provided by the subjects under interrogation by agents of the IDF/Mossad.

The Military Option:

The preemptive strike outlined by the Israeli Prime Minister consists of a joint attack conducted by the combined forces of U.S. And IDF military resources.

Specifically, the plan calls for tactical bombing of the nuclear facilities by U.S.B-2

Stealth" bombers of the 393rd Bomb Squadron, commanded by Lt. Col. Paul W. "Nuke"

Tibbets IV, employing tactical nuclear ordinance. Israel proposes to conduct a simultaneous bombing campaign of one square mile of the surrounding area employing conventional (non-nuclear) munitions, with the dual purpose of (1) destroying the extended infrastructure of those facilities, and (2) facilitating plausible deniability of U.S.

A involvement in the operation.

The suspected nuclear facilities themselves consist of research and development

R&D) installations located 50 feet underground in hardened bunkers in an ancient area of Tehran adjacent to a nuclear power plant purported by Iran to be exclusively used to generate electricity for non-military purposes.

Analysis and Recommendation:

It is the position of this office that the risk posed by Iranian offensive nuclear capabilities absolutely requires neutralizing those risks through military intervention.

Specifically, the current climate of Islamic radicalism and the known sentiments of Iranian President Ahmenidijad makes the specter of international terrorism in combination with nuclear weapon capabilities untenable (Allison, 2004). In this regard, this office is more concerned with the sentiments and thinly-veiled intentions of radical

Islamic factions toward the West and all non-Muslims in general (Schwartz, 2002) than with the specific immediate national security concerns - as realistic as they may be foremost in the mind of the current Israeli Prime Minister, as well as all former and future

Israeli Prime Ministers, by necessity (Lozowick, 2003).

This office is mindful of the strategic significance of Israel as it pertains to U.S.

A interests in the Middle East, as well as of the moral imperative of preventing the destruction of that nation by unprovoked hostile attack (Dershowitz, 2003). However, this office considers the Interests of Israel, however legitimate, as a moot issue in connection with a nuclear-armed Iran. Regardless of any immediate threat to Israel in particular, if the intelligence information provided by the Prime Minister proves to be accurate and reliable, the U.S. is obligated to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons, strictly in relation to U.S. national security interests (Allison, 2004). Should

Iran export nuclear weapons beyond its borders, their likely destination is the American

Homeland.

Like the specific national security concerns of Israel, whether or not the intelligence establishes that Iran is actually on the verge of bona fide nuclear weapons, that point is also moot, with respect to the obligation of this administration to pursue a military recourse at the present time. A determination on the part of the joint agencies both domestic and those responsible for intelligence operations abroad, as recommended) charged with verifying the information supplied by Israel that Iran is imminently close to achieving nuclear weapons status is unnecessary to justify U.S.

A military action. It is entirely enough that those agencies determine that Iran is merely on the verge of possessing fissionable Uranium (i.e. HEU) in quantities sufficient to produce single device capable of nuclear detonation, regardless of its sophistication, suitability for delivery by missile delivery systems, or reliability (Allison, 2004). At the present time, this office harbors no delusions about the permeable nature of U.S. boarders and the inability of authorities to prevent the nuclear catastrophe envisioned and indeed planned by Al Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden, et al. (Williams, 2005) by intercepting fissionable material at our borders. It is the view of many experts, including one former Assistant

Secretary of Defense for Policy and Plans (Allison), and a former Chairman of the Department of Military Strategy and Operations at the National War College and current

Director of the Institute for Homeland Security (Larsen) that failure to contain the nuclear threat before fissionable material falls into the hands of national entities sympathetic to Jihadist sentiments will likely result in a nuclear catastrophe on U.S. territory whose magnitude and consequences will relegate the infamous attack of September 11th to a mere "footnote" in American and world history, in relative significance (Allison, 2004).

International Law and Political Ramification Scenarios:

It is the position of this office that a nuclear capable Iran represents an immediate nuclear threat on U.S. soil, the prevention of which any incumbent U.S.

A administration must act to preempt, regardless of international law and opinion, and political fallout. In the event the intelligence detailed by the Israeli administration proves to be accurate with respect to nuclear weapons development, this office is reminded of the words of the late President John, F. Kennedy, spoken almost exactly 45 years ago to the day, on October 22, 1962, addressing the Soviet threat in Cuba:

We no longer live in a world where only the actual firing of weapons represents a sufficient challenge to a nation's security to constitute maximum peril. Nuclear weapons are so destructive and ballistic missiles are so swift that any substantially increased possibility of their use or any sudden change in their deployment may well be regarded as a definite threat to peace." (Sorensen, 1965)