Lawrence Freedman\'s Kennedy\'s Wars Berlin Cuba Laos and Vietnam

Kennedy's Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, & Vietnam" by Lawrence Freedman, the author looks specifically at John F. Kennedy's role in foreign politics. This book covers in depth the major global emergencies during the Kennedy Presidency, including Berlin, Cuba, and Vietnam.

It is clear Freedman's thesis for writing the book is a convincing attempt to answer the "what if?" question surrounding Kennedy's Presidency, including the possibility of reestablishing cordial relations with Castro and whether he would have pursued the same route as President Johnson did into Vietnam. The author notes, "Questions of what might have been still dominate considerations of Kennedy's presidency, and they are addressed in this book" (Freedman xii). Since Kennedy was assassinated in 1963 before he had the chance to prove and continue his foreign policy, these are valid questions about an administration left hanging. Throughout the book Freedman continually returns to this thesis as he examines each crisis the administration faced, and analyzes their reaction to it. He used numerous source documents along with personal interviews to advance his thesis, and this not only gives his work credence, it captures the readers' attention and makes them want to learn more about Kennedy's thoughts and reactions to these seemingly continual crises.

Freedman's thesis is compelling and clear. Kennedy and his advisors were faced with numerous foreign crises during his presidency, and they had to be flexible, because each crisis demanded a new solution. Each was demanding, and at the height of the Cold War, each had to be dealt with delicately, because nuclear war was a serious and constant threat. As each new threat shows itself, Freedman clearly defines it, gives background on it, and then speculates on what Kennedy might have done differently, and what others might have done in the same circumstances. These speculations are often subtle, as in the Berlin crisis, when Freedman speculates, "Kennedy might also have pondered why Cuba and 'thermonuclear' weapons twice appeared in the same sentence" (Freedman 120). Clearly, Freedman's studies gave him insight into Kennedy's thoughts and ideas, but he admits the actual thought processes are speculation at best, and this fits neatly into his "what if" thesis. For in hindsight, it is often easy to second-guess decisions and ideas, but there will always be the question of "what if," to ponder, along with the second-guessing.

Of course, Freedman includes a few minor theses throughout the book, too. One of those central to the main thesis is the idea of "escalation," which comes up often throughout the pages, and ties in with the main thesis quite well. Freedman shows how the Cold War prompted a fear of escalation of nuclear and other threats on both sides of the Atlantic, and how escalation of any situation could eventually lead to world nuclear war. In fact, part of Freedman's escalation thesis is that the word developed and was first used because of the Cold War. He writes, "First used in its contemporary context in Britain in 1959, escalation soon appeared in the mainstream American literature" (Freedman 24). This theory appears early in the book, and Freedman continually refers to the fears of escalation while defending and defining his "what if" thesis. Probably the most important of these "what if" questions relate to what happened in Vietnam during the Johnson administration. Freedman speculates on what might have happened had Kennedy lived and won a second term. He states, "This is not to say that he was determined to withdraw. This may have been his preference, but as likely he would have persevered with established policy, possibly providing more military and economic support just so long as he could claim that this was still a Vietnamese war" (Freedman 517). Thus, Freedman leaves us thinking. Our history could have been far different had Kennedy lived. Our presence in Vietnam might have been far different, and we might have even renewed relations with Cuba. Obviously, these things did not occur, but it is interesting to see where the country's journey might had gone had Kennedy lived, and Freedman's book is a compelling look at the "what if" scenario.

Freedman's purpose in writing the book is clear. His work is a major assessment of President Kennedy as a military president. Freedman himself is a reputable academic of war studies and nuclear strategy, and so, his attention to Kennedy's Cold War crisis is understandable. He himself states in the Preface that he did not intend to write a biography, which had been done before, he hoped to create a deeper understanding of Kennedy's foreign policy, especially in a time when nuclear weapons were so prolific. He also wanted to show many of the other "players" in Kennedy's cabinet and advisory staff, and he did this by interviewing as many of these survivors as he possibly could. What results is a finely tuned picture of Kennedy's policies, along with a close look at how administrations deal with crisis after crisis.