Rule the Case of Christophersen

¶ … Rule

The case of Christophersen vs. Allied-Signal revolves around a deceased individual, Albert Roy Christophersen. Mr. Christophersen worked at a Marathon Manufacturing plant producing nickel-cadmium batteries. Over the course of his career, he was repeatedly exposed to fumes from the production process in the course of his duties. When Mr. Christophersen ultimately passed away from cancer, his survivors sued the company. They claimed that the product involves in the battery production were the cause of the cancer that killed Albert Christophersen. It was alleged that the companies were aware of the dangerous nature of the materials used in the production process and failed to protect Mr. Christophersen.

At the district court level, the court ruled that the plaintiffs "failed to state a design defect or manufacturing defect claim" and thus granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment (Appellate court judgment). The court also granted a motion for summary judgment on the marketing defect claim for failing to prove causation. The plaintiffs had made the claim on the basis of expert testimony from a Dr. Miller. The district court ruled that Dr. Miller's opinion should be excluded. (Ibid.)

The plaintiffs appealed. The appellate court weighed the issue of Dr. Miller's testimony. The appellate court realized that they could only overturn the ruling of the district court if exclusion of Dr. Miller's testimony was "manifestly erroneous." They turned to the Federal Rules of Evidence to help make their determination. There are four signals that must be met in order for expert testimony to be admissible. The first three comprise the threshold that all expert testimony must pass, the final signal is that "the testimony's potential for prejudice not outweigh its probative value." (Ibid).

The district court relied on Rule 703, pertaining to the witness' methodology, to exclude Dr. Miller's testimony. Dr. Miller's testimony was in fact based on interview with a co-worker of Mr. Christophersen. There was little other research done by Dr. Miller and his work was not consistent with methods normally used by oncologists or pathologists, given that he was neither. The appellate court thereby rules that the district court was not manifestly erroneous and did not err in granting summary judgment.

The final holding is significant with respect to expert and scientific testimony for a couple of reasons. One is that it upheld the integrity of Rule 703. Had the appellate court overruled the district court, Rule 703 would have lost much of its ability to protect against untrustworthy "expert" witnesses. The ruling therefore demands that an expert witness provide expert testimony.

Without this ruling, an expert witness could be called, but could base his or her testimony on methodology that was not consistent with expert methods. In this case, Dr. Miller admitted that there were three main models used to test for such causation, but also admitted that he did not use them. The plaintiffs clearly thought that by putting an MD on the stand who would agree with their case, that would be sufficient. Perhaps they felt a jury would be sympathetic to their case, if the decision came down to a proverbial "battle of witnesses." However, in this case there was no such battle. Dr. Miller was not an expert and while his testimony was not excluded on those grounds, it could have been. Nonetheless, his lack of expertise showed through in his faulty methodology.

This hints at another point of significant from this case regarding expert testimony. While Dr. Miller could have been excluded on Rule 702, since he was clearly not an expert, the district court did not use this as grounds for excluding his testimony. This sent a signal that courts should give the expert witness the benefit of the doubt with respect to marginal qualifications. If the witness is indeed no expert, this will be revealed by the faulty methodology they use, which will allow for exclusion under Rule 703.

The dissenting judges felt that the majority was amending the Rules of Evidence. One dissenter when so far as to state that "a dispute among qualified experts would preclude, not mandate, summary judgment." The dissenting judges fail to recognize that not every person put before a court as an "expert" is one, nor should their opinions be allowed if they are not based on methodologies consistent with an expert. If there is any such amendment to the Rules of Evidence in Christophersen v. Allied-Signal, the amendment is to strengthen the rules, making them less open to abuse from fraudulent "experts" who testimony is geared more towards engendering sympathy from a jury.