Bay of Pigs - Leadership

¶ … Bay of Pigs - Leadership and Foreign Policy

One of the most uncertain times in American foreign policy history was in 1961, during the crisis of the Bay of Pigs. In a magazine article by retired Marine officer Jack Hawkins (1996) talks about his role in, and the information he has on the Bay of Pigs, which was an invasion of Cuba by 1500 Cuban expatriates whose goal it was to overthrow the Communist regime of Fidel Castro (Hawkins 36). Hawkins reveals what he refers to as Project Cuba, a plan that would involve overthrowing the Castro government as first being formulated by the Eisenhower administration. Hawkins says in August of 1960, he was assigned to a paramilitary CIA group as a Marine officer experienced in amphibious operations and guerrilla warfare (Hawkins 36). In 1961, President Kennedy was briefed on Project Cuba and he decided to follow through on the project. What would follow would become one of the biggest demonstrations of American ineptitude in the history of America. It was, Hawkins alleges, a failed effort because of presidential indecision, and because President Kennedy, though he committed to the initiative, did not back his commitment with the needed support in human assets or in weaponry (Hawkins 36). if, as Hawkins alleges, the Bay of Pigs was a failed operation because presidential indecision and because the support to which the committed was not provided, then could the initiative have succeeded? Or would Cuba have succumbed to the revolutionary forces vying for power, and never have successfully been democratized even if Castro had been successfully ousted?

To answer these questions, we must go beyond a single perspective that might be limited to just the information, accurate or otherwise, with which that perspective was informed. Hawkins claims to have been assigned to the CIA paramilitary unit responsible for training and interacting with the expatriates to build an invasion force of individuals who would move in to establish the new democratic government in Cuba (Hawkins 36). It is Hawkins perspective that Kennedy authorized the operation, committed U.S. resources to the operation, then, he failed to deliver on his commitment (Hawkins 36). The result was disastrous. The Cuban expatriates were left to flounder on Cuban beaches without the air support, U.S. military support, or the weapons that had been promised them. They were killed and, or, captured and executed.

We'll begin analysis by breaking down what Hawkins alleges were the President's commitment to the operation: (a) air support, (b) military support, - weaponry.

The Bay of Pigs Air Support, Weapons, and U.S. Military

Jack Hawkins says that U.S. air support was a crucial to success or failure of the invasion at the Bay of Pigs (Hawkins 36). Since the mission, as we know, failed, we will examine what happened to the air support that Hawkins claims was committed to the mission, and then not provided. In a study by researchers James G. Blight and Kornbluh (1999), they agree with Hawkins that the brigadistas or invading expatriates did not receive "expected" U.S. air support (Blight and Kornbluh 1). They agree, too, that this was one of the determining factor in the failed exercise (Blight and Kornbluh 2). Relying upon declassified documents, Blight and Kornbluh quote Jacob Esterline, a former CIA operative, who later became CIA station chief in Miami (Blight and Kornbluh xiv). Transcripts from investigations into the Bay of Pigs reveal that Esterline was convinced that air support was part of the plan (Blight and Kornbluh 46). Esterline claims that the invasion hours were coordinated with the CIA and with officials in Washington, DC, but that the support was never provided (Blight and Kornbluh 93). The U.S. Air Force was a no show for the operation. This is the description that Blight and Kornbluh provide about the failed air support, which is proven, by their research, to have been promised, but was called back (Blight and Kornbluh 167).

16 April: At about midday, President Kennedy formally approves the landing plan and the word is passed to all commanders in the operation. Assault shipping moves on separate courses toward the objective area. At 9:30 PM, McGeorge Bundy telephones General Cabell to tell him that the dawn air strikes the following morning should not be launched until planes can conduct them from a strip within the beachhead. Bundy indicates that any further consultation with regard to this matter should be with the secretary of state. At 10:15 PM, General Cabell and Richard Bissell go to Secretary Rusk's office. Rusk tells them he has just been talking to the president on the phone and recommended that the Monday morning air strikes (D-Day) should be canceled and the president agreed. Cabell and Bissell protest strongly, arguing that the ships as well as the landings will be seriously endangered without the dawn strikes. Rusk indicates there are policy considerations against air strikes before the beachhead airfield is in the hands of the landing force and completely operational and capable of supporting the raids. Rusk calls the president and tells him of the CIA's objections but restates his own recommendation to cancel the strikes. He offers to let the CIA representatives talk to the president directly but they decline. The order canceling the air strikes is dispatched to the departure field in Nicaragua, arriving when the pilots are in their cockpits ready for takeoff (Blight and Kornbluh 167)."

As we can see, from Blight and Kornbluh's research using declassified documents, there was less presidential indecision, and the President's decision to call back the air support was based on information provided to him.