March (1981) Concerns That Process

¶ … March (1981) concerns that process of change in an organizational setting, attempting to recast the discourse on change from something dramatic, extraordinary and all-encompassing to something more streamlined, regular and specific to emergent needs. That is to say that, according to March, organizational change is not something which occurs only under special or extenuating circumstances. Instead, this should be thought of as an absolutely imperative part of weathering the normal ebb and flow of business processes.

In light of this claim, March provides what the article refers to as footnotes for engaging this change in a more standardized and prepared manner. To this extent, March provides five basic rules of thumb for understanding organizational change and does so with a focus on the degree to which this change should be seen as normal and attainable rather than urgent, specialized and inherently problematic. The focus of these footnotes seems to suggest that change must not be thought of as a measure to only be taken under conditions of duress or one requiring a total redefinition of business processes. Instead, many changes are gradual, responsive and taken by the volition of organizations.

Certainly, March seems to make the argument that this volition is a key part to the success found in mounting a change, making the case that this -- rather than a sense of urgency -- will facilitate proper planning and objective evaluation. To this extent, March contends that most effectively oriented organizations will be prepared for change that is dynamic and meaningful. March argues that "what most reports on implementation indicate . . . is not that organizations are rigid and inflexible, but that they are impressively imaginative. Organizations change in a way that fulfills the intentions of a particular group of actors." (March, 563)

This is a demonstration of the firm grounding of an organization in certain structural and personnel-based successes. In order to take on change with stability and organizational readiness, March's footnotes serve as a constructive guide. Here, March identifies five primary points of consideration. First and foremost, he contends that a challenge for leadership is in recognizing that change is frequent and routine as a function of the nature of business at large. Within the context of this reality, March argues that the competent leader will recognize the somewhat limited degree of control which he or she will have on the organization's experience and response to these changes. March seems to suggest here that the control applied to the process by managerial leadership must be suited both for stewardship and flexibility in the face of unpredictable or uncontrollable externalities. (March, 563)

A second footnote helps us to understand the balance needed between transformation and continuity. Here, March considers stability to be a crucial element of weathering change, with certain processes helping through their consistency to retain core elements of the grounding organization even as elements of its operation, personnel or identity are altered. This also helps us to understand a third footnote that assesses the theoretical constructs entering into the process of change. A compelling point here is made that change implicates an array of externalities that include "demographic, economic, social, and political forces." (March 563) This means that the only real theoretical variation from one organization to another is based on the nature of the action taken. The assessment of change itself will typically arise from such externalities, placing many organizations in an essentially responsive position rather than one of innovation.

This is a point which is clarified further by a fourth footnote which remarks upon the unpredictable nature of organizational change. Recognizing as we have stated that organizational change Is necessary and sometimes even routine, March indicates that nonetheless, we are unlikely to project all possible successes, pitfalls and insights produced by said change. The final footnote helps to round out our preparation for these unpredictable difficulties, indicating in an interesting choice of phraseology that organizational rationality must be balanced by an unintentional 'foolishness.' This, March contends, means that "because there are so many very unlikely future events that can be imagined and each is so improbable, we ordinarily exclude them from our more careful forecasts, though we know that some very unlikely events will occur." (March, 572)

This provides us with the core insight of the March article, which is that the fact of change itself is predictable and must be prepared for, but the nature which change actions will take is far more variable and unpredictable. Effective managerial leadership will understand the regularity of change and prepare for its frequently irregular outcomes. This is a perspective that is give some degree of greater nuance in the article by Jarzabkowski (2004), which seems to echo in its focus the premise of the second footnote of March's article. Namely, Jarzabkowski pays his greatest attention to the implications of organizational continuity to weathering all manner of organizational obstacle and challenge. To the author's perspective, it is the regularity and efficiency which is achieved through the consistency of certain processes and approaches that will function as a compass in the context of voluntary or involuntary change. Accordingly, Jarzabkowski argues that "this is illustrated in path dependence, persistent organizational routines, and organizational memory. The strategic and operational routines of an organization have genetic properties that predispose it to act in certain ways and, more importantly, define the possible options that it may take." (Jarzabkowski, 533)

In this latter point though, Jarzabkowski seems to take a counterpoint to the March discussion, revealing a skepticism concerning the ability of an organization entrenched in certain processes to accept or facilitate change where necessary. This means that in the event of such changes as those prompted by larger industry process evolution; Information Technology system transformation; personnel and organizational restructuring; or in the face of any number of the externalities considered by March, an organization which demonstrates this level of recursiveness may be unable to take the proper steps to ease transition. To Jarzabkowski, this promotes a certain proclivity of personnel toward resistance to change that transcends the simple practical demands of executing responsibilities. As the author contends, "routines are socially complex, embedded, and interlocked. They comprise a social architecture that penetrates a firm's communication channels, information filters, and problem-solving strategies, making it difficult for the firm to absorb new technologies (Henderson and Clark 1990). The normative influences of routines may be understood as organizational memory (Walsh and Ungson 1991) or as a cultural web (Johnson 1987), providing embedded repertoires, rites, and rituals for action that are persistent sources of firm identity." (Jarzabkowski, 533)

For an organization preparing to undergo change, a balance must be achieved between preserving those elements of this identity that are desirable and instigating a widespread acceptance of the impetus for and nature of change. This returns us to a primary argument of the March article, which concerns the demand for a total and constant orientation toward the prospect of change. Adjustment to externalities and the needed internal flexibility to achieve this should be considered a normalized part of organizational maintenance, indicating to leadership that recursiveness must not be conflated with continuity.

Though somewhat of a departure in its focus from the broader scope of this discussion, the article by Kronenberg & Khademian (2009) is useful in helping to understand the intricacies of organizational orientation which must accompany broader theoretical and cultural aims. Namely, the text considers public, government and security agencies as bureaucracies with a particular skill at assesses the encompassing nature of certain issues but which fail at translating these into actionable processes. The text calls this a failure to 'connect the dots,' and produces a discussion focused on the events surrounding the September 11th Terrorist attacks and the Commission report produced thereafter.