ADA Today and Its Application Title I

ADA Today and Its Application

Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, which took effect July 26, 1992, stops private employers, state and local governments, employment agencies and labor unions from discriminating against qualified individuals with disabilities in job application procedures, hiring, firing, advancement, compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions and privileges of employment. An individual with a disability is a person who, according to the EEOC:

Has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities;

Has a record of such an impairment; or Is regarded as having such an impairment.

A qualified employee or applicant with a disability is an individual who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the job in question. (EEOC, 1990)

Reasonable accommodation may include, but is not limited to:

Making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by persons with disabilities.

Job restructuring, modifying work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position;

Acquiring or modifying equipment or devices, adjusting modifying examinations, training materials, or policies, and providing qualified readers or interpreters. (EEOC, 1990)

According to the EEOC, "An employer is required to make an accommodation to the known disability of a qualified applicant or employee if it would not impose an "undue hardship" on the operation of the employer's business. Undue hardship is defined as an action requiring significant difficulty or expense when considered in light of factors such as an employer's size, financial resources and the nature and structure of its operation.

An employer is not required to lower quality or production standards to make an accommodation, nor is an employer obligated to provide personal use items such as glasses or hearing aids." (EEOC, 1990)

There are differing recent interpretations of ADA. In Townsend v. Quasim, 328 F.3d 511 (9th Cir. 2003), the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a district court's summary judgment on the Olmstead claims of a class of medically needy Medicaid recipients who were limited to receiving nursing home care because Washington State had not applied for a community-based services waiver for that population.

The district court had held that the exclusion of medically needy people from Washington's community-based waiver program was discrimination based on income level rather than disability. In addition, the district court invoked Rodriguez v. City of New York to hold that the ADA does not require states to provide new services that they do not already provide to people with disabilities.

The Ninth Circuit held that plaintiffs had established that they were being discriminated against, since the plaintiff was disabled, preferred to be served in the community, and the State did provide community services of the kind that the plaintiff class requested. The majority distinguished Rodriguez by pointing out that "where the issue is the location of services, not whether services will be provided, Olmstead controls."