High Risk and Consent

¶ … Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC)

Fee splitting Agreement between Mr. Dark and Mr. Pasada

(i) Is the fee-splitting agreement between Mr. Pasada and Mr. Dark enforceable?

No, unfortunately for Mr. Pasada the fee-splitting agreement is not enforceable under Rule 701.2 (g) of the Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC). This rule is intended to protect the client and is not the right argument to be made for a lawyer's protection by Mr. Pasada in these circumstances.

(ii) Did the letter signed by Mr. Tomas constitute consent?

No, this letter does not constitute consent. Mr. Tomas's signature on the letter merely acknowledges that he received it, read it, and understood its contents. The letter does not ask for consent to the agreement, nor does it imply that Mr. Tomas has consented in any way; it merely established that the letter was received.

What was the legal effect of the memo from Mr. Pasada to Mr. Dark?

Although this memo does serve as a record of the verbal agreement between the parties involved with the case, it does not establish consent on a legal basis. The letter does document the fact that Mr. Tomas understood and verbally approved of the arrangement, however the Rule explicitly calls for the written consent by the client and verbal consent alone does not fulfill this requirement.

(iii) Was the fee-splitting agreement unconscionable?

No, the fee-splitting agreement with Mr. Thomas was not unconscionable, especially in a lengthy patent case such as this one. Other arrangements that represent a fee-splitting agreement of up to 50% were cited as conscionable given factors such as the lengthy time periods involved, high-risk, and upfront expenses involved in such cases.

(iv) Does Mr. Pasada have any viable defenses or can Mr. Pasada assert any other causes of action against our client?