Lessons Learned by American Experience of the Vietnam War: Diplomatic Negotiations, Presidential Leadership, and Cultural/Social Context The objective of this study is to examine the lessons learned by the American Experience of the Vietnam War in terms of diplomatic negotiations, presidential leadership, and the cultural and social context of the war. The work of Mariney (1989) writes that the U.S. civilian and military leadership failed "to heed the lessons of the past during the Vietnam war." (p.1) Not only was the enemy underestimated but as well, America underestimated the war's nature. The historical context was not given due consideration according to Mariney (1989) and specifically in terms of how the Chinese, Japanese, and the French have "over the centuries, attempted to exert control over Indochina unsuccessfully." (p.1)

Vietnamese Strong National Identity

The result of this experience was the forging of a strong national identity in Vietnam, both North and South and it is reported that the leadership "had demonstrated a strong national resolve and resistance to foreign domination as war evidenced by the defeat of the French at Dien Bien Phu." (Mariney, 1989, p.1) The North Vietnamese are reported to have been ready to accept "limitless casualties in its conflict with the United States." (Mariney, 1989, p.1) Lewis (1996) writes that it is proliferated in the post-mortems on Vietnam "and with the survival of an independent South Vietnam still uncertain, intelligence officers as well as policy makers and executors of policy have a compelling need to know what lessons the record of American involvement holds.

II. Comprehension of the Strategies of War

Lewis states "Only in the past decade has an increasing minority of young Americans been educated and trained for developing personal awareness of what may be the critical factors: (1) the frequent and unconscious distortions in their -- and everyone's -- perceptions of worlds other than their own; and (2) the ways...

... We failed to distinguish a sect from a party, a clique from an organization, a group of intellectuals or politicians with tiny clienteles from a political movement, a police force, officer corps, and set of rich South Vietnamese chaos to a South Vietnamese mistakes. speak, doubly of the essence. merchants from a political class. We tended to attribute combination of Communist disruptiveness and reversible ... [without realizing] that those "mistakes" were, so to speak, doubly of the essence." (Lewis, 1996, p.1)
Lewis relates that the primary outcome of the setbacks experienced by the United States in the Far East ... has been the delusion of our policy-makers that they understood Asia. Two elements ... contributed to this delusion. The first was the conviction that there must be measurable facts in Asia because, regarding ourselves as rational, we had to operate on the basis of facts. So in Vietnam, we proceeded to "quantify" situations with statistics and graphs and charts that told everything except the only important reality -- what the people think. ... Our lack of understanding has…