Attack on Pearl Harbor Lessons

Attack on Pearl Harbor

Lessons from the attack on Pearl Harbor

The attack on Pearl Harbor was described by U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt as a "day of infamy." The statement basically sums up the sentiments of Americans during that time, from a historical perspective the attack on Pearl Harbor is a manifestation of power relationships in the international arena between the United States and Japan and their failure to achieve a consensus that could have prevented their clash in World War II. It is noteworthy to analyze the lessons that can be learned from the events of Pearl Harbor, that these lessons transcend more than the military failure of the U.S. To anticipate the attack but to address the root cause of why the attack happened in the first place.

In 1940, Japan expanded its influence in the territories of French Indo China and the Dutch East Indies. The U.S. In its effort to halt the Japanese expansionist policy implemented a ban for the sale of war materials to Japan that include oil, iron and steel for airplanes. However, the move further fueled dissention between the two countries. Japan and the U.S. held talks to iron out a compromise but the extreme militarists such as General Tojo Hideki were gaining power in Japan. They hoped to seize lands in Asia and the Pacific and the U.S. was interfering with their plans. To prevent interference with its expansions into new areas, the Japanese needed to cripple the American naval forces stationed in Hawaii. (Stearns, Schwartz and Beyer, 1991, pp. 699-700) With talks at a standstill, General Tojo ordered a surprise attack on the American fleet at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Early on December 7, 1941, Japanese airplanes damaged and destroyed 19 ships and killed more than 2,400 people. However, the carriers, the main targets of the attack, survived because they were at sea. The Americans were completely unprepared for the air attack at Pearl Harbor; most of them were asleep or eating breakfast. Japan did not issue any formal declaration of war and thus the surprise attack was a military success. The next day U.S. President Roosevelt asked Congress to declare war on Japan. (Gaynor and Esler, 2003, pp.770-80).

Despite the attack on Pearl Harbor that ushered in the United States' entry into World War II, Japanese sentiment of engaging the U.S. into an all out war was less optimistic. Akira (1990) argued that Japanese leaders took the plunge into war with little hope of victory against the U.S. while simultaneously making preparations for a war against the U.S.S.R. And continuing hostilities against China. Akira stressed that it is well-known that the top level navy leaders had serious misgivings about the prospect of protracted war based on their knowledge of the disparity in national strength between Japan and the U.S. In fact, Commander in Chief of the combined fleet Yamamoto Isoroku felt that Japan would be able to achieve a measure of success a the onset but the war would inevitably turn into a long one. Yamamoto noted that "the war would continue for several years, our supplies would be exhausted, our ships and arms would be damaged and ultimately we would not be able to escape defeat." (Akira, 1990, pp.133-134).

Masaru (1990) added that another difficulty between the two nations was America's attitude during the U.S.-Japanese negotiations on the eve of the outbreak of war. In particular, Masaru points to the hard line position of Secretary of State Cordell Hull. Hull turned down Japan's proposal for summit meeting between Prime Minister Konoe and President Roosevelt. Then Hull presented the Hull note which included a demand for immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Japanese troops from China. This demand was met with considerable opposition by Japan. Masaru stressed the worsening communication between Washington and Tokyo. Masaru reiterated that although Ambassador Joseph Grew had a good grasp of the situation in Japan, his views were not seriously considered by Hull, Hornbeck and other U.S. policy makers. Hornbeck in particular, was well-known as a pro-China hand. However, Hornbeck's hard line policy toward Japan only served to push the Japanese further in their drive south and into conflict of with the U.S. (p.49).