Library filters and their implementation

Library Filters

Why Libraries Must Not Use Software Filters to Censor Speech: One Person's Hate is Another Person's Political Philosophy

The French 17th century freethinking philosopher Voltaire said one of the most famous quotations in regards to the freedom of speech. He said that he would, though he disagreed with every word out of his colleague's mouth, defend to the death the man's right to say such terrible things. Perhaps the 21st definition of Voltaire's remark might be, 'though I disagree with every word upon you pet causes' local URL, I will defend to the death your right to point and click to this website on the Internet, lest my own right be similarly threatened.'

Recently, the idea of 'hate crimes' became codified in the American legal system, and thus the idea of similarly correlated 'hate speech' was formed. 'Hate speech' is usually defined as speech that attempts to create hatred against a group of individuals of a particular gender, race, religious, or ethnic group. This form of speech is increasingly the target of legislators and activists who wish to make it an object of legislation, banning this form of expression, analogizing it to libelous slurs, 'fighting words,' and general verbal harassment. In an effort to curtail hate speech, libraries have even tried to install filters to prevent individuals using public Internet access to examine the manifestos of groups that promote so-called hate speech.

Simply on a level of technological capabilities, this is problematic, given that groups that advocate hate might not be recognized currently, and might not be screened, and groups that do not advocate hate might be incorrectly identified in this ongoing process of identification and unjustly blocked by the software, and tarred with the label of hate. Also, if an individual is conducting research upon, for instance, the American Nazi Party, he or she would be unable to examine the evils of this group, in their own words, and thus open his or her research up to charges of bias and inaccuracy.

Alan Dershowitz offers another, more rights-based reason to reject such software filters in libraries. He would state that any ban upon speech leaves the individual conducting the ban open to his or her own speech being banned or filtered. For instance, although banning anti-Black speech might seem laudable to one activist, another individual might deem the words of the Nation of Islam to be offensive and hateful against non-Blacks. Although Dershowitz, for instance, is a committed activist for Israel and the rights of American Jews to practice their religion in a free and open fashion. He is well aware of the fact that many individuals have erroneously attempted to besmirch Israel and its supporters with the charge of racism, most famously in the UN's allegation that racism was analogous to Zionism during the 1970's. This act is a clear indication that even if the majority definition of racism may encompass a particular ideology, the majority definition of racism is simply a snapshot of society at one particular point in time, it cannot be a long-lasting legal definition of what constitutes racism or hate.

Vicki Chang's essay on "Libraries, the Internet, and Freedom of Speech," offers a slightly different perspective on the issue, highlighting the public nature of libraries as an arena where individuals seek out knowledge. It could be argued that in private, individuals have all the freedom they desire to access the websites of hate advocacy groups, but the public funds allocated to libraries do not necessarily have to subsidize hate-promoting groups. Why should the tax dollars of an African-American, for instance, subsidize someone's research of the Klan? However emotionally resonant this argument is, it does not answer the question of who is to determine truly what is the difference between a group advocating hate and a political position, however noxious. Does the mere statement that one ought to go out and murder individuals of a particular group constitute hate, a hate so pure that it must be banned?

In the case of the last-listed example, one of course is tempted to answer yes, before coming up yet again against the problem of true enforceability. One website might advocate a political point-of-view that one disagrees with, such as the poet laureate of New Jersey's condemnation of Israel, or the Nation of Islam's condemnation of white Americans. Another website that identifies itself with such a group might advocate hate, spread libel, and encourage violent actions to support that hatred speech. Although the latter might be worthy of a ban in a public area, how it is possible to screen out one type of hate speech and allow the official political website to exist, without continued human screening and policing of the internet use of all library patrons or through the imperfect use of software filters that are trained to merely focus on certain words?

Alexander Hamilton's early discussion of freedom of the press, in our nation's history, is perhaps gives the most cogent gloss of this issue. For instance, Hamilton would suggest that so long as an allegation is not libelously false, it might be advocated, even against a group of individuals. An argument, even a supposedly racist one, about Middle East history can be made, for instance, but one cannot make inaccurate, spurious allegations about someone as a Jewish person that are not true on a personal level. Thus, refining hate speech to mean speech that stirs up hate against an individual outside of a political context could be worthy of prosecutorial attention -- as would the hate-filled screeds published upon the Internet by the assassins at Columbine.