Realism and Liberalism in U.S.

Realism and Liberalism in U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Iran

One of the longer international conflicts in recent history is the perpetual state of conflict which has existed between the United States and Iran, a revamped Cold War of ideological rivals that has simmered since the 1979 Islamic Revolution resulted in a prolonged hostage crisis. Beginning with President Jimmy Carter's humiliation at the hands of the embassy hostage takers in Tehran, and continuing through the 1980's as the Reagan Administration retaliated to Hezbollah terrorist attacks by shooting down Iran Air Flight 655 in an ostensibly erroneous application of military power, the state of international relations between America and Iran has been defined by hostility and distrust. When President George W. Bush included Iran in his now infamous "Axis of Evil" soliloquy during his 2002 State of the Union address, this invective signaled that the impasse between these two nations, both considered economic and cultural powers within the Western and Islamic cultures respectively, had continued to harden with the progression of time. Today, the nuclear aspirations of Iran's dictatorial regime represent the most current manifestation of this increasingly volatile standoff, as President Barack Obama engages in a practical process involving stern diplomacy, targeted economic sanctions, and the use of social media to sabotage Iran's established ruling order. International relations theory is typically evidenced during times of conflict and strife between two opponents on relatively equal footing, and by studying seven instances in which American public opinion of its government's foreign policy is examined, one can objectively determine whether the U.S. has embraced either realism or liberalism in its relationship with Iran.

The distinction between a realist and liberalist approach to America's foreign policy in regards to Iran is most visible in the ongoing effort to prevent the regime of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and his eventual successor, from joining the list of nations with nuclear weapons capability. According to Clifton W. Sherrill, a professor of international relations at Troy University, "the Iranian regime is motivated by a desire for coercive power externally and a need to maintain its radical Islamist image internally ... (and) attempting to dissuade the regime from acquiring nuclear weapons by addressing defensive security concerns will not succeed"1 (2012, pg. 44). Sherrill's cogent analysis of Iran's provocative actions in continuing to pursue its aspirations of nuclear armament presents a decidedly realist view of the situation, presenting America's best option as a policy of multilaterally enacted punitive sanctions designed to cripple the Iranian regime's ability to exert and maintain authority through the distribution of resources. Conversely, the findings of "A Cross-Cultural Study of Attitudes toward Iran's Nuclear Development Program," conducted in 2009 by Sahar Sadedin of the Canadian Academy of Business and Technology, "showed that while North Americans perceive offensive reasons as the main motivation for Iran's nuclear development program, Iranians perceive defensive, civilian, and political reasons as the main motivations for Iran's nuclear development program"2 (pg. 292). By analyzing the cultural differences in the way Iran's nuclear policies were perceived by various nations with a vested interest in the outcome, Sadedin demonstrated that the portrayal of a foreign policy action is largely dependent on perspective, with Iranians

1 Sherrill, Clifton W. "Why Iran wants the bomb and what it means for U.S. policy." The Nonproliferation Review 19, no. 1 (2012): 31-49.

2 Sadedin, Sahar. "A Cross-Cultural Study of Attitudes toward Iran's Nuclear Development Program." The International Journal of Arts and Sciences 6, no. 1 (2009): 272-299.

overwhelmingly viewing their government's goal of obtaining nuclear capability as an exercise in liberalism, their state's actions determined by domestic issues and a defensive posture, while Americans remain decidedly unconvinced.

In an Op-Ed published by the New York Times, columnist Russ Douthat examines the role of political pragmatism in shaping the domestically liberal Obama Administration's increasingly realist approach to foreign policy. According to Douthat, while "the Obama administration did briefly flirt with new strategies, putting more pressure on the Israeli government and attempting outreach to Tehran ... The White House soon reverted to the policy status quo of Bush's second term ... (during) the twilight struggle over Iran's nuclear program -- featuring sanctions, sabotage, and the threat of military force"3 (2011, pg. 2). In Douthat's estimation, President Obama has evolved in drastic terms since his election in 2008, from a naively optimistic candidate with visions of becoming a diplomatic peacemaker, to a staunch advocate of realism in foreign policy who is willing and able to remain ruthlessly determined to preserve America's base of power. President Obama's remarkable ability to combine his liberal inclinations on humanitarian issues with expertly wielded applications of America's economic and military superiority was presaged in an article published by Harvard Magazine before ballots had been cast in the 2008 election. When professor of international relations Joseph S. Nye Jr. boldly declared that "the old distinction between realists and liberals needs to give way to a new synthesis that you might choose to call 'liberal realism'"4, (2008, pg. 36), he

3 Douthat, Ross. "Obama the Realist." The New York Times, February 07, 2011.

4 Nye, Joseph S. "Toward a Liberal Realist Foreign Policy: A memo for the next president." Harvard Magazine 110 (2008): 36-38.

provided a startlingly accurate prediction of President Obama's methodically effective strategy of relying on liberalist motivations to enact firmly realist foreign policy directives in relation to Iran.