Search and rescue coordination failures in the Oklahoma City bombing and Hurricane Katrina
Incident responses to violence or any other probably cause of mass death can be hard to prepare for and execute. Events like this are not limited to what happened on 9/11. Examples of different but still cataclysmic events include Hurricane Katrina, the OKC Murrah building attack and the Japan earthquake, tsunami and nuclear meltdown that recently occurred.
✍️ How to write this paper — guide & tools ▾
¶ … SAR teams that responded to the Oklahoma City attack perpetrated by Timothy McVeigh. The second question pertains to Hurricane Katrina and the NRP/NRF responses. The final question deals with key players relative to the NIMS process.
OKC SAR Response
The official report issued by Oklahoma had a "lessons learned" section and part of that section related directly to the response and recovery operations that ensued after the bombing. Issue 1 of that section was very striking. Due to the chaos and the overloading of networks such as those from cell phones, the overall communication abilities of the SAR teams was very limited to nothing. The fact that these teams were ostensibly relying on civilian communication arrays is fairly jaw-dropping but not surprising given other events in U.S. history that have been botched.
This leads to two issues the author of this paper would identify regarding that fact. First, OKC SAR's should have their own communication channels along the same lines as fire and police operations. It is true that it will likely never be used extensively, but not having it in a time like the OKC bombing is nuts. If a tornado hit OKC like it did Joplin, this would happen all over again. The second issue is that the communication problem persisted for more than half a day and that is equally appalling. To imagine if the World Trade Center attack, which was an attack on a much wider scale, would be sobering to consider.
Lastly, per the request of the instructor, the catastrophic event annex is to be looked at. As far as FEMA and their CEA framework, one major tenet is that federal intervention and assistance is required to effectively deal with such an event, but the state really needs to be as self-sufficient as they can be. The destruction of a town would most certainly need to involve FEMA, but this was just one building and immediate surrounding area. Even so, the USAR was dispatched by FEMA just before 9 am on the day of the attack (Ghilarducci, 1995). The communications that did occur were all to go through the Rescue Command (RC) center, which is a good idea (Edmonson et al., 1995). Medical contingencies should be addressed when handling such an event, as was proven by a USAR member from FEMA that got a 106 degree temperature en route to the blast radius (Barbera, DeAtley & MacIntyre, 1995).
Two Concerns
One issue that predates 9/11 and has gotten both better and worse since then is airport security. Some of the screening tactics and procedures engaged in by the TSA are reassuring but some of them are head-scratching. When grandmothers and infant children are being poked and prodded for bombs or weapons, that is lunacy. Israel is widely condemned for their unapologetic racial profiling, but they simply point to two facts. The first is that most airplane-oriented terrorists are Muslim men in the 18-34 age range and the second is that Israel screens people based on psychosocial techniques as well as racial profiling and they are never hijacked (Weinberger, 2010)(Hasisi, 2011). This would never fly in the United States because the focus on the TSA doing their right includes terrorism events but also includes tertiary topics such as how to screen transgender passengers. The latter is an issue because it begs the question whether a transgender should be frisked by a male or a female.
The second issue is related, but a bit different, and that is overall airport security. A terrorist does not have to get on a plane to inflict mass death and even the areas not behind the security dates should be scrutinized and controlled. This is not to say that airports should become police states but any airport that allows a person to carry a gun into an airport so long as they do not go beyond the security checkpoint is a bit much. Anybody that is clearly acting nervous or otherwise suspsious should be questioned or monitored. There are just certain lines that should not be crossed. There will be lawsuits and accusations, but patient safety is more important that hurt feelings and demagogic talk, in the views of many (Weinberger, 2010).
Create your account
Always verify citation format against your institution’s current style guide requirements.