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Democratic theory in American Politics

Last reviewed: June 9, 2017 ~9 min read

The fundamental aim of democracy in political governance is to ensure elected officials represent the interests of their constituents in the legislature. This means that the votes taken by members of Congress should reflect the policy preferences of their constituents. In reality, however, there is often disconnect between what legislators vote for and what their constituents prefer. In his book Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age, Bartels argues that the increasing economic inequality in the US is evidence that legislators do not in reality represent the interests of their interests -- they represent the interests of more powerful groups or entities as opposed to the average citizen. With reference to matters of economic inequality, this paper discuses the discrepancy between the choices of legislators and the policy preferences of their constituents.

Who actually governs in the American political system remains a contentious question in political discourses, particularly due to inequality in the distribution of wealth, resources, knowledge, and social status. Contrary to the assertions of democratic theory, policy making on key issues is in reality governed by alliances that comprise elected and unelected individuals and groups (Bartels 1). These individuals and groups have immense power and resources at their disposal, which they use to influence policies and the actions of elected officials. In other words, elected leaders vote to fulfill the interests of certain individuals and groups, not necessarily the average citizen.

Disconnect between the wishes of the electorate and the policies that legislators actually push or vote for has been observed in the US. America has become enormously richer in the last five decades or so, but significantly more unequal at the same time. Economic statistics indicate that the income of the top 1% more than doubled (from 10.2% to 21.8%) between 1950 and 2005 (Bartels 1). The top 0.1% made even greater wealth, with their income tripling during the same period. In essence, resources have increasingly become concentrated in the hands of the affluent.

Remarkable changes in the political arena have also been witnessed during the same period, creating further advantages for the wealthy. As Bartels explains, the cost of political campaigns has increased dramatically since the 1950s, making it quite difficult for individuals without resources to finance their election or reelection bids (p. 2). These individuals turn to wealthy people, corporations, as well as business and professional organizations to finance their political campaigns. Indeed, lobbying activities on the part of firms, business organizations, and professional associations have increased rapidly in the last few decades, actually even overtaking the growth of public interest groups and other mechanisms of organized representation such as labor unions. The implication is that elected officials ultimately listen to the voice of their funders and sponsors, not necessarily their constituents. This is to say that increased economic inequality has reinforced enduring disparities in political representation and influence in modern America.

Does this mean that economic inequality and democracy do not go together in reality? In other words, can democracy really be achieved in the presence of substantial economic inequality? Bartels' evidence shows that elected leaders are "utterly unresponsive to the policy preferences of millions of low-income citizens, leaving their political interests to be served or ignored as the ideological whims of incumbent elites may dictate" (p. 2). At its core, democracy is about continuous responsiveness of elected officials to the preferences of their constituents. It is about representing all citizens equally. A closer look, however, reveals that America is far from being a true democracy.

Economic inequality without a doubt profoundly affects democracy. However, as Bartels explains in his book, democratic politics also shape economics immensely (Bartels 2). Whereas socioeconomic factors such as globalization, technological advancement, and demographic shifts have powerfully influenced inequality over the years, politics substantially strengthen or prevent the inequality depending on what political motives elected officials aim to achieve. Citing the association between public policies and economic equality in the US since the 1950s, Bartels establishes that partisan politics and the political ideologies of elected officials have substantially affected the economic fortunes of the ordinary American citizen. This evidence leads Bartels to conclude that economic inequality is in large part a political outcome.

Theoretically, the views or preferences of the public in a democracy constrain the actions, choices, and ideological convictions of elected officials. This is, however, different in practice given that legislators command immense political leeway (Bartels 3). The frequent instances of Republican and Democratic legislators from the same state consistently portraying diverse policy choices provide ideal examples of how elected officials do not actually act in the interest of the general public. Why would two legislators from the state have divergent policy objectives given that they represent the same constituents? The only logical reason is that each legislator is inherently pushed or swayed by the interests of certain individuals or groups. The same phenomenon is also observed when there is change of administration at the national level. When Republicans replace Democrats in the White House, and vice versa, obvious shifts in public policy objectives are often observed, a further indication that elected officials do not really represent the ordinary citizen in public policy making.

Bartels' study of Republican and Democratic presidents since the 1950s shows significant differences in the economic objectives presidents pursue while in power. The evidence shows that on average, the real incomes of middle income households "have grown twice as fast under Democrats as they have under Republicans, while the real incomes of working poor families have grown six times as fast as under Democrats as they have under Republicans" (p. 3). In other words, the rate of income growth on the part of poor and middle income households is in significant part dependent on which party is in power. More strikingly, partisan differences remain even after accounting for variations in historical trends whose control lies beyond individual presidents. This suggests that economic disparities are not just an unavoidable economic phenomenon.

Bartels attempts to explain why Republicans have historically achieved phenomenal success in the US political arena in spite of their detrimental consequences on the economic prosperity of low and middle income households. Contrary to the popular belief that working class Whites are drawn into Republican politics by notoriously contentious issues such as homosexual marriages and abortion, Bartels finds that poor Whites have in the last 50 years or so actually portrayed democracy in their voting behavior, particularly at the presidential level (p. 3). This, according to Bartels, has counterbalanced the gains Republicans have achieved in luring wealthy White voters. In addition, poor Whites have increasingly prioritized economic issues over social issues. Also, poor White voters tend to be less concerned about social issues compared to their affluent counterparts.

Bartels' analysis reveals three reasons why Republicans have achieved tremendous success in the political arena in the last five decades or so (p. 4). First, voters myopically focus on recent economic performance, which often works to the advantage of Republicans as they often concentrate on income growth during election periods. Another reason is that voters at every level tend to be peculiarly sensitive to high income growth rates, which further benefits Republicans as they generate income growth especially for affluent households. Lastly, voters tend to be responsive to campaign spending. This also benefits Republicans given their unparalleled success in raising funds for political campaigns. Fundraising is a particularly important driver of economic inequality as elected officials will typically reward individuals and entities that funded their political campaigns. The rewards often come in the form of advocating for policies that favor the interests of the funders and sponsors.

While ordinary citizens tend to be concerned about economic inequality, a substantial number of them show less concern about public affairs and politics compared to the affluent and political elites. According to Bartels, majority of the ordinary citizens depict "ignorance and misconnection between values, beliefs, and policy preferences" (p. 4). Consequently, political elites maintain immense power to influence public policy in their favor. A good example provided by Bartels in his analysis is the reduction of federal taxes in 2001 and 2003 during the Bush era. The tax cuts significantly reduced the tax burden on the wealthy. However, the opinions of the public regarding the tax cuts were astonishingly misinformed and confused. Though the benefits of the tax cuts were mainly reaped by the top 5%, opinions on the tax burden of the wealthy did not significantly influence public opinion.

Another ideal example is the temporary abolishment of the federal estate tax in 2001 (Bartels 5). Similar to the tax cuts during the Bush era, the cancellation of the federal estate tax was extraordinarily popular amongst ordinary citizens irrespective of their economic situation and political inclination, and in spite of the fact that majority of them had not been affected by the tax. Though the estate tax was repealed in 2001 following a wide-ranging campaign against it, Bartels argues that the fundamental issue is not why it was repealed, but why it was in existence for more than eight decades. The survival of the tax for such a long period of time further indicates that the views of ordinary citizens are less consequential than those of the affluent and political elites. Furthermore, the estate tax was reinstated in 2011 after the temporary cancellation, meaning that the American political system is predominantly driven by the interests of powerful and wealthy individuals and groups, not the average citizen.

Overall, the reality of American politics is that elected officials act in the interest of the wealthy rather than their constituents as dictated by democratic theory. This is particularly evidenced by the fact that public policies in the US have historically favored the affluent section of the society, with economic gaps between the wealthy and the poor widening progressively. Based on the trustee model of representation, it may be argued that this level of responsiveness to the interests of the public is appropriate given that the ordinary citizen lacks the capacity and knowledge to take an informed position on a public policy issue. The trustee model of representation has without a doubt plunged more and more Americans into economic misfortune as most elected officials in reality serve the interests of a few individuals and groups. On the contrary, the delegate model of representation sees elected officials as delegates or representatives of the electorate. This means that the choices of policymakers must always reflect the wishes of those who send the delegate to the legislature. While members of Congress may be more informed about public policy issues than the ordinary citizen, their choices should ultimately be in line with the policy preferences of their constituents. This is the fundamental hallmark of a true, representative democracy.

Work Cited

Bartels, Larry M. Unequal democracy: the political economy of the new gilded age. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008.

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PaperDue. (2017). Democratic theory in American Politics. PaperDue. https://www.paperdue.com/essay/democratic-theory-in-american-politics-essay-2168551

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