Loop High Rise Fire

Fire Safety

Six people died and several more were severely injured in the 2003 Chicago Loop high rise fire, at the Cook County Administrative Building. Around 2,500 government employees work in the building, which was built in the 1960s and bought by the county in 1996. Officials now believe that many of the fire's casualties could have been prevented had the building fire safety codes been up-to-date and had proper protocols for evacuation been followed by the Chicago Fire Department. Although the building did have an official fire evacuation plan, it was not followed, and although evacuation drills were conducted four times a year, the evacuation procedure was chaotic and disorganized. Conflicts of interest related to political ties between the mayor's office and the building management company may be partially responsible for the building's inadequate safety features such as its lack of a sprinkler system. In addition to the building's safety flaws, miscommunication between building management and the fire department regarding evacuation procedure protocol was a primary cause for the fiasco.

The main problems with the building's safety features include the automatic locking of stairwell doors with no override system; the lack of pressurized stairwells; and the lack of a sprinkler system. The stairwell doors are designed to lock from the inside to prevent intruders. However, in the case of a fire, the automatic locks become a serious hazard preventing persons trapped inside to find safety. Buildings with similar security locks should be installed with a remote override system. All six of the building's casualties were persons trapped in the stairwell.

The lack of pressurized stairwells also contributed to the accumulation of smoke within the stairwells causing many of the victims' deaths and smoke inhalation injuries. A pressurized system would have allowed for the trigger of ventilation systems that would also have whisked smoke away from the area as a chimney would. Without the pressurization system in place, smoke billows up through the stairwells, suffocating all in its path. In the future, citywide fire safety codes should require for pressurization systems in stairwells as well as for lock override systems.

When the building was renovated, city officials did not demand that a sprinkler system be installed in the building. A sprinkler system may have saved lives and may have minimized smoke-related injuries and deaths. The lack of a sprinkler system proved to be a major flaw in the building's 1996 renovation plans. There is speculation as to whether the lack of a sprinkler system was partly due to the political tie between the building management and real estate development companies and the county office, which waved the requirements for the sprinkler system due to the age of the building. The city has issued contradictory safety regulations for buildings, giving more leeway to buildings built before 1975. Although installing sprinkler systems is initially costly, they save lives: no deaths have been reported in buildings with sprinkler systems in place. Therefore, upgrades to a building's safety codes are ultimately cost-effective.

Moreover, there is some question as to whether the building's fire alarm system was adequate. The building was also not equipped with heat sensors or other more sophisticated alarm systems. No employee reported hearing an alarm, only announcements over the building's public address system. The announcements that were given were inconsistent, not given according to proper protocols issued either by the building's own safety code or by the local fire department. When victims trapped in the stairwells phoned emergency 911, they were given a range of contradictory advice and information. The fire fighters should have taken over the public address system in order to provide those trapped inside with clear, sensible evacuation advice.

The problems related to fire safety code violations and botched evacuation procedures were as serious if not more serious than the errors in building safety features. The fire safety code in place at the Cook County Administrative Building was an eight-page document given to all tenants, but the Building/Tenant Fire Safety Plan was not followed. The planned evacuation protocol called for partial evacuation of the areas in serious danger and did not call for a total evacuation.

Furthermore, the building security officers are supposed to yield command of the public address system to fire fighters upon their arrival. However, when the fire fighters arrived, none of the officers spoke orders into the public address system and left the PA announcements up to the security officers. As a result, security officers gave misguided orders and called for a total building evacuation minutes after the blaze was reported. Safety officials report that had more workers remained at their desks, there may have been fewer casualties. Workers trapped inside the building also report mixed messages being broadcasted over the PA system. For example, at first, only occupants of the twelfth floor were told to evacuate but soon thereafter the evacuation order extended to the entire building. Victims scurried, not knowing which stairwells they should use and were unable to communicate with fire safety officials when trapped inside.

Fire safety officials arrived in good time, but even their evacuation and fire fighting protocols were not followed. For example, Captain Michael Gubricky elected to fight the fire from the southeast stairwell, which was the building's smoke tower. The smoke tower is in place mainly to offer an evacuation route because of the increased ventilation. The Captain's decision was unwarranted, given that the smoke tower is supposed to be used as an evacuation route and only as a last resort for fighting the fire. Fighting the fire from the smoke tower was not only dangerous, it diverted fire fighting attention that needed to be given to the persons trapped in the building's other stairwells. Some of the victims reported that firefighters did not listen when they were told that people were trapped in other stairwells. Firefighters failed to search the southeast stairwell, not believing that anyone was trapped there. In general, evacuation procedures were chaotic.