Low intensity crises in risk and disaster management

Low-Intensity Crises

The world in which we live has become increasingly industrial, technological, and digital. As such, many hazards present themselves in terms of phenomena such as pollution and its effects. As a result, unforeseen events might occur that result in low-intensity crises. The way in which these are identified, monitored and managed can mean the difference between life and death, and also the difference between tens or thousands of injured persons. In terms of future crisis management, it is also crucial to investigate crises of the past. This will ensure that past mistakes will not be repeated, and that lessons will be implemented for future improvement of crisis management systems. In this regard, two low-intensity crises are investigated: the London smog of 5-8 December, 1952, and the fire at Sandoz Ltd. during November, 1986.

London Smog

The Crisis

London is known for its dense fog resulting from its location as well as its climate. However, industrialization has complicated the composition of this fog to a point where it has become life-threatening for those living in the city. This was proved on 5 December 1952. The city was immersed in a thick blanket of smog, or fog filled with smoke.

Initially, many did not recognize the life-threatening nature of the smog, and saw it as little more than an inconvenience. The smog thickened so rapidly that motor vehicles had to be abandoned, while train stations and airports had to cancel their schedules because of the lack of visibility. School children were advised to stay home, because it was feared that they would be lost on the way to school. The smog was so thick that people had to cover their mouths and noses in order not to choke. Even theaters became so filled with smog that people were forced to abandon their entertainment in the middle of the afternoon and leave for home. Other indoor environments such as the British Library were also penetrated, with Archivists finding smog in book stacks. Visibility rapidly declined, and some report such intense darkness that they could not see their feet. On 7 December, visibility was at only one foot (Nielsen, 2002). The city was brought to a virtual standstill for four days, until 8 December, after which an unexpected wind cleared the smog as quickly as it had arrived.

It was believed that the smog resulted from a combination of coal burning, near freezing temperatures, high pressure and very light winds. Because of cold temperatures, people burned an increasing amount of coal. The smoke from the coal mixed with natural fog in the atmosphere, which further dropped temperatures. The concomitant increase in coal usage resulted in a cycle of coal burning and the resulting thick smog (Nielsen, 2002). Dangerous levels of sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides and soot were found in the smog.

I.2 Identification and Management

The life-threatening nature of the situation only became apparent after the first reports of cattle casualties at the Smithfield Show. People with respiratory and cardiovascular problems were affected worst, and many of them died. According to a Ministry of Health report, it was estimated that 4,057 more people died than would have been the case in normal conditions, although normally healthy people were not so badly affected (BBC News, 2002).

It therefore appears that the situation was not at first viewed as exceptionally serious. It was only when casualties at hospitals rose dramatically that the truth of the situation was realized. If the issue was identified correctly earlier, fewer casualties might have resulted and better precautions taken.

Part of the problem of early identification is the fact that pollution at the time was not seen as a particularly serious problem. Indeed, it was accepted as part of life in any big, industrialized city (Nielsen, 2002). Furthermore, London was known for its dense fog, and although the level of smog at the time was recognized as unusual, it was not viewed as particularly problematic in terms of being life-threatening (Davis, Bell & Fletcher, 2002). After the thousands of deaths resulting the 1952 event, this view was changed forever. London's smog was accepted for the poisonous entity it was and new measures were put in place to curb the problem of air pollution both in the city and other industrialized locations.

The effect of the 1952 smog has therefore been far-reaching not only in terms of the actual results at the time, but also in terms of the future and further research. Davis, Bell & Fletcher (2002) suggest that even more deaths than were initially estimated were the result of the smog. While thousands died during the event itself, mortality remained high for months afterward. Indeed, the authors suggest that the majority of the deaths later attributed to influenza were actually the result of the 1952 smog. Indeed, as many as 12,000 of these deaths may have been caused by breathing in the poisonous air of 1952.

The events in London during 1952 has changed the view of air pollution in industrialized cities, and particularly in London, for good. It was realized that the impact on human health is far greater than initially believed. Indeed, a further result was increased research into the longer-term health effects of air pollution. It was found that air pollution not only directly affected respiratory and cardiovascular health, but also less obvious areas such as infant and elderly death rates, birth weight, infant growth, and could cause various forms of cancer (Davis, Bell & Fletcher, 2002).

I.3 Results and Lessons Learned

To curb future unacceptable levels of coal in the air, the Government began to phase out coal fires in favor of paraffin heaters. Further measures culminated in the current 80 monitoring stations for air quality throughout the city (BBC News, 2002). Computers and monitoring equipment measure the level of pollutants such as fine particles, carbon monoxide and nitrogen dioxide in the air.

Clean air is also an issue addressed by legislation such as the Clean Air Act that requires manufacturing and chemical establishments to limit their pollutant emissions. The current situation in London is however still somewhat below the ideal level of clean air. Nitrogen dioxide and daily fine particles for example still exceed their targets along major road networks, central London and around Heathrow Airport. It appears then that motor vehicles have replaced goal as the main cause of air pollution in London, although some critics hold that the situation has greatly improved since 1952. Studies collaborate this, but emissions remain a problem.

Indeed, according to Davis, Bell & Fletcher (2002), estimates of up to 380 premature fatalities and as many as 350 respiratory hospital admissions per year are ascribed to air pollution caused by transport. Studies in Europe have also indicated that the overall health problem resulting from transport air pollution is greater than fatalities resulting only from traffic accidents. Recent reports have confirmed the dangers of even relatively low air pollution levels, especially in the long-term.

Davis, Bell & Fletcher (2002) cite an ongoing study by the American Cancer Society, which indicates that living in areas with higher levels of air pollution runs concomitantly with increased risks of lung cancer and cardiopulmonary mortality. Concomitantly, a reduction in air pollutants such as coal burning have been demonstrated to be very beneficial for human health. Dublin, for example banned all burning of bituminous coal, which resulted in a 70% decrease of black smoke over a decade, a reduction of respiratory-related deaths of 15.5%, and a reduction of 10.3% in cardiovascular deaths.

The London smog of 1952 is therefore important in several respects. Firstly, as mentioned above, the reality of air pollution and its dangers have become abundantly clear. The event serves as a tragic lesson from history. More important even than this is the fact that this lesson can be used in future preventative action. Because the dangers of smog and other air pollution are clear, the situation in developing countries can be monitored and researched based upon knowledge that did not exist in 1952.

Davis, Bell & Fletcher (2002) cite the problem of rapidly developing countries where air pollution is an increasing problem. While coal burning is no longer at the heart of this problem, pollutants include modern substances such as biomass fuels, garbage and incompletely burned organic materials. These present a significant health hazard not only in factories, but also in homes worldwide.

Problems that are associated with these conditions include the above-mentioned cancers, respiratory and heart conditions. Davis, Bell & Fletcher (2002) cite the example of women in Indian, Chinese and African rural areas, who are developing lung cancer and respiratory illness similar to those generally found in smokers. The reason for this is continuous exposure to indoor fuels with smoky emissions.

A ray of hope is presented by the fact that the causes for these conditions are known and can be treated by a variety of means. In addition to legislation such as the Clean Air Act as mentioned above, information for studies in air pollution and its effects is taken seriously in efforts to change public policy. Efforts are made to make healthier choices in terms of energy and transport in both developed and developing countries. All legislators now acknowledge the need for alternative energy and transport choices to promote the health and well-being not only of current generations, but also those of the future. Indeed, on a wider scale, healthier choices can eventually mean the difference between the longevity of the human race or its ultimate destruction. It can therefore be said with certainty that the impact of the 1952 event can still be felt today. It forms the basis of the fundamental realization that air pollution is very detrimental to human health, and that alternative fuel sources are essential if the situation is to improve.

II the Fire at Sandoz Ltd.

II.1 the Crisis

The 1986 fire at Sandoz Ltd. occurred near Basel, Switzerland on 1 November. Like the London smog, was more or less a disaster waiting to happen. In this case however, human error rather than the collaboration of natural elements, is mostly responsible for the disaster. The disaster was two-fold: the fire that resulted in the firefighting effort, and subsequently the large-scale chemical spill into the Rhine River. The fire began in a building that the company used to store pesticides, mercury and other chemicals. The result was very toxic fumes, and residents were warned to stay indoors.

Firefighters responded to the fire in the normal manner, by using water hoses. The fire was already out of control when it was seen by highway patrol police and the plant night watchman. Because of the flammable chemicals in the warehouse, the fire soon consumed the whole building and its contents. In response, the firefighting team decided to use large amounts of water to prevent further harmful emissions (Federal Emergency Management Agency). For this purpose, more than 3,000 gallons of water per minute was pumped form the river. The basin provided for 12,000 gallons of the deadly mix created by the firefighting water mixed with chemicals. This was however not enough, and it overflowed. This triggered the second part of the disaster.

The chemicals in the building mixed with firefighting water. This water was washed into the river, along with thirty tons of chemicals, which turned the Rhine River red. The chemicals included 35 different chemicals such as pesticides, dyes and heavy metals (PANNA, 2007). Being highly toxic, the chemicals killed all living organisms in its path (BBC.co.uk). The Rhine is eastern Europe's most important waterway.

The disaster had wide-ranging effects on the environment. It negated 10 years of cleaning work on the river. In a single day, the disaster repolluted the Rhine to the level of decades of industrialized pollution from France, Germany and Switzerland. Before the cleaning effort, the river was so polluted that fish began to disappear and swimming was forbidden for being dangerous to human life. According to the PANNA (2007) report, more than 500,000 fish were killed in the river, and several species were eliminated. The whole scale death of all living organisms in the death stretched for 300 km downstream.

Several elements contributed to the risk and outbreak of disaster, to which the facility itself was no small contributor. The warehouse was fairly old, having been built in 1967. It formed part of the larger complex owned by Sandoz in Schweizerhalle near Basel on the left bank of the river. Not being intended as a warehouse per se, but rather as a shelter from weather, the building had not sprinkler system. Such a system was not installed, because the company did not consider the risk of fire to be significant (Federal Emergency Management Agency).

This is interesting when considering that the part of the building where the fire started was stacked with mainly flammable liquids such as pesticides, fungicides and herbicides. Phosphoric acid and organic mercury compounds particularly had a 30 degree C. flashpoint. It is believed that ferric ferrocyanice may have been instrumental in the start of the fire. These flammables were all stacked together, with the other half of the building containing mainly harmless chemicals (Federal Emergency Management Agency). Surely this in itself increases the risk significantly.

II.2 Identification and Management

Like the smog disaster, officials in charge of crisis management did not realize the extent of the disaster before it was too late. The first part of the disaster, the fire, was only noticed when it was already a significant problem. The chemicals inside the building were very flammable, and the building was big. These two factors contributed to an exacerbated disaster before it was even seen. Furthermore, the lack of foresight by stacking flammable materials together as well as the lack of a sprinkler system to mitigate the risk factor resulted in the lack of control over the fire.

The second part of the disaster was exacerbated because of a lack of proper communication between officials in charge of the Rhine. The Swiss official in charge at the time for example informed his French and German colleagues only via the local warning system, but did not notify officials through the international warning system. Thus downstream alarm offices never received notification until the pollution had reached them, and it was too late to close water intakes (Huisman). International warning centers only received word two days after the disaster, because it occurred over a weekend. German television stations did however broadcast information relating to the disaster, and German authorities on the right river bank were able to close their water intake stations on time to avert serious problems. To mitigate the disaster, weirs in the Lower Rhine in the Netherlands were opened so that the affected water could be directed to the North Sea (Huisman).

Also instrumental in the lack of management for this particular disaster is the fact that Sandoz itself appears not to have learned from its mistakes. As mentioned in the following section, the company nearly caused another spill into the Rhine before moving its business from the premises.

II.3 Results and Lessons Learned

The immediate effect of the spill was a wide scale public outcry, with environmental and other agencies calling for a shut down of Sandoz (Federal Emergency Management Agency). Apparently this outcry was not without a sound basis: according to PANNA (2007), Sandoz's operations nearly resulted in another spill on the Rhine. The result is that the company moved all production to Brazil by 1989. Long-term planning to avert future disasters of the kind included placing water quality surveillance stations along the Rhine to monitor water quality and prevent illegal discharge from manufacturers (Huisman).

In an attempt to make optimal use of the lessons learned from the disaster, the officials involved met to determine ways of streamlining the existing communication and reporting system along the Rhine. The result was an improvement to the international warning system and the harmonization of regulations governing pollution problems. These regulations are now more specifically aimed at preventing sudden spillages. Further discussions were held at a conference in December 1986, where the focus was on further reducing the pollution and prevent future incidents of the kind. Industries are now for example required to construct basins for the storage and treatment of liquids occurring both on site and entering from other sources such as firefighting efforts (Huisman). Such water is then to be treated to meet current emission standards before being discharged into rivers.