The London smog of 1952 and the Sandoz fire of 1986

Low-Intensity Crises

The world in which we live has become increasingly industrial, technological, and digital. As such, many hazards present themselves in terms of phenomena such as pollution and its effects. As a result, unforeseen events might occur that result in low-intensity crises. The way in which these are identified, monitored and managed can mean the difference between life and death, and also the difference between tens or thousands of injured persons. In terms of future crisis management, it is also crucial to investigate crises of the past. This will ensure that past mistakes will not be repeated, and that lessons will be implemented for future improvement of crisis management systems. In this regard, two low-intensity crises are investigated: the London smog of 5-8 December, 1952, and the fire at Sandoz Ltd. during November, 1986.

London Smog

The Crisis

London is known for its dense fog resulting from its location as well as its climate. However, industrialization has complicated the composition of this fog to a point where it has become life-threatening for those living in the city. This was proved on 5 December 1952. The city was immersed in a thick blanket of smog, or fog filled with smoke.

Initially, many did not recognize the life-threatening nature of the smog, and saw it as little more than an inconvenience. The smog thickened so rapidly that motor vehicles had to be abandoned, while train stations and airports had to cancel their schedules because of the lack of visibility. School children were advised to stay home, because it was feared that they would be lost on the way to school. The smog was so thick that people had to cover their mouths and noses in order not to choke. Even theaters became so filled with smog that people were forced to abandon their entertainment in the middle of the afternoon and leave for home. Other indoor environments such as the British Library were also penetrated, with Archivists finding smog in book stacks. Visibility rapidly declined, and some report such intense darkness that they could not see their feet. On 7 December, visibility was at only one foot (Nielsen, 2002). The city was brought to a virtual standstill for four days, until 8 December, after which an unexpected wind cleared the smog as quickly as it had arrived.

It was believed that the smog resulted from a combination of coal burning, near freezing temperatures, high pressure and very light winds. Because of cold temperatures, people burned an increasing amount of coal. The smoke from the coal mixed with natural fog in the atmosphere, which further dropped temperatures. The concomitant increase in coal usage resulted in a cycle of coal burning and the resulting thick smog (Nielsen, 2002). Dangerous levels of sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides and soot were found in the smog.

I.2 Identification and Management

The life-threatening nature of the situation only became apparent after the first reports of cattle casualties at the Smithfield Show. People with respiratory and cardiovascular problems were affected worst, and many of them died. According to a Ministry of Health report, it was estimated that 4,057 more people died than would have been the case in normal conditions, although normally healthy people were not so badly affected (BBC News, 2002).

It therefore appears that the situation was not at first viewed as exceptionally serious. It was only when casualties at hospitals rose dramatically that the truth of the situation was realized. If the issue was identified correctly earlier, fewer casualties might have resulted and better precautions taken.

Part of the problem of early identification is the fact that pollution at the time was not seen as a particularly serious problem. Indeed, it was accepted as part of life in any big, industrialized city (Nielsen, 2002). Furthermore, London was known for its dense fog, and although the level of smog at the time was recognized as unusual, it was not viewed as particularly problematic in terms of being life-threatening (Davis, Bell & Fletcher, 2002). After the thousands of deaths resulting the 1952 event, this view was changed forever. London's smog was accepted for the poisonous entity it was and new measures were put in place to curb the problem of air pollution both in the city and other industrialized locations.

The effect of the 1952 smog has therefore been far-reaching not only in terms of the actual results at the time, but also in terms of the future and further research. Davis, Bell & Fletcher (2002) suggest that even more deaths than were initially estimated were the result of the smog. While thousands died during the event itself, mortality remained high for months afterward. Indeed, the authors suggest that the majority of the deaths later attributed to influenza were actually the result of the 1952 smog. Indeed, as many as 12,000 of these deaths may have been caused by breathing in the poisonous air of 1952.

The events in London during 1952 has changed the view of air pollution in industrialized cities, and particularly in London, for good. It was realized that the impact on human health is far greater than initially believed. Indeed, a further result was increased research into the longer-term health effects of air pollution. It was found that air pollution not only directly affected respiratory and cardiovascular health, but also less obvious areas such as infant and elderly death rates, birth weight, infant growth, and could cause various forms of cancer (Davis, Bell & Fletcher, 2002).

II.1 the Crisis

The 1986 fire at Sandoz Ltd. occurred near Basel, Switzerland on 1 November. Like the London smog, was more or less a disaster waiting to happen. In this case however, human error rather than the collaboration of natural elements, is mostly responsible for the disaster. The disaster was two-fold: the fire that resulted in the firefighting effort, and subsequently the large-scale chemical spill into the Rhine River. The fire began in a building that the company used to store pesticides, mercury and other chemicals. The result was very toxic fumes, and residents were warned to stay indoors.

Firefighters responded to the fire in the normal manner, by using water hoses. The fire was already out of control when it was seen by highway patrol police and the plant night watchman. Because of the flammable chemicals in the warehouse, the fire soon consumed the whole building and its contents. In response, the firefighting team decided to use large amounts of water to prevent further harmful emissions (Federal Emergency Management Agency). For this purpose, more than 3,000 gallons of water per minute was pumped form the river. The basin provided for 12,000 gallons of the deadly mix created by the firefighting water mixed with chemicals. This was however not enough, and it overflowed. This triggered the second part of the disaster.

The chemicals in the building mixed with firefighting water. This water was washed into the river, along with thirty tons of chemicals, which turned the Rhine River red. The chemicals included 35 different chemicals such as pesticides, dyes and heavy metals (PANNA, 2007). Being highly toxic, the chemicals killed all living organisms in its path (BBC.co.uk). The Rhine is eastern Europe's most important waterway.

The disaster had wide-ranging effects on the environment. It negated 10 years of cleaning work on the river. In a single day, the disaster repolluted the Rhine to the level of decades of industrialized pollution from France, Germany and Switzerland. Before the cleaning effort, the river was so polluted that fish began to disappear and swimming was forbidden for being dangerous to human life. According to the PANNA (2007) report, more than 500,000 fish were killed in the river, and several species were eliminated. The whole scale death of all living organisms in the death stretched for 300 km downstream.

Several elements contributed to the risk and outbreak of disaster, to which the facility itself was no small contributor. The warehouse was fairly old, having been built in 1967. It formed part of the larger complex owned by Sandoz in Schweizerhalle near Basel on the left bank of the river. Not being intended as a warehouse per se, but rather as a shelter from weather, the building had not sprinkler system. Such a system was not installed, because the company did not consider the risk of fire to be significant (Federal Emergency Management Agency).

This is interesting when considering that the part of the building where the fire started was stacked with mainly flammable liquids such as pesticides, fungicides and herbicides. Phosphoric acid and organic mercury compounds particularly had a 30 degree C. flashpoint. It is believed that ferric ferrocyanice may have been instrumental in the start of the fire. These flammables were all stacked together, with the other half of the building containing mainly harmless chemicals (Federal Emergency Management Agency). Surely this in itself increases the risk significantly.

II.2 Identification and Management

Like the smog disaster, officials in charge of crisis management did not realize the extent of the disaster before it was too late. The first part of the disaster, the fire, was only noticed when it was already a significant problem. The chemicals inside the building were very flammable, and the building was big. These two factors contributed to an exacerbated disaster before it was even seen. Furthermore, the lack of foresight by stacking flammable materials together as well as the lack of a sprinkler system to mitigate the risk factor resulted in the lack of control over the fire.

The second part of the disaster was exacerbated because of a lack of proper communication between officials in charge of the Rhine. The Swiss official in charge at the time for example informed his French and German colleagues only via the local warning system, but did not notify officials through the international warning system. Thus downstream alarm offices never received notification until the pollution had reached them, and it was too late to close water intakes (Huisman). International warning centers only received word two days after the disaster, because it occurred over a weekend. German television stations did however broadcast information relating to the disaster, and German authorities on the right river bank were able to close their water intake stations on time to avert serious problems. To mitigate the disaster, weirs in the Lower Rhine in the Netherlands were opened so that the affected water could be directed to the North Sea (Huisman).

Also instrumental in the lack of management for this particular disaster is the fact that Sandoz itself appears not to have learned from its mistakes. As mentioned in the following section, the company nearly caused another spill into the Rhine before moving its business from the premises.

II.3 Results and Lessons Learned

The immediate effect of the spill was a wide scale public outcry, with environmental and other agencies calling for a shut down of Sandoz (Federal Emergency Management Agency). Apparently this outcry was not without a sound basis: according to PANNA (2007), Sandoz's operations nearly resulted in another spill on the Rhine. The result is that the company moved all production to Brazil by 1989. Long-term planning to avert future disasters of the kind included placing water quality surveillance stations along the Rhine to monitor water quality and prevent illegal discharge from manufacturers (Huisman).

In an attempt to make optimal use of the lessons learned from the disaster, the officials involved met to determine ways of streamlining the existing communication and reporting system along the Rhine. The result was an improvement to the international warning system and the harmonization of regulations governing pollution problems. These regulations are now more specifically aimed at preventing sudden spillages. Further discussions were held at a conference in December 1986, where the focus was on further reducing the pollution and prevent future incidents of the kind. Industries are now for example required to construct basins for the storage and treatment of liquids occurring both on site and entering from other sources such as firefighting efforts (Huisman). Such water is then to be treated to meet current emission standards before being discharged into rivers.

As for communication, e-mail is now common practice for the Rhine warming system. A new collaboration system of clearer mutual understanding now exists between regional, national and international warning stations. New clean-up objectives and repopulation of the Rhine were also discussed. The objectives for a 50% reduction in the ten years since the disaster, and the repopulation plans were largely successful, with more than 80% of the pollutants cleaned up in III Conclusion

It is a sad fact of human life that we are often unprepared for disasters, precisely because they are unforeseen. Unfortunately events such as the London smog and the Sandoz fire often result in large-scale losses of either human life, assets or ecological harmony. The mitigation of these disasters are often significant in terms of scale and cost. It would therefore be even more expensive not to turn such experiences into lessons for the future.

In the case of the London smog, the lessons learned seem to manifest themselves all over the world. Because of the disaster, identification and management has much improved for both developed and developing countries. This is a case in which history was used to learn from and to improve lives in the future.

In the case of the Sandoz fire, management officials seem to be the ones who learned the most and acted upon these lessons to mitigate future disasters. The disaster was terrible and tragic, but also possible to remedy, which the officials did. All problems were identified and considered for necessary changes to prevent further problems in the future. It is unclear why Sandoz Ltd. believed that a sprinkler system is unnecessary or why they felt that the fire risk was low in a building filled with flammable materials. They are not reported to have learned a large amount from this mistake, although this is not necessarily the case.

Philosophers might enjoy saying that disasters occur to learn from, and they would be right. The above examples show that the world and those in it do learn, although slowly. Perhaps learning from one's past mistakes is one of the greatest attributes of life on earth. Perhaps this is one of the greatest survival skills. Because we learn, we evolve, and because we do not repeat mistakes, we live to see another day.

Sources

BBC News. 1986: Chemical spill turns Rhine red. On this day: 1 November. http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/november/1/newsid_4679000/4679789.stm

BBC News UK. (2002, Dec. 5). The Great Smog of London. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/2545759.stm

Bitzer, Dirk. 1986 Environment: So many dead fish! Geschichte

http://www.geschichte.nrw.de/artikel.php?artikel%5Bid%5D=141&lkz=en

Davis, Devra L. Bell, Michelle L. & Fletcher, Tony. (2002, Dec) a look back at the London smog of 1952 and the half century since. Environmental Health Perspectives. Database: FindArticles.com. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0CYP/is_12_110/ai_98539832

Federal Emergency Management Agency. Supplement on Sandoz Chemical Plant Fire, Basel Switzerland. http://www.interfire.com/res_file/pdf/Tr-009.pdf.

Huisman, Pieter. Learning by Doing: experiencces with sudden occurring pollution in the Rhine Basin. http://insma.udg.es/isse2003/resums/P_Huisman2.htm

Met Office. The Great Smot of 1952. http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/education/secondary/students/smog.html

Nielsen, John. (2002, Dec. 11). The Killer Fog of '52. http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=873954

PANNA (2007). Syngenta Corporate Fact Sheet. Pesticide Action Network North America. http://www.panna.org/resources/documents/syngenta.dv.html