Mahan and Turner and U.S.

Mahan and Turner and U.S. Foreign Policy

Two individuals probably had more of an impact upon U.S. foreign policy than any others: Frederick Jackson Turner and Alfred Thayer Mahan. Turner's ideas on the closing of the American frontier and Mahan's ideas on the employment of the battleship navy to secure American interests overseas set the tone for the twentieth century in terms of foreign policy analysis and formulation.

Turner presented the American frontier as the driving catalyst of American history and the official closing of it by the U.S. Census Bureau after the publication of the results of the 1890 census as a watershed event. Until that census, there appeared to be no end to the American west. Past the line of that frontier, there was no end to opportunity. The frontier could absorb the American poor in droves with its free land. Manifest Destiny drove Americans west in a natural display of American progress. There had been a frontier ever since Columbus discovered America. Now, with the stroke of a pen, that frontier was gone and the boundless vista of opportunity offered by the American frontier went with it (Burner, Bernhard and Kutler 661).

While Turner was going out on a bit of a pessimistic note, Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan of the U.S. Navy had no hang-ups about moving the frontier beyond America's Western coast and into the saltwater expanses of the Pacific.

While an undistinguished U.S. Navy officer of 30 years, the time that saw the majority of his career was a time of peace. What he did excel in was scholarship. He was an outstanding student with a first class intellect. His career saw the rise of the "battleship era" in naval history as ironclad battles went on all over the world in various locales. There were no written naval doctrines for the use of battleships and he saw it as his destiny to write the rule book on this new age of the naval warfare of iron (later steel) and steam.

What Mahan found in his study of naval history was an elusive thread regarding ancient and modern maritime empires. What he postulated was that their greatness came from the control of the sea, especially the vital sea lanes and points, such as coaling stations for the steamship navies of the world. He felt that this had never been fully appreciated before and that it was his job to expound upon it.

His work began in lecture format and later found its way into published book form. This led to his publication of The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783 which became a classic text and basis for American imperialism. This and other succeeding works pounded home the need for a strong battleship navy to control the critical lines of communication for a maritime empire. Unlike many proponents of U.S. overseas involvement, Mahan did not coat his ideas in philosophically pleasing clothing. Very much the Social Darwinist, he had no problems arguing that in a world of struggle for survival between great powers, national power depended upon naval supremacy. Instead he dealt with the naked power realities of the multi-polar world of the time. He advocated overseas colonies in the Caribbean and the Pacific linked by a U.S. controlled Panamanian Canal. According to Mahan, strong powers had a special responsibility to dominate weak powers. We had to keep the peace (Nash, Jeffrey, Howe et. al. 638) .