The Cabanatuan prison camp rescue and Army ranger tactical planning

MDMP Exam

Requirement 1 -- Running Estimate

Requirement 2 - The Problem

Requirement 3 -- The Mission

Requirement 4 -- Purpose and

Requirement 5 -- CCIRs

Requirement 6 -- Commander's Judgement

Requirement 7 -- COA Analysis

Requirement 1 -- Running Estimate

Time management is one of the key elements in planning. There must be a balance between taking time to plan and creating synchronization, and maintaining the initiative that can be difficult to determine (ARMY, 2012). A running estimate is important because it provides an assessment of the current operation against the planned baseline and establishes whether or not future contingent operations are still supportable.

Once the Japanese are aware of the Rangers and the guerillas presence, they are undoubtedly going to call for reinforcements as well as consider executing the POW held in the camp. Since the camp is also a transit post, then timing is even that much more critical as more Japanese forces could arrive quickly. The element of surprise is essential. The Rangers need to reach the camp shortly after detection so that they can overwhelm the camp's guards before they are able to take out any of the POWs. Once the Rangers reach the camp, they will need to show force sufficient enough to capture the attention of all of the Japanese soldiers at the camp. This should ensure that they are too distracted to pay attention to the POWs.

Mucci's platoon left the base camp on 28 January at 0500 to march five miles to the first guerrilla camp in the path and then marched another fourteen miles to Balincarin. At this point they met with the Alamo Scouts and another guerrilla unit. A planning session was held at which point because the Alamo Scouts were not finished gathering information and there are also heavy Japanese presences recently reported in the area. This is the point in which the raid of the camp and the rescue of the POWs must now be planned.

After the twenty-four hour delay and when the Alamo Scouts have returned with their information, the objectives can be further defined. It has already been reported that there are Japanese roughly four miles south. The Rangers now have two guerrilla forces to work with. One consists of sixty men (twenty were left at the guerrilla camp) and is headed by Captain Joson. The other guerrilla force is headed by Rounsaville and consists of ninety armed men and one hundred sixty unarmed men.

Since the camp with the POWs doubles as a transit post, there will be two routes to secure -- one from the north and one from the south. Unless the Alamo Scouts provide information to the contrary, the larger guerrilla force should be assigned to a blocking position to the south where the largest Japanese force was spotted. The armed men can serve a blocking post while the unarmed men can prepare the route and supplies necessary to get the POWs back to American lines. Captain Joson and his guerrilla force must block the road to the north.

The two guerrilla forces must be put into operation at exactly the same time and each of these forces should be allowed one hour to construct an adequate blocking position. Mucci needs to send Scout to monitor their progress and make recommendations to their position. Once set, Mucci and the Rangers should proceed to the camp. There cannot be a major delay in the Rangers launch, but they need to give the guerrilla forces a slight head start to secure their areas and ensure the Rangers path can be cleared.

Once the path is clear, the Rangers will approach the camp within one hour and penetrate the camp within two hours. The Rangers will thus have one hour to disarm the camps defenses and reach the POWs. At which point the Rangers will have two hours total to remove the POWs from the camp and direct them toward the unarmed guerrillas that will be waiting to assist their transit. The two guerrilla forces will have to remain in their blocking positions and hold these positions for a total of four hours before falling back to join the main force and POW on their way back to the closest guerrilla camp of Balincarin. This is a fourteen mile hike that will take roughly five hours transporting the wounded POWs. Most of this journey will be open however the condition of the POWs will likely be deteriorated from their imprisonment and they are likely to move slow even with guerrilla assistance. Once the combined unit makes it back to Balincarin then the Rangers and guerrillas can fortify the area, feed the forces and POWs, and treat the sick and wounded to the best extent possible with the resources available and which point they can coordinate with the 6th Army to get the POWs to complete safety.

Requirement 2 - The Problem

The defining challenges to effective planning are uncertainty and time -- both of which are major factors in this scenario. Planning and plans help leaders (ARMY, 2012):

Understand and develop solutions to problems.

Anticipate events and adapt to changing circumstances.

Task-organize the force and prioritize efforts.

One problem deals with uncertainty. Issues that are surrounded with uncertainty include where the Japanese forces are located, the defenses that are present in the camp, the condition of the POWs, and the ability of the guerrillas to effectively block Japanese forces, and more. Another problem deals with time and the element of surprise. Surprise is a critical success factor in ensuring the safety of the POWs since the Japanese will have the option to attempt to take out the POWs once they spot enemy forces. Therefore timing must be coordinated among all efforts present to engage the Japanese guards at the camp immediately. The overall problem can be thought of in terms of timing and security.

Requirement 3 -- The Mission

Raid -- (attack) an offensive task that destroys or defeats enemy forces, seizes and secures terrain, or both (Army, 2004).

Liberate --any area, domestic, neutral, or friendly, which, having been occupied by an enemy, is retaken by friendly forces (DoD, 2009).

Secure -- In an operational context, to gain possession of a position or terrain feature, with or without force, and to make such disposition as will prevent, as far as possible, its destruction or loss by enemy action. See also denial measure (DoD, 2009).

The mission will consist of securing the entry and exit to the camp, raiding the camp, and liberating the POWs. The ESSENTIAL task is to liberate the POWs and the other two tasks are ends to that mean.

Requirement 4 -- Purpose and Task

• The Filipino Guerrillas -- the guerrillas need to effectively block each the north and south road to the camp (task). This will allow the Rangers to take the camp and liberate the POWs without confrontation with Japanese forces responding from these routes (purpose)

• The Alamo Scouts -- the Alamo Scouts are tasked with providing information about terrain and the position of enemy forces (task). This will allow LTC to plan the most effective route to liberate the POWs (purpose).

• The Filipino Civilians -- The civilians will be tasked with assisting the POWs with food, care, and movement (task). This will allow the POWs to move to friendly territory as quickly as possible (purpose).

• The Radio Team in Guimba -- the radio team in Guimba can coordinate with the Rangers and the 6th Army (task). The radio team can facilitate the transfer of the POWs to safety (purpose).

• The 6th U.S. Army -- the 6th Army is tasked to provide support to the Rangers and POWs upon completion of their mission and the path back to safety (task). This will allow the POWs to reach safety behind American lines as quickly as possible (purpose).

Requirement 5 -- CCIRs

IF the POWs are still alive and in the camp

AND the guerrillas can block the Japanese

AND the Rangers can overtake the camp

AND the Rangers can take the camp before the POWs are harmed

THEN the POWs can be liberated and moved to behind American lines

The allied forces have not taken major losses and have ammunition remaining

This situation assumes that the 6th Army link-up can reach the camp before the Japanese response is able to overtake the Rangers defensive position of the camp. This scenario would entail significant risk. For example, the Japanese could position themselves between the 6th Army and the camp making the 6th Army's rescue more difficult. Furthermore, the Rangers could also likely be running low on ammunition and might have difficulty defending their position. However, if some POWs have conditions that do not allow them to be moved, then this strategy might be necessary in order to save the entire POW group.

• Move outside the camp to the first concealed location, defend it, and ensure 6th Army has its link-up force moving toward us quickly.

Facts and Assumptions:

The POWs can be moved to a concealment position

The 6th Army can reach the concealment position before a major Japanese response

This strategy would also be relatively risky since the exact position of the enemy's forces is likely unknown. Furthermore, it is not clear if concealment would allow the group to remain undetected long enough to the 6th Army to arrive. One option would be to use a hybrid of the 2nd and 3rd contingencies. The Rangers could lead the POWs in the direction of the 6th Army as quickly as possible while leaving Scouts as spotters for the Japanese response. If the Scouts found the Japanese approaching, then the group could then take the first available concealment position and defend it. This would allow group to get at least marginally closer, if not better, to the 6th Army link-up which would lengthen the time it took the Japanese response to reach the position of the POWs.