Meaning of life in philosophy and human existence

¶ … Question of Evil

One of the most challenging questions that faces Christian -- theologians, clergy, and the laity -- is why does God permit there to be evil in the world. If God is both omnipotent and benevolent, then why does He permit evil to persist and often even to flourish and triumph? A related and equally important question is that once we acknowledge that evil exists in the world through God's permission, what does this tell us about God's own morality? In this paper I will examine the contributions of two important thinkers on this issue, the eighteenth-century philosopher (and possibly atheist) David Hume and the twentieth-century philosopher and theologian John Hick. They offer divergent paths for the believer -- or non-believer -- to explore the question of evil.

Hume wrote a great deal on religion throughout his life; despite this fact the parameters of his personal beliefs are not well-known. This might have been because the civil punishments for apostasy could be severe. Or perhaps he chose not to divulge his beliefs because he wanted his writings to be viewed without what would then have been the shadow of atheism hanging over them. Or perhaps -- and I believe this to be the truest version -- he himself was simply ambivalent. We see such ambivalence even in the same piece of writing. In The Natural History of Religion, for example, he begins by stating that "The whole frame of nature bespeaks an intelligent author." And yet he concludes this same essay: "Examine the religious principles, which have, in fact, prevailed in the world. You will scarcely be persuaded, that they are anything but sick men's dreams."

Hume's Dialogues was an even stronger statement of his skeptical perspective. And it becomes clear in this work (not published until after his death, perhaps because of its radical thesis) that part of his skepticism arises from the question of evil. Hume's examination of why evil exists in the world arises from his more general argument in the essay, which is the question of what is the nature of the "first cause" of the universe? In other words, what can one discover about the beginning of the universe by its current state? And what, in particular can we discover about the nature of God -- if we assign to him the genesis of the universe -- from the current state of affairs? (I find it fascinating that this process in many ways neatly parallels the process through which astro-physicists parse the nature of the Big Bang by an examination of the state of the modern universe.)

At the core of Hume's argument was a refutation of the most common "proof" of the existence of God in the eighteenth century. That proof (the "argument from design") argued that people must assume that the current state of the universe indicates irrefutably the existence at the beginning of the world of a divine being who was compassionate, benevolent, and wise. Hume's response to this -- at least from my own viewpoint in the twentieth century -- is in fact the irrefutable one. Hume argues that there is simply no need for evil to exist: "Now, this I assert to be the case with regard to all the causes of evil, and the circumstances on which it depends. None of them appear to human reason in the least degree necessary or unavoidable; nor can we suppose them such, without the utmost license of imagination." Therefore Hume argues -- and I find myself in full sympathy with him -- that there cannot therefore be a benevolent God at the beginning of things. I would further extend this argument by saying that what Hume is suggesting is one of two things: Either that God does not exist at all, or that he exists but is morally flawed.

Christian theologians have, across the centuries, argued that the presence of evil in the world disproves neither the existence of God nor the existence of God's beneficence, but rather that the presence of evil indicates that evil is a necessary part of God's plan for the world. This argument is (I believe depending on one's personal belief system) either patently absurd or inherently reasonable. Hume is arguing the former (or at least something close to the former), and I myself believe that his argument is highly persuasive. This is to me one of the most important questions that arises around the idea of any religious belief, or rather any religious belief in a monotheistic religion. I can think of no acceptable (in either intellectual or moral terms) reason for an omnipotent God to allow evil (or suffering -- but that is a different question for another time) to exist.

Stepping outside of Hume's central argument here -- or rather keeping in the spirit of Hume's argument but bringing in an additional set of facts -- I believe that the problem of the question of evil is one that is not problematic to all religious systems or religious faiths but rather to monotheistic religions that feature an omnipotent and benevolent God. Polytheistic religions do not have this problem, for they feature deities in a range of moral rectitude. Christians may turn to the devil to explain evil, but this argument does not serve them very well because the Christian God is supposed to be more powerful than Satan, and so Christians cannot explain the presence of evil in the world by pointing fingers at Satan. However, a believer in a polytheistic religion can point to the moral ambiguity of, say a Zeus, in explaining the lack of pure good in the world. Members of communities of faith that argue that there is truly no good or evil -- or rather, that the closest facsimiles of good and evil arise from human actions -- are on even firmer ground vis-a-vis the question of evil. (Hindus follow such a belief system.)

Close to the conclusion of his essay, Hume describes the world that he sees this way: "The whole presents nothing but the idea of a blind Nature, impregnated by a great vivifying principle, and pouring forth from her lap, without discernment or parental care, her maimed and abortive children!" And yet -- and this is one of the strongest points for me both of Hume's arguments and of my own understanding of the nature of the universe -- Hume does not therefore find life unbearable. There is evil in the world, and there is therefore likely to be no beneficent God, but this does not undermine the value of life.

John Hick -- most certainly not a skeptic -- responds to arguments such as Hume's (for he is not responding directly to Hume per se but rather to the content of the argument that Hume along with many others make) is that atheists and skeptics begin their argument about the question of evil with a fundamentally flawed argument. An atheist (Hick argues) posits that a benevolent and omnipotent God would want to (and would be able to) prevent evil -- but this is not a necessary assumption. I myself agree with this statement: I personally cannot understand why a benevolent God would tolerate evil. And even, in fact, be responsible for the creation of evil in the world.

However, I acknowledge that Hick has an intellectually useful objection. Those who question the necessity of evil are making an important assumption about the nature of the universe: They are assuming that evil is -- well, a bad thing. Hick responds that this is an essentially flawed argument: To him, a benevolent and omnipotent God might well have a good reason to allow evil to continue. This is a logically sound objection on his part. But it is only a logically valid argument, one acceptable within the confines of a debate but of no merit outside of formal argumentation. In other words, Hick's argument sounds good if one looks at it in only formal sense. If one looks at the content of his argument, it falls apart. Yes, those who are arguing against any sort of argument from design, are making an initial assumption -- that the presence of evil is a fundamental problem for Christians. I agree.