Metaphysics concepts and applications

Metaphysics and Its Relevancy to Ethics in the 21st Century

The first step toward knowing anything is always finding out. -- Louise Ropes Loomis, 1943

Throughout history, mankind has been searching for the secrets of the universe and what part we play in it. Early philosophers used metaphysical analyses to help them discern these mysteries, with varying degrees of success. Today, many people simply disregard metaphysics as being an esoteric blend of black magic and superstition, while others point to the fundamental knowledge that has emerged as a result of people delving further into the unknowns that have always characterized the human condition. In addition, even its proponents do not seem to be able to agree on a single definition for the term, but almost everyone recognizes the influence the discipline has had on contemporary thought. This paper provides an overview of metaphysics, an analysis of what some of its most well-known advocates have had to say about it, followed by an assessment of how metaphysical thought has influenced ethics today. A summary of the research is provided in the conclusion.

Review and Discussion

Background and Overview. In an effort to keep things on a level that people can understand, it seems that most authorities on metaphysics employ the word "simple" and "simply" a lot to describe what metaphysics is and how it works; for example, according to philosopher Frederick Sontag, the term "metaphysics" is "simply basic philosophy, the search for and the questioning of first principles" (p. 1). Likewise, the word "Metaphysics" in Greek "simply means 'After Physics'" (Loomis 1943). According to this author, the term Metaphysics derives from the title written by some ancient editor on certain unnamed rolls of Aristotle's own notes which he was placing next to the treatise on physics. "As it comes to us, the Metaphysics is a compilation of a number of originally separate blocks of notes, all dealing with the most fundamental problems of philosophy but put together without much care to make them fit" (p. 3). Finally, "metaphysics is simply philosophical study, the objective of which is determining the real nature of things; in other words, to determine the meaning, structure, and principles of whatever is insofar as it is" (Walsh & Grayling 2004). Beyond these simple concepts, though, exists an enormously complex and convoluted world of philosophical analysis where none but the intrepid may have ventured in the past.

While metaphysics today is popularly conceived as referring to anything excessively subtle and highly theoretical and although it has been subjected to many criticisms, it is presented by metaphysicians as being the most fundamental and most comprehensive of inquiries, so far as it is concerned with the nature of reality as a whole (Walsh & Grayling, 2004). Nevertheless, the very term is fraught with much historical and misinformation baggage that has colored the way people think about such philosophical approaches today. In fact, Walsh (1963) suggests that the very word "metaphysics" is.".. full of controversy; the emotions it excites vary in character, but are seldom anything but strong" (p. 11). This shift in views is fairly recent, and there was actually a time when metaphysics was believed to be the highest form of knowledge, the most fundamental and comprehensive of all the branches of study to which human beings could devote themselves.

According to Walsh, "Metaphysicians were said to be occupied with 'reality' as opposed to 'mere appearance', and they were supposed, as Plato put it, to take all being and all knowledge for their province" (1963, p. 36). This was clearly a lot of territory for any one discipline to cover, but for these ancient logisticians, it only made sense to begin at the beginning. "Because metaphysics was the fundamental discipline which discovered the most important of truths, its results might be expected to affect those of every other form of enquiry; the findings of all other sciences must accordingly be regarded as provisional, in need of revision or ratification by the metaphysician" (Walsh, 1963, p. 37).

According to Morris (1992), contemporary philosophical theories are concerned with explanations that conform to this schema: "(T) it is true that p, because q. That this is a distinctively philosophical kind of explanation can be seen intuitively by considering the intuitive difference between these two questions: 1. Why is she mowing the lawn? 2. Why is it true that she is mowing the lawn?" (p. 12). Morris notes that (1), but not (2), could be truthfully answered by saying: "Because she thinks the grass is too long. (2), but not (1), could be correctly, if uninformatively, answered by saying: because, as a matter of fact, she is mowing the lawn" (Morris, p. 12).

Morris says he calls explanations that conform to this precise schema "metaphysical explanations," which is "a terminological stipulation, though I think it is in tune with much current usage of the term 'metaphysical'" (p. 13). Such metaphysical reasoning may appear convoluted on the surface (and it is), but a careful analysis shows that the distinction made by Morris captures the essence of how such reasoning can be applied to a wide range of settings and circumstances in a "follow the money" type of logical assessment.

Aristotle. Metaphysics was Aristotle's study of the meaning and nature of being in the broadest sense; this contained Aristotle's ideas of the causes and character of all existence and of that one Cause that is the ultimate source and end of all (Loomis, 1943). The first step toward knowing anything, Aristotle maintained, was empirical analysis to determine why it is or what caused it. As a result,.".. we have his famous doctrine of the four causes, which between them all account for everything that is and every event that happens" (Loomis, p. 4). After showing that we can say of an object some things assuredly true, the most important and essential thing to say of it, he declares, is not how big or how old or where it is or what it is doing, but what it is -- in other words, what is its substance. "So, at length, the inquiry comes down to this -- what is substance? A combination, he now answers, of a blank, inert, limitless substratum or underlying something, which he calls matter, and a dynamic, purposeful, shaping principle or essence, he calls form" (Loomis, p. 3).

In fact, Aristotle maintained that everything in the universe that comes into any kind of being is a result of form entering into appropriate matter. "Matter alone has potentiality, a capacity, that is, of becoming something. Marble can become a statue, a human seed can become a man. But Nature or the hand of man must seize and put form into it before it can realize its possibilities or the potential become actual" (Loomis, p. 4). That actuality is then represented by the statue that was carved from the formerly featureless marble; in other words,.".. The man full grown from the feeble seed -- is the thing's end or final cause, to realize which it exists" (Loomis, p. 4).

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz's Metaphysics. According to Hassing (2003), "Conventional scholarship would emphasize 1686 as the point at which the Leibnizian philosophical system was in place, subsequent obscurities concerning forces and monads notwithstanding" (p. 721). In his essay, "Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist," Adams (1994) points out that Leibniz's doctrine of monads and his theory of the physical world may have been overlooked by contemporary theorists at times by the interest in his philosophy of logic, but "they can hardly be said to have been neglected" (p. 5). In Leibniz's famous theory of preestablished harmony, there are several levels at play. For example, the deepest level involves a harmony between the perceptions of different monads; further, there is a harmony between body and soul (this can also be viewed as a harmony between diverse causal systems -- between the kingdom of "efficient causes," a system of mechanical causation operating in the phenomenal, corporeal world, and the kingdom of "final causes," a system of teleological causation operating within the monads) (Adams, 1994).

The highest level of Leibniz's hierarchy involves a harmony between "the Physical kingdom of Nature," comprising the "two Natural Kingdoms" of efficient and final causes, "and the Moral kingdom of Grace. In other words, the highest level of the hierarchy is "between God considered as Architect of the Machine of the universe, and God considered as Monarch of the divine city of Minds" (Adams, 1994, p. 83). Leibniz believed that it was possible to discern such interactions by thoughtful analysis, but was careful to avoid rushing ordinary people into accepting this enlightened view without preparing them for the powerful revelations that it might provide them. Hassing (2003) cites the following instructive guidance from Leibniz's unpublished De Summa Rerum of 1676:

metaphysics should be written with accurate definitions and demonstrations, but nothing should be demonstrated in it apart from that which does not clash too much with received opinions. For in that way this metaphysics can be accepted; and once it has been approved then, if people examine it more deeply later, they themselves will draw the necessary consequences. Besides this, one can, as a separate undertaking, show these people later the way of reasoning about these things. In this metaphysics, it will be useful for there to be added here and there the authoritative utterances of great men, who have reasoned in a similar way; especially when these utterances contain something that seems to have some possible relevance to the illustration of a view. (13)

By contrast, Mercer uses Leibniz's Rhetoric of Attraction to explain the discrepancies between different descriptions of his intellectual evolution and philosophical system, statements that ultimately served to "lead wayward souls to the philosophical truth" (2001, p. 37). Consequently, Mercer regards Leibniz as a "conciliatory eclectic par excellence," who was one of a group of teachers and scholars with whom he worked early in his intellectual career, from 1661-68.

Hassing notes that Jakob Thomasius was Leibnez's primary inspiration; however, Johann Adam Scherzer, Johann Christoph Sturm, and Erhard Weigel at Leipzig and Jena were influential as well. In fact, in Leibniz, the term "system" assumes a new connotation: "One can rightly speak of the Cartesian system in the sense of a whole whose parts are interdependent for their intelligibility, or of Aristotle's system, although in a looser sense, owing to the heterogeneity of the Aristotelian sciences" (Hassing, 2003, p. 721). Hassing suggests that in Leibniz, though, "system" actually means bringing together opposing accounts that had previously irreconcilable. "Consider Leibniz's extraordinary (attempted) reconciliations and harmonizations: Plato and Aristotle, Aristotle and the mechanists, Catholic and Protestant, Christianity and freethinking, East and West, the goodness of God and the evil of the world" (2003, p. 722).

Immanuel Kant. Rather than depending on a spiritual divinity as the source of morality, Immanuel Kant relied on a "categorical imperative" that was an absolute framework that brooked no qualifications whatsoever. Kant's view was that an individual should not act because of the motives specified by the theologians; rather, people must obey moral rules just because it is the right thing to do, and only then can people be said to be truly morally right. In his analysis of Kant and the exact sciences, Michael Friedman (1992) suggests that "much of Kant's philosophical development can be understood... As a continuous attempt to construct... A genuine metaphysical foundation for Newtonian natural philosophy" (p. 4). De Jong (1995) reports that Immanuel Kant began his philosophical career as an advocate of what was previously known as "Leibnizian-Wolffian metaphysics"; however, Kant became increasingly less convinced of the possibility of reconciling this metaphysics with the exact sciences of his day. Kant also believed that the metaphysical methodology should follow that of Isaac Newton (whom he also greatly admired): "The true method of metaphysics is basically the same as that introduced by Newton into natural science and which has been of such benefit to it" (in De Jong, p. 40).

In Kant's Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Present Itself as a Science, he says, "My purpose is to convince all those who find it worth their while to occupy themselves with metaphysics: that it is absolutely necessary to suspend their work for the present, to regard everything that has happened hitherto as not having happened, and before all else first to raise the question: 'whether such a thing as metaphysics is possible at all'" (Kant, 1953, p. 3). On the one hand, Kant wondered, "If it is a science, how does it come about that it cannot establish itself, like other sciences, in universal and lasting esteem?"; on the other hand, "If it is not, how does it happen that under the semblance of a science it ceaselessly gives itself airs and keeps the human understanding in suspense with hopes that never fade and are never fulfilled?" (Kant, p. 4). To help solve this philosophical quagmire, Kant proposed an ethical system based on a belief that the reason is the final authority for morality.

According to Kant, moral truths are not received from divine sources or inspiration; instead, such moral truths are based on reasons that make sense to all people (in fact, all rational beings) who spend the time necessary to think about them in the first place. Kant says that his work, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, was "intended for nothing more than seeking out and establishing the supreme principle of morality." In this regard, Kant states in part that reason.".. we find that the more a cultivated reason applies itself with deliberate purpose to the enjoyment of life and happiness, so much the more does the man fail of true satisfaction.... And they end by envying, rather than despising, the more common stamp of men who keep closer to the guidance of mere instinct and do not allow their reason much influence on their conduct," a concept that brings the discussion to Kant's first proposition, "Duty."

The First Proposition - Duty. Kant uses reason to examine reason to determine what duties are required to ensure behaviors are moral. According to Kant, "For as reason is not competent to guide the will with certainty in regard to its objects and the satisfaction of all our wants, this being an end to which an implanted instinct would have led with much greater certainty; and since, nevertheless, reason is imparted to us as a practical faculty,... its true destination must be to produce a will, not merely good as a means to something else, but good in itself, for which reason was absolutely necessary." Further, Kant suggests that the concept of duty must be differentiated from inclinations because the motivation for the behaviors may affect the morality of the behavior; Kant says that duties include that of having a "good will"; however, this also suggests that there are certain "subjective restrictions and hindrances." Other duties include maintaining one's own life, being beneficent whenever possible, and to secure one's own happiness.

Duty and Moral Worth. Kant's second proposition is:

That an action done from duty derives its moral worth, not from the purpose which is to be attained by it, but from the maxim by which it is determined, and therefore does not depend on the realization of the object of the action, but merely on the principle of volition by which the action has taken place, without regard to any object of desire."

Third Proposition -- Duty and the Respect for the Law. Kant maintained that actions of any sort must be undertaken from a sense of duty dictated by reason, and no action performed for expediency or solely in obedience to law or custom can be regarded as somehow being "moral." Kant says his third proposition is a consequence of the first two: "I would express thus Duty is the necessity of acting from respect for the law.... But I cannot have respect for it, just for this reason, that it is an effect and not an energy of will."

The Categorical Imperative. Kant's "categorical imperative" is an absolute framework that allows no qualifications whatsoever. According to Kant, humanity does not actually require science and philosophy to know what should be done in order to be honest and good:.".. Yea, even wise and virtuous. Indeed we might well have conjectured beforehand that the knowledge of what every man is bound to do, and therefore also to know, would be within the reach of every man, even the commonest."

In this regard, Kant succeeds in providing an exhaustive assessment of what roles reason and duty play in developing moral concepts in mankind:

Whether we demonstrate our knowledge or our ignorance, something certain must at last be settled about the nature of this would-be science; for things cannot possibly go on any longer on their present footing. It seems almost ridiculous, while every other science makes ceaseless progress, to be constantly turning round on the same spot without moving a step forward in the one that claims to be wisdom itself and whose oracle everyone consults. Also it has lost a great many of its supporters, and we do not see those who feel themselves strong enough to shine in other sciences wanting to risk their reputation in this one, in which everyone who is ignorant in all other things arrogates to himself a decisive judgment; for there is in fact no sure weight and measure as yet in this territory with which to distinguish soundness from shallow chatter. (Kant, 2003 ed., p. 4).

Kant maintains that actions are moral if and only if they are undertaken for the sake of morality in and of itself, in other words, people are not moral if they bring an ulterior motive to the rationalization process. As a result, the moral quality of an action must be measured not according to the action's consequences, but according to the motive that produced it in the first place. Kant also believed that actions are only moral if they are undertaken out of respect for the moral law (as opposed to some other type of motivation such as an individual need or desire) (De Jong, 1995). Kant believed that ideas are special concepts which arise out of human knowledge of the empirical world, but somehow appear to point beyond nature to some transcendent realm. According to Kant, the three most important metaphysical ideas are God, freedom and immortality. In Kant's view, a priori was a method whereby knowledge could be gained without appealing to any particular experience or experiences. This method is used to establish transcendental and logical truths. However, most of the proponents of virtue ethics in recent years have found little to admire in Kantian ethics, which they depict as being rigidly rule-governed, unable to take account of differences between persons and cases, based on unconvincing accounts of self, freedom, and action, burdened with an excessive individualism, fixated on rights, and specifically unable to provide an adequate account of the virtues (Crisp, 1998, p. 77). At any rate, Kant sought to demonstrate that it is possible to have a universal morality without the intervention or direction of a divine source; however, in reality, absolute moral standards, as extensions of natural law, are also influenced by those aspects of life that are unpredictable and just part of the human condition. If everyone in a Utopia where the practice of the Golden Rule was universal, and where there was no poverty, no crime, and no hunger or want, such absolute moral standards could be viewed as right and appropriate; however, "Utopia" means "No-place" and this is the reality that Kant was up against, and ultimately failed to overcome.

Rene Descartes. In his preface, Descartes warns the reader: "I would not urge anyone to read this book except those who are able and willing to meditate seriously with me, and to withdraw their minds from the senses and from all preconceived opinions" (p. 8). This is not a casual warning because what Descartes describes in his Meditations on First Philosophy concern fundamentally difficult questions about humankind's relationship with a Creator and about people themselves.

Stroll and Popkin (1979) report that Rene Descartes lived during a turbulent period in world history, when much of what people believed was true was being increasingly challenged. "Both France, where Descartes was born, and the Netherlands, where he lived most of his adult life, were in the grip of religious struggles between the Catholics and the Protestants over the question of what was true in religion, and what means ought to be employed to discover religious truths" (Stroll & Popkin, p. 41). According to Descartes's perspective, then, "If there is a possibility, no matter how remote, that a belief is either false or doubtful, then it should be rejected. Unless one is willing to test one's beliefs in this severe fashion, one can never be certain" (Stroll & Popkin, p. 43). Descartes maintained that people should examine whether beliefs which are based on sense information can be false or doubtful, whether beliefs based on reasonings can possibly be false or doubtful, and so forth. "If the general type of belief can possibly be rejected, then all the individual beliefs of the same category are to be considered as open to question. The Cartesian "Method of Doubt" is first applied to one of the major sources of our information: the senses" (Stroll & Popkin, p. 43).

Descartes provides some advice for those who may still be confused about how to proceed in any given circumstance: "In the case of any given object, there may be many things about it that we desire but very few things of which we have knowledge. And when we make a bad judgment, it is not that we exercise our will in a bad fashion, but that the object of our will happens to be bad" (p. 92). In other words, whenever the problem of inaccurate judgment presents itself, it is because people tend to assume that their understanding about the issues is better than it actually is, rather than because they understand the problem in a poor fashion. Ideas or concepts which humans acquire or possess prior to experience can be called a priori (literally, 'from beforehand'). Sometimes, however, it is claimed that they are innate; that is, we have them from birth. Therefore, an innate idea is one which is allegedly inborn in the human mind, as contrasted with those received or compiled from experience. This appears to be the stronger claim, since humans could well (on a weaker view) acquire an idea independently of actually experiencing that idea, but not independently of having built up a series of other ideas based on experience.

While virtually everyone can agree on certain parts of this type of debate, it is probably because no other satisfactory answer exists. For example, there is agreement that an innate idea is one which is allegedly inborn in the human mind, as contrasted with those received or compiled from experience. From Copleston's (1960) perspective, Descartes addressed the issue of discovering the "first principles or first causes of everything which is or which can be in the world" through a process which does not involve "deriving them from any other source than certain germs of truth which exist naturally to our souls" (p. 37). Innate ideas were believed to exist in the mind before birth or direct sensory experience (i.e., a priori ideas), and served as the foundation for all further understanding about the universe. Copleston points to Descartes' assessment that.".. we shall without difficult set aside all prejudices of the senses and in this respect rely upon our understanding alone by reflecting carefully on the ideas implanted therein by nature" (p. 38).