Metaphysics the Problem of Freedom

Metaphysics

The problem of freedom and determinism, or the problem of free will refers to a logical conundrum: if "all events are caused" then "how can any human actions…be free?" (p. 395). Determinism does not presuppose the existence of a God or some personal force that arbitrarily creates a fate. Rather, determinism implies that human beings might not be aware of the antecedent causes of future events. Possible futures are caused by definite pasts. Free will cannot change the past, but free will can arguably change the future.

However, the problem of free will can be extended even to the realm of thought. Determinism may suggest that human beings are pre-programmed to make certain decisions: programmed by "antecedent factors over which we have no control," (p. 395). Thus, determinism applies not just to external causes but also to internal ones. Human nature or personality can be considered part of a deterministic worldview. The problem of free will therefore poses serious problems related to moral responsibility. Determinism can be interpreted to mean that people are not responsible for their actions. If people are not responsible for their actions because they have no control over their ability to make decisions, then determinism calls into question issues of personal accountability and even justice. If people are responsible for their actions and have full free will, then the law of causality is itself called into question.

2. Hard determinism assumes that "every event has a cause and that this fact is incompatible with free will," (p. 401). Free will is posited to be an illusion, one that "we maintain out of our desire to punish and blame others for wrong doing and to congratulate ourselves for doing the right thing," (p. 401). Genetics and environmental factors determine human actions and behaviors, according to hard determinism. Human beings do make choices in the course of their lives, but those choices are constrained by hereditary and environmental factors. If free will is an illusion, then a "science of behavior" is necessary to "show us how to manipulate the causes of human behavior," (p. 401). A science of human behavior would be based on observations of how people act under certain conditions, or on how their ancestors acted. Changing destructive behaviors would require discovering the cause of those behaviors: either in a person's genetic code or in a person's environment. The intervention would target those factors, rather than encouraging the person to use willpower.