Metaphysics versus psychology: philosophical distinctions and debates

METAPHYSICS vs. PSYCHOLOGY

Metaphysics and Psychology have historically been at odds with one another in what is an unnatural although real separation from a somewhat new science and its mother science. Although many believe that psychology and metaphysics are actually joined together the view of many in these two areas of study are adamant that the two are opposed to one another. Indeed it is just this debate which will be examined during the course of this study reported herein.

Metaphysics is the mother science of psychology and was first established as such in ancient times by such as Aristotle, Plato and others. Metaphysics is of the nature that conducts an examination of reality and the relationship that exists between the physical world and other realms including those of mind and matter. This work in writing will examine the various views of both metaphysics and psychology and the compatible factors that exist between these two as well as that which is not compatible.

This work examines the definition of both Metaphysics and Psychology and the similarities and differences that exist between the two. It is important to examine the differences between metaphysics and psychology in order to understand how each of these two sciences are constructed and why these two sciences are held by many to be in opposition to one another although the opposition of the two is in reality unnatural.

In addition, this work will examine the divisions within the realm of psychology the derivations of each of these divisions and their use in scientific explanation. As it will be shown in this work the divisions of psychology are derived from Greek and specifically the division known as ontology which addresses the philosophical view of the spirit or the individual's being and their existence or that which inherently comprises the individual which is unable to be seen or touched but which is evidently present and which exists.

The important questions addressed by the ontologist are those related to questions concerning the origin of the being of the individual as well as of the universe and all life within the universe. Another branch of psychology which will be examined is that of Cosmology which is related to questions concerning the very nature of nature itself and which is also derived from the Greek language relating to the order that exists inherently in the world and the universe. This aspect of psychology addresses the relationship that exists between the plants the earth and the stars.

Indeed, Cosmology addresses the universal laws including those of gravity and other such topics inclusive of power and motion, time, space, disintegration and preservation. (the Methodist Review, 1895) Philosophies serve a very special place in the lives of mankind and just as well psychology is also held in high regard and yet neither of these can be held as faultless in their explanations of how the universe should be correctly and optimally arranged, ordered, or even explained. This is because within each of these areas of science that so much is yet unlearned and therefore little understood by human researchers and scientists.

The three divisions of psychology which will be indentified and reviewed in this study can be described as much like the snake that consumes its own tail and round in a circle travel the study of phenomena, logic, and ontology in the attempt to explain that which is yet unexplainable and which knowledge remains elusive in the area of scientific study and understanding based upon the present measures and instruments of measure known to contemporary mankind and indeed from all appearances this has always been the case in the attempt to understand precisely where metaphysics and psychology both the twain small meet in sciences grasp for knowledge.

This study intends to show that a great degree of separation between psychology and metaphysics results in failure to commit to theoretical consistency due to the inconsistencies that are contained in the study of psychology. The assumptions of psychology will also be examined in this study including the assumption that things are and minds are and that within limitations by the supposed nature of both of these then necessarily act in a causal manner affecting each other. The warning was sounded from the entity known as mainstream science which included Newton against metaphysics or the 'old psychology'. (Ladd, 2007)

II. Objective of the Study

The objective of the research in this work is to examine metaphysics vs. psychology from the metaphysical viewpoint. Rather than attempting to examine metaphysics from the view of psychology this study intends to examine the two sciences or compare them and specifically viewing them in opposition from the metaphysical point-of-view.

III. Purpose of the Study

As just previously stated, the purpose of this study is to examine psychology vs. metaphysics from the metaphysical viewpoint. This view is rarely taken in research as it is traditionally accepted that psychology is somehow superior to metaphysics and that metaphysics lacks the power to properly classify and explain the aspects of logical, phenomenal, and ontological views held by psychology in explaining human being and existence for scientific purposes.

IV. Significance of the Study

The significance of this study is the information and knowledge that will be added to the already existing knowledge base in this area of study. It is held by the writer of this work that the specific method of research specific to the metaphysics view of the opposition that exists between metaphysics itself and psychology in terms of scientific research and understanding.

V. Research Questions

The research questions in this study include the questions as follows:

(1) How does metaphysics view psychology?

(2) What are the inherent differences between metaphysics and psychology?

(3) Is it possible to combine Metaphysics and Psychology into one area of inquiry?

VI. Definitions of Terms

1. Metaphysics -- Includes the following definitions: .Philosophy: (1) the branch of philosophy that examines the nature of reality, including the relationship between mind and matter, substance and attribute, fact and value; (2) the theoretical or first principles of a particular discipline: the metaphysics of law; (3) a priori speculation upon questions held as unanswerable to scientific observation, analysis or experiment; and (4) Excessively subtle or recondite reasoning.

2. Psychology - Psychology is defined as a "systematic study of the many ways that human beings are factually involved with each other and their worlds" (James, 1895, p.1)

VII. Methodology

The methodology of this study is one of a qualitative nature and one that entails an extensive review of literature in this area of study including material located in books, journals and other professional and academic peer-reviewed publications.

VIII. Organization of the Remainder of the Study

This chapter or Chapter One of this study has introduced the study and what the objectives and purpose of this study are as well as the research questions to be addressed. As well, this chapter has reviewed the significance of this study and its findings as well as the methodology that will be utilized in the research study.

Chapter Two will be comprised of an extensive review of literature in this area of study while Chapter Three will detail the methodology and specific research design in this study. Chapter four will present the study findings and results while Chapter five will discuss the study and Chapter Six will be comprised of the study Summary and Conclusions.

METAPHYSICS vs. PSYCHOLOGY

Chapter Two -- Literature Review

I. Literature Review

The work entitled: "Psychology vs. Metaphysics" published in the Methodist Review states that there has been "an estrangement" between metaphysics and psychology "under the name of the new psychology" carries "an obtrusive and saucy independence toward the mother science. This is unbecoming and unnatural for a real separation is impossible." (Methodist Review, 1895, p.223) the realm of psychology and metaphysics are opposed to one another rather than joined however, it is stated that in "such a construction the two sciences would be arrayed in unnatural war, like a child entering suit to overthrow its mother." (Methodist Review, 1895, p.223) There are stated to be within the realm of psychology at least when applied in the broader sense, three departments including:

(1) Phenomena of mind or scientific psychology;

(2) Laws of mind, called nomology, which belongs to the province of logic; and (3) ontology, or being, inferential and general, in which lies the philosophy of spirit. (Methodist Review, 1895, p.223)

The work ontology is derived from the Greek word 'ontolos' stated to be a participle of the Greek verb 'eimi' meaning 'being' or 'existence' and dealing with the nature of ones' being or existence. (MCSM Study Center, nd, paraphrased) According to some philosophers "we do not know our actual being, but we simply see or perceive its appearance." (Ibid) the source of being is stated to be a "subject for philosophical ontology. The origin or our being, the universe and the life in it are all important questions to the ontologist." (Ibid)

Cosmology is stated to be the component of metaphysics that "deals with the nature of nature." (Ibid) the term cosmology is derived from the Greek word 'kosmos' meaning order and refers to the world and the universe. (Ibid, paraphrased) the cosmologic philosopher is stated to be on who "contemplates the nature of this order and is concerned with the relationships between the plants, the stars and the earth. The laws of the universe are important topics to cosmologic philosophers. They consider the laws of thermodynamics, the laws of gravity, etc. They are also concerned with time and space, with power and motion, disintegration, and preservation." (Ibid)

The third component of metaphysics or that of psychology is a word derived from the Greek language which is stated to refer to "the nature of the psyche or soul." (Ibid) There is a great debate among philosophers about how to define the word soul as some believe that soul and spirit can be used interchangeably and others believe the soul is part of the mind or nervous system or even part of the body's physical chemistry. (Ibid, paraphrased)

It is stated that the contrast of metaphysics vs. psychology lies between the first and third stated above or between the phenomena of mind and scientific psychology and ontology or the philosophy of mind. According to this work in the Methodist Review (1895) the two "are really inseparable. As there can be no physics without metaphysics, nor metaphysics without physics preceding so there can be no physics without metaphysics, not yet any metaphysics without psychics or soul-facts." (p.224) it is reported that just as in physics "…facts precede their philosophy, as in psychology, or should science, fact go before their explanation and arrangement." (p. 224)

However, it is stated that in turn "the facts of physics are largely discovered by the aid of the theories of metaphysics." (p.224) Philosophies are that which serve to organize the expectations of man and direct them "not the realm where the facts are to be found." (p.224) the same is true in psychology in that "no new fact is seized upon in the laboratory but by the foresight and for coordination of the philosophy of psychology already in the field." (p.224)

The article goes on to relate that the three departments of psychology -- phenomenal, logical and ontological -- form one endless fugue, each in turn pursuing the other. It is an eternal round of search after new or old facts to furnish logic, to fill up metaphysics, then of search after more facts, to furnish more logic to fill metaphysics, and so ad infinitum." (Methodist Review, 1895, p.224) it is stated in the Methodist Review Article that in psychology whether one is a materialist, spiritualist, idealist, or realist" the conclusion that one reaches and that which those conclusions are defended with are metaphysical measures, "as such originate in the ontological and inferential department, which is metaphysics par excellence." (Methodist Review, 1895, p.224)

According to the Methodist Review article "metaphysics dominates logic and logic dominates psychology, and psychology dominates metaphysics." (Methodist Review, 1895, p.225) This interdependence results in confusion arising very easily and according to the Methodist Review article "A phenomenon is brought to light." (1895, p.225) Since metaphysics has had charge of psychology for quite some while it is stated to have become somewhat of what is generally conceived as a "traditional stepmother" and due to this psychology "has suffered many things." (p.225)

The article in the Methodist Review (1895) states that Professor James produced treatises on scientific psychology that were both "brilliant and interesting" and that James ended his two volumes with a confession of failure and states "We have no sense of psychology -- only a mass of facts, which await, as did astronomy, some Galileo to come and reduce them to a science." (Methodist Review, 1895, p. 225) in the attempt of James to avoid metaphysics what has occurred is that James has in actuality "indulged in some sorry specimens of the same and has broken down according to his own confession. Like all the wicked he passed on and was punished." (Methodist Review, 1895, p.225)

Georger Trumbull Ladd writes in the work entitled: "Philosophy of Mind an Essay in the Metaphysics of Psychology" that at the time of his writing it had been more than 100 years since "the philosopher Kant expressed himself in despair over the possibility of psychology ever securing title to a place among the exact sciences." (p. 1) Kant's perception of what he viewed as an "inherent lack of power" possessed by psychology to combat the historical lack of certainty of metaphysics and to adorn the mantle of mathematics. According to Ladd (2007) the philosophers who most loudly speak out against a combination of integration of metaphysics and psychology are those the most guilty of them all in doing just that or combining metaphysics with scientific psychology and stated is that the practice of such philosophers "suggests not unkindly sarcasm that the metaphysics hypotheses and tenets which they think it indispensable to exclude from the science of mental phenomena are solely those of their opponents." (p.2)

Ladd speaks of the practice of 'pure science' and comparing science and metaphysics to the offerings of a garden state that the seed of "the purity of the empirical science is diligently sown before out delighted eyes, as its comes fresh from numerous physiological and psycho-physical laboratories, or from the brains, fertile in conjecture, of the author himself. Yet somehow, when the total crop is ready for the harvest, not a few sprouts of metaphysics are still found to have crept into it." (Ladd, 2007, p.2) Ladd states that the psychologists who are the most adamant of the potential for ridding scientific psychology from all influences of metaphysics are those who have provided the "least intelligent and calm discussion of the real and permanent relations between the two. Their practice, therefore, too often seems dependent on a lack of consistent theory." (Ladd, 2007, p. 8)

According to Ladd there are various forms of these type inconsistencies which are linked with various forms of "concealed or repressed philosophical opinion." (p. 9) Ladd states that some writers posit the superiority of "empirical psychology without metaphysics or psychology without a soul." (p.9) However required for the "effective working of their psychological theories at least so much metaphysics as it consists in the assumption of an entity called the brain, on whose activity or influence they can lay the responsibility for mental phenomena." (Ladd, 2007, p.9)

The view of these psychologists concerning causation is one that is of a serious nature ontologically 'so long as they are dealing with states of consciousness in systematic dependent upon predefined states of physical or chemical sort." (Ladd, 2007, p.9) However, Ladd states that when these individuals are "faced about by the acknowledged sequences of other phenomena, and are compelled to consider whether states of consciousness can, as is ordinarily supposed, be real causes of subsequent physical and chemical changes, then their entire theory of causation is deftly adapted to the claims of the shallowest phenomenalism." (Ladd, 2007, p.9)

Psychology is stated by Ladd to "assume that things are and minds are and that within certain limits determined by the so-called nature of both, they act causally upon each other. Those happenings which are ascribed to things, and those which are ascribed to minds, are never regarded by science without metaphysics as mere phenomena; or rather the very word phenomena necessarily suggests and implies beings of which and to which the phenomena are." (p.6) the study of psychology, according to Ladd (2007) as a natural science "is not really…the pursuit of a knowledge of correlations between the phenomena wholly 'within any metaphysics whatever' it is rather the pursuit of this science with only such metaphysics as is naively assumed in all scientific inquiry." (Ladd, 2007, p.6)

Newton warned against all metaphysics and this has resulted in those in the present day during physical investigation to carefully regard the warning of Newton considered to be a "great master." (Ladd, 2007, p. 7) Metaphysics is referred to as the "old psychology." (Ladd, 2007, p.7) the 'new' psychology is held to be that which demonstrates scientific methods without the use of metaphysics. In truth however, Ladd states that modern science has filed to demonstrate itself independent from of "systematically stripped of metaphysics." (Ladd, 2007, p. 8)

Ladd states that rather than being "mere formulas for stating uniform sequences among phenomena, they are descriptions and explanations of experiences which appeal at every step to the invisible and mysterious entities, to hidden and abstruse forces, to transactions that are assumed to take place among beings whose existence and modes of behavior can never become, in any sense of the words, immediate data of sensuous knowledge." (Ladd, 2007, p.8)

It is interesting to note the statement of Ladd (2007) that there is a place of high honor that will be realized following unknown suffering and affliction due to being castigated to the "…philosophical biologist, or that philosopher sufficiently acquainted with scientific biology, who subjects the modern doctrine of evolution to a thoroughly critical analysis, with a view to detect and to estimate its metaphysical assumptions." (p.9) Ladd states that when this individual appears and if the critique takes the destructive view, then it will be "interesting to know how much will remain of the so-called 'science' of evolution; but if the criticism be favorable and conservative in result, it is safe to say that this result will be attributable to the fact of the 'scientist' having builded better as metaphysicians than they knew as mere 'scientists'." (Ladd, 2007, p.9)

Ladd states as an example of metaphysical assumptions that the assumption of 'luminiferous ether' which is a hypothetical entity and of which there is no immediate or certain knowledge because it cannot be seen, it cannot be tasted, and it cannot be smelled or even touched however, "if one is permitted to assume such an entity, and such transactions in this entity, then one can the better account for existences and transactions of which one has indubitable knowledge. The assumed entity is assumed as an entity; and such an assumption cannot be made 'without metaphysics." (Ladd, 2007, p.9)

The work entitled: "Metaphysics, Phenomenology and Psychology in Thomas Reid's Philosophy of Mind" a publication of Clark University

reports that 'acquired perception' is a key term in the philosophy of mind of Thomas Reid. The term perception means increased inferential abilities based on expanded conceptual repertoires are what we really acquire. A different picture treats acquire perception as a distinctively perceptual ability: along with an expanded conceptual repertoire, normal perceivers acquire more perceptual sensitivity to properties not represented in original perception…" (Clark University, nd) Reid holds that all perceptions both original and acquired are comprised by two components:

(1) a conception; and (2) a belief. (Clark University, nd)

The provision of the conception is a non-conceptual presentation of an object "the belief predicates features of the object conceived by way of concept-application." (Clark University, nd) the belief component in perception is held by Reid to be part of the perception itself instead of just a belief of the perception or 'perceptual belief' or even a belief 'simpliciter' as both of these are distinctly separate from perceptual experience. Acquired perceptions if they are perceptions that are genuine from the view of Reid are therefore portions of the content of the actual experience instead of inferential beliefs or non-inferential experience-based beliefs. The distinction made by Reid between acquired perception and original perception is not just metaphysical but instead is a portion of the human perception account developmentally viewed. Reid's project is described as naturalist and post-Newtonian and to be characterized by "psychological and phenomenological stories" to relate. (Clark University, nd)

Original perceptions are psychologically "productive preconditions for acquired perceptions" which makes the provision of the traction necessary for acquisition of perceptual experiences that are ever more sensitive to a variety of features in our environment. Phenomenologically, the distinction captures differences among stages of development and between normal and anomalous experiences." (Clark University, nd) the phenomenology of Reid is stated to resist "the temptation to regard what is given in original perception as the given that is always really present in -- indeed exhaustive of, and somehow behind -- perceptual experience." (Clark University, nd)

The work entitled: "The History of Psychology" states that while psychical phenomena are of all data the most accessible, "the history of psychology bears witness to the extreme difficulty of gaining the proper point-of-view for the study of the phenomena in question. Psychology indeed appears surprisingly early as one among the other sciences, but for centuries psychology does little more than reflect the presuppositions and conclusions of philosophy." (Wilm and Pinter, 1914, p.3) When the points-of-view of a metaphysical world view are transferred to the realm of conscious phenomena, the latter appear as manifestations or modes of activity of a soul, an entity usually thought of as substantial." (Wilm and Pinter, 1914, p.3)

The work of Eugene DeRobertis entitled: "Metaphysics and Psychology: A Problem of the Personal" reports a reexamination of the relationship between metaphysics in psychology and proposes that psychology's rejection of metaphysics is "due to a conception of metaphysics in more traditional terms, despite the fact that much of psychology is influenced by this traditional metaphysics." (p.1) DeRobertis posits that May (1958) related that psychology realized freedom from metaphysics "toward the latter half of the nineteenth century." (p. 1) Psychology is defined as a "systematic study of the many ways that human beings are factually involved with each other and their worlds" (DeRobertis, 1958, p.1)

John Locke and his empiricist view as well as his claim that knowledge resulted from the interaction of material substances in a process that is now referred to as sensation" greatly influenced psychology and its freedom from ties of a metaphysical nature. From the view of Locke "epistemology took precedence over metaphysics." (DeRobertis, 1958, p. 1) DeRobertis goes on to relate that the "eventual [and so called] liberation" of psychology from metaphysics was given further impetus as positivism flourished in Western culture." (p.102)

DeRobertis states that August Comte in his work "Cours de Philosophie Positive (1830-1842) proposed a philosophy that would be "a thoroughly 'positive' or experimental science. Comte's empiristic system did not include a place for metaphysical though beyond the purely natural scientific psychology began to guide the study of human behavior and mental processes." (DeRobertis, 1958, p.102) DeRobertis states that Strasser (1977) stated that the metaphysic which lies hidden in the various psychological and psychopathological 'systems' is for the most part already present in the categories and concepts which are selected for describing the normal or pathological movements of the heart. Thus one who is not trained philosophically is unaware that, by taking over certain supposedly technical and descriptive concepts and methods, he has already adopted a determinate path which may lead him into a hedonistic, naturalistic, idealistic or mechanistic anthropology." (DeRobertis, 1959, p.103)

Behaviorism when it is derived from realism and empiricism left person and world as two separate entities. Moreover, it failed to account for the authentically personal in humans via a reductionism that posited the mental dimension as unobservable. Behaviorism did not deny the operation of mental events, but their status was clearly epiphenomenal." (DeRobertis, 1959, p.103) Rather than overcoming dualism, behaviorism holds "outwardly observable behavior to be the monistic unifying principle of human existence and any notion of mind or self is a useless step in the connection between stimuli and response." (DeRobertis, 1959, p.103)

Franz Brentano (1874) wrote in the work entitled: "Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint: The Concept and Purpose of Psychology" that there are certain phenomena "which once seemed familiar and obvious and appeared to provide an explanation for things which had been obscure." (Brentano, 1874) These phenomena subsequently are stated to have began to seem "quite mysterious themselves and to arouse astonishment and curiously." (Brentano, 1874) These phenomena were thoroughly examined by the great thinkers of ancient times however there has been little in the way of "agreement or clarity" in this debate even until the present day. (Brentano, 1874, paraphrased)

Brentano writes that there is no branch of science "that has borne less fruit for our knowledge of nature and life, and yet there is none which holds greater promise of satisfying our most essential needs." Indeed, there is stated to be no area of knowledge that so many individuals look at with any greater contempt "with the single exception of metaphysics…" (Brentano, 1874) Then as well there are those who hold that the other sciences "are, in fact, only the foundation; psychology is, as it were, the crowning pinnacle. All the other sciences are a preparation for psychology; it is dependent on all of them." (Brentano, 1874)

Psychology means "science of the soul" (Brentano, 1874) the first with making a classification of science was Aristotle who also expounded upon the separate branches. Soul was described by Aristotle in the work 'Peri Psychis' that soul was the nature, "the form, the first activity, the actuality of a living being." (Brentano, 1874) a living being was one that grew, reproduced, nourished itself, is possessed with the ability to feel sensation and thought. While Aristotle did not attribute plant life with consciousness he still considered the vegetative realm as "living and endowed with souls." (Brentano, 1874)

Psychology first addressed beings endowed with sensitive or vegetative intellectual abilities however, the field of psychology was narrowed a great deal as vegetative activities are no longer within the realm of psychological study and discussion. It is the view of Brentano that there was no arbitrariness in narrowing psychology's domain but instead was an "obvious correction necessitated by the nature of the subject matter itself. In fact, only when the unification of related fields and the separation of unrelated fields is achieved can the boundaries between the sciences be correctly drawn and their classification contribute to the progress of knowledge." (Brentano, 1874)

Metaphysics is held to be the highest of all realms of thought for man since man belongs to the metaphysics realm then metaphysics can be viewed through the individual's understanding of his or her own life. Metaphysics is related to creation and its components of constructive and destructive events, evolution's purpose and meaning and the way that evolution functions. The creation of values and meanings by the human results in metaphysical discourse. Within the realm of orthodox science it is impossible to divorce metaphysical concepts from science. These include such as electricity, gravitation, magnetism, and other laws of causation which are metaphysical concepts in that it will never be possible to directly verify the existence of these forces except in an indirect manner and based upon the effects of these forces. Likewise the beginning point of traditional philosophy is that of metaphysics and ethics. The components of philosophy include those as follows:

(1) empiricism;

(2) Psychology and Epistemology;

(3) Metaphysics;

(4) conceptual analysis;

(5) ethics;

(6) aesthetics;

(7) science; and (8) politics. (Heath, 2003)

Penn and Clark (1999) state that metaphysics is that branch of inquiry which concerns itself with the unseen objective reality, and with fundamental ontological questions -- such as the nature of the human person -- and the implications of our answers to such questions for clinical research, and/or practice. " Aristotle stated agreement that an investigation into such as the organs "is not the province of one who studies the soul, but of one who studies the body." The filed of psychology is stated of Heath (2003) to have "became circumscribed" and simultaneously the "concept of life was also narrowed…" (Heath, 2003) Heath states that in modern terminology the word 'soul' speaks in reference to the substantial bearer of presentations and other activities which are based upon presentations and which, like presentations, are only perceivable through inner perception." (2003) Psychology was defined by Aristotle as the:

"…science of the soul. So it appears that just as the natural sciences study the properties and laws of physical bodies, which are the objects of our external perception, psychology is the science which studies the properties and laws of the soul, which we discover within ourselves directly by means of inner perception, and which we infer, by analogy, to exist in others. Thus delimited, psychology and the natural sciences appear to divide the entire field of the empirical sciences between them, and to be distinguished from one another by a clearly defined boundary. " (Heath, 2003)

The first claim is stated by Heath (2003) to be untrue and further stated is that facts exist which can be likewise demonstrated the same manner in the "domain of inner perception or external perception. " the reason is stated to be due to the broader range since these principles are more comprehensive and are not exclusively owned by the natural sciences of by psychology and in fact are such as is applicable to each of the sciences and are numerous in nature and important enough "for there to be a special field of study devoted to them. It is this field of study which, under the name metaphysics, we must distinguish from both the natural sciences and psychology." (Heath, 2003) However, the distinction between these branches of knowledge is unclear and when two sciences collide there exists "borderline cases between the natural and mental sciences stated by Heath (2003) to be inevitable." (Heath, 2003)

Heath states that the investigation of the psychologist and the physiologist are "intimately correlated, despite their great differences in character." (Heath, 2003) in fact, physical and mental properties are in reality one and the same as physical states may be aroused by other than physical states and as well there are mental consequences that arise from physical states and alternatively physical consequences occur due to mental states. (Heath, 2003, paraphrased) a separate science has been designated by some thinkers to deal with such questions. For instance, Fechner termed this branch of science as 'psychophysics' which has been termed by others to be 'physiological psychology'. (Heath, 2003, paraphrased)

Fechner's purpose was the elimination of "all boundary disputes between psychology and physiology. Heath (2003) states that while it is "…obviously the task of the psychologist to ascertain the basic elements of mental phenomena? Yet the psychophysicist must study them too, because sensations are aroused by physical stimuli. Is it not the task of the physiologist to trace voluntary as well as reflex actions back to the origins through an uninterrupted causal chain? Yet the psychophysicist, too, will have to investigate the first physical effects of mental causes."

For this reason the natural treading of physiology upon psychology and psychology upon physiology is stated to inevitable and "no greater than those which we observe, for example between physics and chemistry." (Heath, 2003) the distinctions that are drawn between sciences is stated by Heath (2003) to be of an artificial nature. Heath relates that once a solution has been found to this difficulty then the problem is thereby solved as it will:

…definitely be the task of the psychologist to ascertain the first mental phenomena which are aroused by a physical stimulus, even if he cannot dispense with looking at physiological facts in so doing. By the same token, in the case of voluntary movements of the body, the psychologist will have to establish the ultimate and immediate mental antecedents of the whole series of physical changes which are connected with them, but it will be the task of the physiologist to investigate the ultimate and immediate physical causes of sensation, even though in so doing he must obviously also look at the mental phenomenon. Likewise, with reference to movements that have mental causes, the physiologist must establish within his own field their ultimate and proximate effects." (Heath, 2003)

Heath (2003) reports that not all psychologists define psychology as the "science of the soul" but instead define psychology as "the science of mental phenomena, thereby placing it on the same level as its sister sciences." In the opinion of these same psychologists natural science "is to be defined as the science of physical phenomena, rather than as the science of bodies." (Heath, 2003) Heath (2003) that there is a need to clarify what is means by science of mental and science of physical phenomena and states that the words 'phenomenon' or 'appearance' are many times used "in opposition to 'things which really and truly exist'."

For example it is stated that an experiment was conducted by John Locke which involved him warming one hand and cooling the other hand and then placing his hands at the same time in the same water basin. Locke reports having felt cold in one hand and warmth in the other hand thereby proving "that neither warmth nor cold really existed in the water." (Heath, 2003) Heath (2003) states that it is known that placing pressure on ones' eye can result in "the same visual phenomena as would be caused by rays emanating from a so-called colored object. And with regard to determinations of spatial location, those who take appearances for true reality can easily be convinced of their error in a similar way. From the same distance away, things which are in different locations can appear to be in the same location, and from different distances away, things which are in the same location can appear to be in different locations. A related point is that movement may appear as rest and rest as movement. These facts prove beyond doubt that the objects of sensory experience are deceptive. But even if this could not be established so clearly, we would still have to doubt their veracity because there would be no guarantee for them as long as the assumption that there is a world that exists in reality which causes our sensations and to which their content bears certain analogies, would be sufficient to account for the phenomena." (Heath, 2003)

According to Heath (2003) applying the definition of psychology as the science of mental phenomena so that natural and mental science resemble one another cannot be reasonably justified. Heath (2003) states that the phenomena "revealed by inner perception are also subject to laws. The laws of the coexistence and succession of mental phenomena remain the object of investigation even for those who deny to psychology any knowledge of the soul. And with them comes a vast range of important problems for the psychologist, most of which still await solution." (Heath, 2003)

The work of Wozniak (1996) entitled: "Mind and Body: Rene Descartes to William James" states that the formal beginning of experimental psychology is found in the work of Gustav Thodor Fechner (1801-1887) and that prior to Fechner "there was only psychological physiology and philosophical psychology" as it was Fechner "who performed with scientific rigor those first experiments which laid the foundations for the new psychology and still lie at the basis of its methodology." (Wozniak, 1996)

In Fechner's work entitled "Nanna' and his work entitled "Zend-Avesta (1851) Fechner is stated to have "sketched out a dual-aspect, monistic, pan-psychical mind/body." Fechner is stated to have "likened the universe, which is at one and the same time both active consciousness and inert matter, to a curve that can be regarded from one point of as convex and from another as concave yet still retains its essential integrity. In line with this approach to mind/body, Fechner laid out a future program for psychophysics -- to demonstrate the unity of mind and body empirically by relating increase in bodily energy to corresponding increase in mental intensity." (Wozniak, 1996)

Fechner is reported to have sometime between 1851 and 1860 "worked out the rationale for measuring sensation indirectly in terms of the unit of just noticeable differences between the two sensations" is reported to have developed three basic psychophysical methods:

(1) just noticeable differences;

(2) right and wrong cases; and (3) average error. (Wozniak, 1996)

With these, Fechner carried out the classical experiments on tactual and visual distance, visual brightness, and lifted weights. It was this that comprised the largest part of the first two volumes of the work 'Elemente der Psychophysik'. The aim of Fechner is this work was the establishment of a precise science of the functional relationship between sensation and nerve excitation and out psychophysics. The principle of intensity of a sensation was formulated by Fechner in which the stimulus is logged (S = k log R) "to characterize outer psychophysical relations. In doing so, he believed that he had arrived at a way of demonstrating a fundamental philosophical truth: mind and matter are simply different ways of conceiving of one and the same reality." (Wozniak, 1996) Wozniak reports that the philosophical message contained in 'Elemente' was for the greatest part ignored, however the methodological and empirical contributions of that work by Fechner were not ignored. Fechner's aim as to counter materialist metaphysics however, it is reported that Fechner was "a well-trained, systematic experimentalist and a component mathematician and the impact of his work on scientists such as "Helmholtz, Ernst Mach, a.W. Volkmann, Delboeuf, and others was scientific rather than metaphysical. By combining methodological innovation in measurement with careful experimentation, Fechner moved beyond Herbart to answer Kant's second objection regarding the possibility of scientific psychology. Mental events could, Fechner showed, not only be measured, but measured in terms of their relationship to physical events. In achieving this milestone, Fechner demonstrated the potential for quantitative, experimental exploration of the phenomenology of sensory experience and established psychophysics as one of the core methods of the newly emerging scientific psychology." (Wozniak, 1996)

Wozniak (1996) reports that as Fechner was finishing the 'Elemente' Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920) was beginning his position assisting Helmholtz director of the Physiological Institute. It is reported that during this period "Wundt seems to have availed himself but little of his contact with Helmholtz.

Carrying out much of his experimental work in his own home and on his own time, Wundt began the study of sense perception that led to a series of publications collected, in 1862, as his Beitrage zur Theorie der Sinneswahrnehmung. The Beitrage consisted of six previously published articles on sense perception preceded by a methodological introduction. In these articles, Wundt provided the basics of a psychological theory of the perception of space (including some discussion of the need for unconscious inference, apparently arrived at in independence of Helmholtz), reviewed the history of theories of vision, analyzed the psychological function of sensations arising from visual accommodation and eye movement, presented the results of experiments on binocular contrast effects and stereoscopic fusion, and argued, contra Herbart, that the content of consciousness at a given instant always consists of a single, unconsciously integrated, percept." (Wozniak, 1996)

Wozniak states that while the body of the Beitrage holds importance in explification of the direction that the work of Wundt was taking that this work is Wundt's "introduction on the method, written specifically for the Beitrage, which marked the emergence of Wundt's plan for an experimental psychology. Rejecting a metaphysical foundation for psychology, Wundt argued for the need to transcend the limitations of the direct study of consciousness through the use of genetic, comparative, statistical, historical, and, particularly, experimental methods. -+Only in this way, he suggested, would it be possible to come to a needed understanding of conscious phenomena as "complex products of the unconscious mind" (p. xvi). As the young Wundt was engaged in thinking through the prerequisites of an experimental psychology, Helmholtz, his immediate superior, the Director of his Institute, was in many ways already engaged in carrying out such a program." (Wozniak, 1996)

The work of Hermann Ludwig Ferdinand von Helmhotz (1821-1894) is also reviewed and it is stated that the interest of Helmholtz was in the clarification of the physiological basis of animal heat, a phenomenon that was sometimes used to help justify vitalism. This led in 1847 to a famous paper on the conservation of energy, which in turn brought Helmholtz the offer of a Professorship of Physiology at Konigsberg, where he remained from 1848 to 1855. In 1855, he moved to Bonn and from Bonn, in 1858, to Heidelberg to serve as Director of the Institute of Physiology." (Wozniak, 1996)

Wozniak reports that during the Bonn and Heidelberg period was the time when Helmholz made his "most fundamental contributions to the newly emerging experimental psychology. From 1856 to 1866, the Handbuch der physiologischen Optik appeared in parts that were gathered into a single volume in 1867. In 1863, while the Optik was still appearing, Helmholtz published Die Lehre von den Tonempfindungen. While we will focus on the Optik here, these two works taken together defined the problematic for the experimental psychology of visual and auditory perception for decades to follow." (Wozniak, 1996)

It is reported that Helmholtz in the "Optik' "extended Muller's doctrine of the specific energies of nerves to offer a comprehensive theory of color vision and famous unconscious interference theory of perception. In the theory of color vision, Helmholtz reasoned that just as the differences between sensations of sound and light reflect the specific qualities of auditory and visual nerves, sensations of color may depend on different kinds of nerves within the visual system. Since the laws of color mixture suggest that virtually all hues can be obtained by various combinations of three primary colors, it seemed to Helmholtz that the perceived hue, brightness, and saturation of color must be derived from varying activity in three primary kinds of nerve fibers in the eye." (Wozniak, 1996)

Helmholz's theory of perception began by recognizing that the doctrine of Muller of specific nerve energies implicated the lack of sensations to provide "direct access to objects and events" instead only serving the minds as representations of reality. Thereby perception "requires an active, unconscious, automatic, logical process on the part of the perceiver which utilizes the information provided by sensation to infer the properties of external objects and events. In this regard, Helmholtz anticipated much of later top-down cognitive psychology." (Wozniak, 1996) Another contribution made to physiology by Helmholz was in his estimation of the rate of travel of the nervous impulse which involved stimulation of nerves at varying distance from a muscle and measurement of the time until contraction of the muscle "…and in the process incidentally introduced the technique of reaction-time into physiology." (Wozniak, 1996)

The work of Edward H. Madden (1963) entitled: "The Metaphysics of Self-Consciousness" states that the longest essay of Wright was "The Evolution of Self-Consciousness" appearing in the North American Review of April 1873, which is a monograph that ranges over a "host of intricate philosophical and scientific questions -- sometimes so intricate that John Fiske complained he did not completely understand it after numerous readings." (Madden, 1963) Wright is stated to have written this essay as a response to the urging of Darwin that he "put his analytical powers to work on the problem of determining, in connection with the evolution of language, when a thing can be properly be said to be effected by the will of man." (Madden, 1963)

In addition, the more general problem of Darwin was examined by Wright and specifically that of "bridging the supposed evolutionary gap between animal instinct and human intelligence." (Madden, 1963) the view developed by Wright was that "there is continuity between instinct and intelligence by describing how the latter emerges from such already existing mental powers as memory and attention, powers common in different degrees to man and the lower animals. Intelligence and self-consciousness, however, he insisted, while they are extensions of already existing mental powers, are also discontinuous with them, that is, they exhibit distinctly new characteristics." (Madden, 1963)

Wright's view of self-consciousness is such that directly opposes realism and idealism and it is reported that in modern terms Wrights' views are what would be called "neutral monism." (Madden, 1963) in Wright's monograph on self-consciousness, Wright distinguishes "scientific thinking" or "reflective thinking" from "enthymematic inference. The former which is peculiar to the minds of men and distinguishes them from the minds of other animals, brings particular facts under explicit general principles or major premises. The latter goes from minor premises to conclusions, skipping major premises. In such cases the data of experience, which if consciously formulated would be the major premises, are causally effective in suggesting, more or less clearly, conclusions from minor premises." (Madden, 1963)

It is reported that enthymematic reasonings are exhibited in inference from signs and likelihoods as in prognostications of the weather and in orientations of many animals. In enthymematic inference signs are harbingers of events without recognition of the relation between the sign and the thing signified; in other words, the semantical capacity of the sign is unrecognized. In scientific inference, however, signs themselves are objects of reflective attention, and a sign "is recognized in its general relations to what it signifies, and to what it has signified in the past, and will signify in the future." (Madden, 1963)

According to Madden (1963) both internal imagery and outward perceptions are "operative in signs in inference and the recognition of them is the crucial step in achieving scientific knowledge. Internal images….are representative imaginations that represent all of the particular objects or relations of a kind, like the visual imaginations called up by such general names of objects as 'dog', 'tree', etc. These images are vague and feeble in intensity but effective as signs or directive elements in thought." (Madden, 1963)

Madden states that the image of men "as a sign of mortality leads one from the sign of this man's human nature to the expectation that he will die; but in enthymematic inference the internal image "men," because of its weak nature, falls out of consciousness and the present sign leads on directly to the anticipation of mortality. The internal sign is lost sight of in the onrush of attention to the thing signified. However, with an extension of the range of memory power together with a corresponding increase in the vividness of its impressions (variations useful in other directions and so likely to be secured by natural selection), a person is able to fix attention on both internal and present signs and so become aware not only of the functioning of internal signs as major premises, but of a simultaneous internal and external suggestion of the same thing; for example, the realization that the internal image "men" and the perception of "this man" both signify "mortality." (Madden, 1963)

Wright states in the work entitled: "Philosophical Discussions:" as follows:

...And the contrast of thoughts [memory images] and things [present perceptions], at least in their power of suggesting that of which they may be coincident signs, could, for the first time, be perceptible. This would plant the germ of the distinctively human form of self-consciousness."

Wright also states that this self-consciousness is dependent for its extension "on the use of language "…it must still be largely aided by the voluntary character of outward signs, -- vocal, gestural, and graphic, -- by which all signs are brought under the control of the will....." (Ibid)

Wright is stated to deduce various metaphysical implications from this account of the origin of self-consciousness and one is stated to be "the distinction of subject and object" which is a "classification through observation and analysis and not, therefore, as the metaphysicians believe, an intuitive distinction." (Madden, 1963) Madden (1963) reports that the classification that is applied may be one that is intuitive in an unlearned sense, this meaning is not the meaning applied by the metaphysician. In fact, the doctrine of the metaphysican is that "…the distinction between subject and object is intuitive "implies that the cognition is absolute; independent not only of the individual's experiences, but of all possible previous experience, and has a certainty, reality, and cogency that no amount of experience could give to an empirical classification." (Madden, 1963) the claim made by Wright is that "only lexical or logical statements are necessary or certain and that this necessity stems from their nature as identity statements, or tautologies." (Madden, 1963) in addition Wright concludes that "…phenomena, before being empirically classified into subject and object, do not belong to either the mental or the physical world; they are neutral phenomena. And the categories of subjective and objective, after they arise, are functional, not substantive, distinctions." (Madden, 1963)

Wright is critical of both natural realism and idealism and Madden reports that natural realism "holds that both the subject and object are absolutely, immediately, and equally known through their essential attributes in perception." Wright, however, objects to an unqualified "immediately known." An unattributed phenomenon, he says, if not referred to its cause or classified as sensation or emotion, belongs to neither world exclusively." (Madden, 1963) Madden does although acknowledge that there may be "…no such unattributed phenomena in present experience, he claims that the classification into subject and object is not independent of all experience. It is, in part at least, instinctive and probably naturally selected from our progenitors." (Madden, 1963)

In addition, while it is agreed upon by Wright that in the present experience that both subjective and objective phenomena are "…immediately apprehended, he does not subscribe to the attribution of them to mental and physical substances. He devotes a large portion of the philosophical part of his essay to showing that the concept of substance arises from misleading metaphors in the syntax of language. This analysis is highly interesting and rewards careful study." (Madden, 1963) Wright make the claim that the conscious subject is "…immediately known and its phenomena are known intuitively to belong to it, whereas objects are known only immediately by their effects on us. He thinks that idealism confuses physiological or genetic subjectivity with phenomenal subjectivity." (Madden, 1963) Specifically stated by Wright is the following:

... It [is] evident that perception, and even sensation, are fully determined or realized in the brain only through other parts of the bodily apparatus, and through outward forces and movements like those of pressure and vibration. That the perception, or sensation, is experienced, or is seated, in the brain, was a natural and proper conclusion. That the apparent object of perception is not only distant from what thus appeared to be the seat of the perception, but that a long series of usually unknown, or unnoticed, movements intervenes between it and this apparent seat, -- these facts gave great plausibility to a confused interpretation of the phenomena, namely, that the perception is first realized as a state of the conscious ego, and, afterwards, is referred to the outward world through the associations of general experience, as an effect produced upon us by an otherwise unknown outward cause. On similar grounds a similar misinterpretation was made of the phenomena of volition, namely, that a movement in ourselves, originally and intuitively known to be ours, produces an effect in the outward world at a distance from us, through the intervention of a series of usually unknown (or only indirectly known) agencies. Remote effects of the outer world on us, and our actions in producing remote effects on it, appeared to be the first or intuitive elements in our knowledge of these phenomena, all the rest being derived or inferential. This was to confound the seat of sensation or perception in the brain with its proper subjectivity, or the reference of it to the subject.

The assertation of Wright in the foregoing statement is that historically and experientially "… phenomena were unclassified or unattributed. Consequently, about subjective phenomena he writes, "Instead of being, as the theories of idealism hold, first known as a phenomenon of the subject ego ... its first unattributed condition would be, by our view, one of neutrality between the two worlds." (Madden, 1963)

The notion of James concerning 'pure experience' in the work entitled "Essays in Radical Empiricism" is stated to be similar to the epistemological view of Wright that "phenomena are originally neutral, belonging neither to the mental nor to the physical world. James denies the substantial existence of consciousness and claims that the only "stuff" in the world of which everything else is composed is "pure experience," i.e., experience unclassified into "subjective" or "objective," or phenomena unreferred to thought or things. Unclassified experience becomes subjective or objective by entering into different sets of relations." (Madden, 1963)

Madden reports that James in his work stated as follows:

One's percept of a room, for example, enters into the biography of the perceiver and the history of the house: As a room, the experience has occupied that spot and had that environment for thirty years. As your field of consciousness it may never have existed until now.... In the real world, fire will consume it. In your mind, you can let fire play over it without effect. As an outer object, you must pay so much a month to inhabit it. As an inner content, you may occupy it for any length of time rent-free." (James cited in Madden, 1963)

Madden reports that "subject and object" or "consciousness and content" are not components that can be isolated within the realm of an experience but instead are experiences which are larger in which "pure experience is taken twice over, in two relationships. There is no self-splitting of pure experience into consciousness and what the consciousness is 'of.' Its subjectivity and objectivity are functional attributes solely, realized only [p. 134] when the experience is "taken," i.e., talked-of, twice, considered along with its two differing contexts respectively, by a new retrospective experience, of which that whole past complication now forms the fresh content." (Madden, 1963)

According to Madden (1963) in his views on reasoning, James was influenced by Wright "in certain details though these details were not the ones most serviceable to him in his later philosophical work." (Madden, 1963) the most significant part of the work of James is his interpretation of reasoning which is stated to be teleological and in which he is stated to reflectively illustrate through a "…man's refusing to buy a rug because "it looks as if it will fade." If the man is basing his conclusion on previous experience with rugs that looked similar and had faded, his judgment is purely empirical. But if he extracts from the total rug (S) some element, a certain dye (M), one of whose attributes (P) he knows is chemical instability, then the judgment is reasoned. Success in reasoning depends upon the sagacity with which one analyzes a thing (S) into an essential property (M). James argues, however, that a property of S. is essential" only relative to individual interests and purposes. There are thus many "essential" ways of conceiving a thing, none of which is truer than others but some of which are more serviceable. Reasoning consists in finding that property which, related to another property, leads to the one conclusion that it is the reasoner's temporary interest to attain. And thinking is first and last and always for the sake of doing." (Madden, 1963) the instrumentalists were highly influenced by this characterization of reasoning.

Wright and James did not share those views on reasoning that so greatly influenced the later pragmatism of James and the instrumentalism of Dewey however, their view toward the logic of psychology was one that is described as "new" and "revolutionary" and one that was shared and which rang the "death knell of Wundt's structural psychology soon after it was born." (Madden, 1963) This new perspective resulted in American functionalism such as the works of Dewey and Angel. The origination of the new view expressed by Wright was that of Darwinian principles and specifically it is stated that in the work of Darwin on biology he observed "that there are minute variations in organisms resulting in different reactions, some of which meet the contingencies of the environmental conditions more adequately than others." (Madden, 1963) Darwin also observed a process of natural selection soon directly his research toward the following two areas:

(1) Reactions of the organism and the environs that elicit the reactions; or response; and;

(2) stimulus. (Madden, 1963)

The work of Frank Visser entitled: "Wilber and Metaphysics" states that Ken Wilber wrote in 1973 that "There is no science of the soul without a metaphysical basis to it…" (2003) Wilber is stated to passionately argue in support of a post-metaphysical spirituality from the perennial philosophy…" (Visser, 2003) Wilber is stated to note the work of Trungpa, as an example of a successful modern day critical approach to metaphysical subjects stating:

"For example, we saw that the traditions often conceived the planes of reality as being the terrestrial, the intermediate, the celestial, and the infinite. These were usually believed to be actual territories existing "out there," populated with mythic beings walking around and talking and having experiences on a different type of actual, concrete territory. The Buddhist "six realms of existence," for example, are clearly of this nature. They are said to be actual places inhabited by hungry ghosts, titans, animals, demigods, angels, and so on. Now, when modern Buddhist teachers look at those realms, they almost always interpret them as actually referring to six major psychological states that humans can experience. Trungpa Rinpoche does this, for example, in his many books. He says that the hungry ghost realm actually means states of psychological jealously and envy. The titan realm actually means states of egoic inflation and narcissism. The god realm actually means states of meditative bliss, and so on. Well, that is exactly a switch from metaphysical to critical -- a switch from postulating these realms as separate ontological realities that can be known only by speculation, to seeing these realms as actually being structures of the perceiving subject -- that is, as being psychological states of being that can be directly known and experienced by a shift in consciousness -- and therefore directly investigated by a phenomenological science (or deep science) of shared introspection and confirmed by a reconstructive science of those who have demonstrated competence in those consciousness shifts. Thus, some of the major tenets or ideas of the great wisdom traditions can still be generally valid, but only if they are reconstructed along modern and postmodern lines, just as Trungpa and so many other sophisticated present-day teachers (in Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, etc.) are already doing. My work is simply giving a philosophical foundation and methodology for doing so -- for moving from a metaphysical to a critical, postmetaphysical, and more integral spirituality."

(Visser, 2003)

Wilber is stated to provide emphasis on the epistemological over the ontological in the work 'Integral Psychology' in his statements that:

(1) This avoids the metaphysical speculations that modernity finds so questionable and (2) Talking about "planes" as completely independent ontological realities is extremely problematic."

Wilber is stated to deny passionately that his work is neglectful of the ontological view specifically stating: "This has led some critics to claim that I completely ignore planes of existence, but that is obviously incorrect." (Visser, 2003) Wilbur is stated to use this concept of basic structures for the purpose of covering "…both the levels of selfhood and the levels of reality mentioned in the perennial philosophy." (Visser, 2003)

Visser reports that the emphasis of the psychological over the ontological is a practical one and that the "same points" can be made essentially "using only the levels of consciousness." (Visser, 2003) the example stated is that "one can say: the human mind studies mental objects

- the ontological way of speaking -- or the human mind can study other human minds -- the psychological way of speaking. But ontology only entails the 'reality' of the mental world or plane which is its natural home." (Visser, 2003) Visser relates that Huston Smith in the work 'Forgotten Truth' makes a statement that "the isomorphism of man and the cosmos is basic premise of the traditional outlook:

SPIRIT

INFINITE

SOUL

CELESTIAL

MIND

INTERMEDIATE

BODY

TERRESTRIAL

SELF

REALITY

Source: Visser (2003)

Visser states that the levels of selfhood "correspond closely to the levels of reality. As the body 'inhabits' the terrestrial world, the mind lives in the intermediate world, the soul -- the locus of individuality -- finds its home in the celestial world, and only Spirit -- which is supra-individual -- belongs to the Infinite." (Visser, 2003) C.W. Leadbeater, observed in "The Astral Plane" observed that there are many inhabitants of this realm which include the following:

(1) Human beings while alive (and dreaming),

(2) Deceased human beings,

(3) Non-human beings such as animals and angels,

(4) Artificial "beings" such as thought-forms. (Visser, 2003)

Leadbeater is stated to delegate the spheres of the emotional nature and the astral world. According to Leadbeater, individuals pass through these worlds experiencing much like what is known as Christian Purgatory and Heaven and the human body which is wrapped by an aura and consisting of various subtle bodies forming that which comprises the human. These astral and mental planes are held to surround the Earth's surface. It was held by Wilber that the "low-subtle stage in itself has nothing to do with paranormal powers of perception, although paranormal events 'sometimes increase in frequency at the psychic level, but that is not what defines this level." (Visser, 2003)

Visser states that it is more on point to view this as a line of development that is completely separate as the perception of the psychic is to "not so much an expansion of the self as an extension of the senses. It bears no relevance for transpersonal development as such, for even if one is able to see auras, one can still be the same unbalanced and narcisstic person as before.. Seeing auras is more like having keen eyesight, it bears no relationship to one's psychological maturity. It may be true that these psychic powers -- in their conscious forms -- occur as transmental stages, but structurally they have nothing to do with the transmental, they are fundamentally transphysical. (the fact that they can or cannot occur rules them out as true stages of development, for no stage of development can be skipped)." (Visser, 2003)

The perennial viewpoint of the 'Great Nest of Being' is characterized as reality which is composed of various levels of existence -- levels of being and knowing -- ranging from body to mind to soul to spirit." (Visser, 2003) Visser states that the involution or descending levels of being includes those as follows:

(1) the process of Creation/Emanation which gives rise to the Spheres of Existence;

(2) the descent of Divine Life into these Spheres or Planes (i.e. involution proper);

(3) the individualization of an animal group soul (called "individualization," leading to the formation of the human Ego);

(4) the incarnation of this human Ego into a new physical body;

(5) the influx of spiritual inspiration from the superconscious mind; to which may be added, for completeness' sake;

(6) Regression from the higher to the lower stages of development; and (7) Integration of the lower by the higher stages of development. (Visser, 2003)

The work of James McCosh entitled: "First and Fundamental Truths -- Being a Treatise on Metaphysics" begins by stating that Metaphysics "is the most confused and confusing of all branches of inquiry." (2007) McCosh notes that Aristotle remarked that Metaphysics "while the first of the sciences in the order of things, will be the last to be constructed." (2007) This is stated to be due to the fact that "these principles at the basis of all the higher operations of the mind are so mixed up with them it is difficult to separate them and make them stand out distinctly to the view." (McCosh, 2007) the laws of reasoning and of discursive thought have been known "since the days of Aristotle" according to McCosh and additionally McCosh notes that Butler and Kant have shed a great deal of light on man's nature and its moral powers. Additionally, there have been critical discovers made "as to sense-perception by physical and physiological research." (McCosh, 2007)